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I. INTRODUCTION
The foregoing title may be something of a misnomer. In fact, there
has been far too little public discussion in the United States about
the pros and cons of a North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). Even though Congress must approve such an agreement
before it can be implemented, the debate accompanying Congressional
consideration of NAFTA will be seriously truncated if the agreement
continues on the legislative "fast track" where it is presently trav-
eling.' Further, the negotiations themselves, which are in process at
this writing (early summer 1992), are being conducted behind closed
doors with little public input beyond a select circle.2
For its aspirational value, however, the title remains. Whether or
not the questions raised by the proposed NAFTA have yet been
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adequately aired, they deserve widespread and vigorous debate. North
American economic integration (already well-underway, but likely to
leap ahead even faster under a free trade agreement) will have pro-
found effects on citizens of the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, effects
whose burdens are likely to fall the heaviest on poor and working
people in all three countries. Economic integration is not a natural
phenomenon like the coming of an ice age, but a matter of human
policy and human decision in which governments are deeply impli-
cated. It should therefore be undertaken in a thoroughly democratic
way, with full public disclosure and dialogue.
The statements, polemics, arguments and statistics that appear
below represent a kind of documentary snapshot of the beginnings
of the public debate on NAFTA and on the future of continental
economic integration. The testimony is taken from a series of hearings
conducted in late August and early September of 1991 by the inter-
agency Trade Staff Policy Committee, based at the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative.
The hearings themselves did not constitute a debate of the kind I
believe the nation needs, because they lacked any link to real authority.
Congress has required that public hearings be held in conjunction
with a decision to enter a new trade agreement,' and the hearings in
this case were duly held. But there were no assured lines of com-
munication between those who came to testify and the official decision
makers on U.S. negotiating strategies for NAFTA or those in a
position to define acceptable outcomes of the NAFTA negotiations.
The hearings were publicized in ways not well calculated to encourage
participation by grass-roots or rank-and-file groups .4
3 Congress has called for the International Trade Commission (ITC) to advise
the President about the probable economic effects of certain changes in trade policy,
and has outlined a procedure whereby the President or the U.S. Trade Representative
may request investigations or reports from the ITC to aid in determining whether
the country should enter certain trade agreements. It also provides that the Com-
mission "shall ... hold public hearings" in preparing its advice. Trade Act of 1-974,
ch. 12, 19 U.S.C. § 2151 (1992).
4 The hearings were announced at 56 Fed. Reg. 136, 32454 (1991) on July 16,
1991. Those wishing to testify were required to provide notice of their intention to
appear and were told to submit twenty copies of a written brief to the Trade Staff
Policy Committee by noon on August 12. Witnesses were told to restrict their
remarks to ten minutes each. Hearings were conducted during working hours on
weekdays. Citizen groups complained that the methods chosen to publicize and
conduct these hearings would make it difficult for many concerned people to testify.
See, e.g., Access to Free Trade Hearings Is Limited, L.A. Coalition Official Says,
8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1198 (Aug. 14, 1991).
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Those who were able to attend and offer testimony found them-
selves addressing ad hoc panels made up primarily of non-decision-
making representatives from various agencies assembled for each city
by the Trade Staff Policy Committee, with no particular assurance
that each representative was knowledgeable about or had authority
in the relevant areas of concern.' The witnesses' various suggestions
were made and noted, and the Chair of the proceedings reiterated
to all in attendance that the Administration was eager to receive their
comments and that their concerns would be passed on to the relevant
parties. 6 But nowhere was there any even semi-formal mechanism for
continued accountability or monitoring of the negotiating process. 7
1 Members of the various panels included representatives from the Agriculture,
Commerce, Energy, Labor, State, and Treasury Departments, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the International Trade Commission, and the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative. See transcripts of hearings, infra part IV (excerpts on file
with author) (complete transcripts available for inspection at Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.).
6 See generally, NAFTA, 1991: Public Hearings Before Trade Policy Staff Com-
mittee in San Diego, California, August 21, 1991, infra part IV (opening statement
of Committee Chairman David Weiss).
The public has remained largely in the dark about the content and strategy of
the agreement until quite recently, but some developments are known. A number
of working groups have formed and are at work on specific issues, and various
groupings have been convened at different points to assess progress and resolve
emerging problems identified by the negotiators. "Ministerial meetings," attended
by the top trade minister for each of the three countries, were held in Toronto in
June, 1991, in Seattle in August, 1991, in Zacatecas in October, 1991, in Chantilly,
Virginia, in March, 1992, and in Montreal in April, 1992.
Lower- and mid-level meetings of trade negotiators and working groups have been
numerous. At present a bracketed text is said to exist (that is, a text in which
contested matters are "bracketed" for further discussion) although none of the
governments has been willing to release that text or discuss much in the way of
specifics. However, a leaked version (or alleged version) of the draft has been
circulating since March. Citizen groups in all three countries have protested the
closed-door policy. Negotiators have defended it as necessary for a successful out-
come.
For diverse reports on these developments, see, e.g., Citizen Groups Score Leaked
NAFTA Draft; USTR Declines to Verify Its Accuracy, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
516 (Mar. 25, 1992); Hills Says Bracketed Text Will Be Ready by End of January,
9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 188 (Jan. 29, 1992); NAFTA Pact Can Be Reached by
November, but Passage Is Up to Congress, Hills Says, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
666 (Apr. 15, 1992); Richardson Predicts NAFTA Draft Text Will Be Ready by
Late February or Early March, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 242 (Feb. 5, 1992); Trade
Ministers to Hold NAFTA Talks in Montreal April 6-8, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
591 (Apr. 1, 1992); Trade Negotiators Report Progress on NAFTA Agreement, 8
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1236 (Aug. 21, 1991); U.S.-Mexican Officials Disagree Over
NAFTA Talks Progress in Agriculture, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 401 (Mar. 4, 1992);
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For some of us present, it seemed at times that questions, challenges,
protests and compliments alike were dropping quietly into a kind of
bland and impervious hole.'
Nevertheless, an interesting assortment of individuals and organi-
zational representatives did get themselves to the hearings, plant
themselves before microphones, and voice their concerns. Trade
unionists, environmentalists, manufacturers, retailers, traders, farm-
ers, religious leaders, college professors, consumers and more, arrayed
themselves before panels convened in San Diego, Houston, Atlanta,
Washington D.C., Cleveland, and Boston.9
Nancy Dunne, Pact Opponents Claim 'Secret' Negotiations, FIN. TIM[s, Feb. 5,
1992, at 5; Drew Fagen, NAFTA Called Threat to Environmental Rules, TORONTO
GLOBE & MAIL REP. ON Bus., Apr. 8, 1992, at B2; Clyde H. Farnsworth, Progress
Reported in Talks on North American Trade, at B2 N.Y. TIMEs, April 9, 1992, at
D2; Firms' Moves to Mexico Decried, KANsAs CITY STAR, Aug. 26, 1991, at BI;
Groups Band Together to Fight North American Trade Proposal, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 5, 1991, at Al; Elizabeth Lesly, Fear of Jobs Lost to Foreign
Lands Spurs Protest on Free-trade Pact, WASH. TIDEs, Apr. 7, 1992, at C3; John
Maggs, Trade Ministers to Meet on N. America Trade Area Pact, 391 J. OF COMM.,
Jan. 27, 1992 at 3A; Mexico's Trade Chief Slams Pact Critics, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 19, 1991, at A2; Pact Likely to Cost More Jobs: But 3-Way
Trade Deal a Must, Study Says, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 7, 1992, at 81; Peter Truell,
U.S., Canada and Mexico to Negotiate a North American Free-Trade Pact, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 6, 1991, at A14; Too High a Price for Free Trade: Citizens' Analysis
of the February 21 Draft of the North American Free Trade Agreement (a joint
review of the draft by Sierra Club, Nat'l Fain. Farm Coalition, Inst. for Agric. &
Trade Pol'y, Dev. Group for Alternative Policies, Econ. Pol'y Inst.) (Apr. 7, 1992)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
8 As the "us" indicates, and as will become evident from the testimony reprinted
below, I was a witness at one of these hearings, the one held in Atlanta, Georgia,
August 27, 1991. I had accompanied a delegation of women workers from East
Tennessee to the Reynosa/Matamoros area of northern Mexico in July of that year.
For one informal window onto this trip, see Fran Ansley, U.S.-Mexico Free Trade
from Below: A Postcard from the Border, 1 TAx J. WOMEN & LAW 193 (1992).
(Parts of our trip were also filmed and later included in part three of a four part
Public Broadcasting System series entitled Made in America? The series aired over
two nights, May 26 and 27, 1992.) We visited with women workers from Mexico
employed by U.S.-owned "maquiladora" factories along the U.S.-Mexico border,
toured neighborhoods where maquiladora workers live, and visited a maquiladora
factory while we were there. (For a discussion of the maquiladora program, see
infra text beginning at note 30.) Several other members of our delegation offered
testimony at the Atlanta hearings as well. See infra part IV.
9 It should be noted that some people voiced their concerns from outside the
hearings as well. See Patrick McDonnell, Environmental Fears Voiced on Free Trade
Plan, L.A. TIms, Sept. 24, 1991, at BI; David Ivanovich, Hearings Air Free Trade
Debate: Pact Draws Praise Inside, Scorn Outside, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 27, 1991,
at IC; Michael Davis, Hearing Pulls Friends, Foes of Trade Pact, Hous. PosT, Aug.
27, 1991, at Cl.
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Unlike Congressional committee hearings, however, which are usu-
ally printed and disseminated to the public, these proceedings were
not slated for publication. Their appearance in this journal therefore
makes available to the public a range of voices that might not
otherwise be widely heard. These transcripts are intended to serve
both as a stimulant and contribution to a larger debate that will
hopefully be forthcoming about this important policy matter.'0
In this introduction I will offer a brief sketch of the background
out of which proposals for a North American Free Trade Agreement
arose, and will highlight some of the major themes and arguments
that have begun to emerge as negotiations have proceeded." As will
become clear from the testimony you are about to read, opinions
are deeply divided on the NAFTA. Readers deserve to be told at
once that my own view thus far is highly critical of the kind of trade
agreement presently advocated by the Bush Administration, and I
expect to be putting forward that view in various contexts in the
future. For now, however, after a brief introduction, my primary
purpose is to let the witnesses that follow speak for themselves.
II. BACKGROUND OF NAFTA
Economic integration on the North American continent is a dynamic
that is already well underway. It will undoubtedly continue, with or
without a formal free trade agreement. Commerce and interaction
of various kinds between the United States and Mexico are clearly
10 I do not wish to suggest by my comment that the editors of this journal
necessarily share my particular analysis in this matter. For that I bear sole respon-
sibility, of course. I do believe the editors and I are in agreement that a thorough
and informed public debate of the issues involved in NAFTA would be a good thing
and are united in the hope that airing the contending views that follow may play
some small role in helping to foster such a debate.
1I must be quick to disclaim any special background in trade law or in inter-
national economics. A concern for issues of international trade is a relatively new
one for me. I nevertheless intend to venture forth (though I hope with appropriate
humility) precisely because I believe that academics like myself, who want their
research and service agendas to focus on the welfare of poor and working people,
have no choice. As never before, the fate of such people in the U.S. is intimately
tied to matters of international policy and to the fate of poor and working people
in other countries. Besides, I think in many instances we will not come to the field
empty-handed: the insight and knowledge such "domestic" academics have about
the concerns and experiences of those at the bottom in our country are badly needed
in the debate over international policy.
1992]
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suggested by the two countries' 2000-mile interface at the border,
and this interchange has long been a significant economic factor for
both nations. There has been a dramatic upswing in cross-border
trade and investment in recent years; however, this upswing has gained
momentum from a number of different sources.
A. Mexico
From 1930 to 1976 Mexico underwent a period of development
and industrialization that earned it a reputation as one of Latin
America's development "success" stories.'3 Compared to other coun-
tries in the region, Mexico boasted a burgeoning middle class and a
diversified industrial base. Consumer demand was relatively high and
supported a range of domestic economic activity. Mexico's devel-
opment policies during this time were not static, but in large measure
were dominated by a relatively nationalistic "import substitution"
strategy.' 4 Mexican laws restricted certain economic activities to the
12 Of course, one should note that "the border" is hardly a fixed entity. It is a
creature of history and has been the subject of political, cultural and military contest.
Much of today's South Texas, for instance, was part of Mexico until the 1840's,
when half of the territory of Mexico was lost to the United States. At one time the
border was set at the Nueces River. After the Mexican-American War, it was moved
south to the Rio Grande, as formally recognized in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
See 24 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Mexico, at 43 (1985).
11 A report prepared by the U.S. International Trade Commission refers to
Mexico's "impressive growth-among the highest in the developing world-in the
three decades following World War II." Review of Trade and Investment Liber-
alization Measures by Mexico and Prospects for Future United States-Mexican Re-
lations: Phase I Recent Trade and Investment Reforms Undertaken by Mexico and
Implications for the United States, U.S. INT'L TADE COMM'N PUB. 2275, Inv. No.
332-282, at 1-2 (April 1990) (hereinafter Liberalization Measures).
14 Import substitution strategies aim to make geo-economically "peripheral" coun-
tries more independent by developing their capacity to produce a full range of goods
and machinery, thereby enabling them to substitute domestically produced goods
for those previously imported from "core" nations. (Such strategies have been based
in part upon the judgment that primary goods, the traditional exports of developing
countries, would decline in significance over time, and reliance on them as motors
of growth would therefore leave such countries still vulnerable to and dependent on
powerful core nations.) See Id. at 1-1.
Present U.S. trade policy, as reflected in the positions advanced by U.S. repre-
sentatives in GATT, the Enterprise for the Americas program, and NAFTA itself,
is adamantly opposed to import-substitution strategies, advocating instead a free-
trade regime based on what is seen as the competitive advantage of each state. In
the case of third world countries, such a regime usually calls for "export-led in-
dustrialization," with cheap labor providing the key ingredient that enables man-
ufacturing for export to core countries. Places like Taiwan, Singapore and South
Korea are often cited as examples of economies that have used export-led strategies
[Vol. 22:329
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Mexican government and/or Mexican nationals, limited direct foreign
investment," and provided for strong, even dominant, government
participation in some areas of economic activity (e.g., banking and
petroleum). Mexican laws also imposed tariffs, quotas, and licensing
requirements on imports.' 6 Meanwhile, the democracy that was os-
tensibly part of the heritage of the Mexican Revolution was drained
of vitality under sixty years of dominance by the Institutional Rev-
olutionary Party (PRI).17
with dramatic success.
Both approaches-import-substitution and export-led industrialization-have tended
to stress industrialization as the centerpiece of development strategies. It may be
that in this sense they are both distinguishable from models put forth by other
recent commentators, based mainly in the world's South, who have stressed the
primacy of "people-centered development," and have called for growth strategies
that are fundamentally oriented toward improving the lives of the poor. For several
views on possible advantages and disadvantages of different development strategies,
see, THE SOUTH Co~mssiON, THE CHALLENGE TO THE SOUTH: THE REPORT OF THE
SOUTH COMMISSION (1990); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR STANDARDS AND DEVEL-
OPMENT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, (Stephen Herzenberg and Jorge Perez-Lopez, eds.,
1990); GrrA SEN & CAREN GROWN, DEVELOPMENT, CRISES, AND ALTERNATIVE VISIONS:
THIRD WORLD WOMEN'S PERSPECTIVES (1987); W.W. Rostow, The Take-Off into
Self-Sustained Growth, 66 EcON. J. 25 (1956).
11 For a helpful look at the history of Mexican nationalism and its expression in
the Mexican Constitution and statutory law, see Jesus Silva & Richard Dunn, A
Free Trade Agreement between the U.S. and Mexico: The Right Choice?, 27 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 937, 943-53 (1990). Despite the nationalism and the restrictions on
foreign participation in the economy, it is not the case that Mexico was barricaded
from the rest of the world in general, or from multinationals in particular. Although
there is a strong contrast between past policies and Mexico's present stance on trade
and foreign investment, even during earlier periods transnational corporations were
solidly involved in Mexico. Their involvement was the target of significant attention
by some Mexican critics unhappy with the extent of U.S. corporate penetration of
the political economy. See David Barkin, About Face, 24 N. Am. CONG. ON LATIN
AM. REP. ON THE AMERICAS, May 1991, at 30, 31 (1991).
16 For highlights of Mexico's earlier policy and a sampling of different viewpoints
on Mexico's changing legal and economic approach to development, see MExiCO:
A COUNTRY GUIDE, (Tom Barry, ed., 1992) (available from the Inter-Hemispheric
Education Resource Center, Albuquerque, N.M.); Nancy Bader, Mexican Sun Rises
on Brighter Economic 'Mafiana': Administration Smooths the Way for Foreign
Investment, PLANT SITEs & PARKS, Nov/Dec. 1990, at 58; Barkin, supra note 15,
at 30; Dionisio Kaye, Mexico: Liberalizing Foreign Investment, 4 TEMPLE INT'L &
Comp. L.J. 79 (1990); Rudy Sandoval, Mexico's Path Towards the Free Trade
Agreement with the U.S., 23 U. MIAMa INTER-AMER. L. REv. 133 (1991); Gregory
Shaffer, An Alternative to Unilateral Immigration Controls: Toward a Coordinated
U.S.-Mexico Binational Approach, 41 STAN. L. REv. 187 (1988).
'7 Reports of human rights and labor rights abuses have continued. In fact, some
have said that the recent changes in Mexico, to be described in the text below,
constitute a kind of perestroika (or "Salinastroika") without glasnost. 22 FREEDOM
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In the early 1980's the Mexican economy suffered a series of
dramatic negative shocks.'" World oil prices plunged while fiscal
policies in lender nations caused interest rates on Mexico's sizable
debt (incurred during the 1970's heyday of petrodollars and easy
global credit) to skyrocket. 9 Meanwhile, a world recession reduced
demand for Mexican exports, and a major earthquake hit Mexico
City in 1985. The combined effect of these and other developments
on ordinary Mexican citizens was devastating. One observer notes
that since 1976 real minimum wages have fallen by approximately
sixty percent; 20 another reports that "the purchasing power of the
Mexican minimum wage fell by twenty-five percent in 1983, eight
percent in 1984, and eleven percent in 1986. '21
REv., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 20. See, e.g., Douglas Payne, Mexico: Election Engineering,
22 FREEDOM REv., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 20; 137 CONG. REc. H6261 (1991) (remarks
of Rep. Pease); Edward Cody, Mexican Government Accused of Bugging Opposition
Meeting, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1992, at A12. Compare Holly Burkhalter, America's
Watch, Human Rights in Mexico, Testimony Before the Foreign Affairs Subcom-
mittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs and Human Rights and Interational Organ-
izations (Oct. 16, 1991) with, M. Delal Baer, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Testimony Before the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
Affairs and Human Rights and Interational Organizations (Oct. 16, 1991) (transcripts
on file with author).
"1 Like any periodization, this one has problems. Mexico's difficulties did not
begin in the 1980's. Their roots also are highly contestable, and cannot be found
entirely in "external" shocks. Compare, e.g., M. Delal Baer, North American Free
Trade, 70 FOREIGN AF., Fall 1991, at 132 ("Mexico's economy malfunctioned in
the 1980s under the strain of its 60-year history of statism, economic nationalism
and single-party rule.") with Barkin, supra note 15, at 31, 33 ("In fact, the crisis
is the product of more than 35 years of successful capitalist development . . .The
accelerated development of the Mexican economy set the stage for a new and more
terrible social polarization of the country, the loss of food self-sufficiency, and
ecological crisis.") and Jesus Silva & Richard Dunn, A Free Trade Agreement between
the U.S. and Mexico: The Right Choice?, 27 SAN Dm oo L. REv. 937, 943 (1990)
("Mexico's economic crisis of 1982 ... was generated mainly by the fall of oil
prices.") See also, DAvID BARKsN, DISTORTED DEVELOPMENT: MEXICO IN THE WORLD
ECONOMY (1990).
"1 When oil prices rose in 1973-74 and 1979-80, some nations experienced large
trade surpluses and were hungry for places to invest. Substantial deposits were made
in banks both in Europe and America. The banks in turn aggressively sought
borrowers. Countries like Mexico, with a good history of growth and relatively
stable governments, were showered with credit. When oil prices dropped, expected
revenues shrunk, and the country was caught in a fierce squeeze. See Barkin, supra
note 15, at 34; Liberalization Measures, supra note 13, at 1-2; see also Richard
Rothstein, Forgive Us Our Debtors: Mexico's Debt to U.S. Banks Cripples Its
Economy-and Ours, L.A. WEEKLY, Dec. 27, 1991-Jan. 2, 1992.
2D See Barkin, supra note 15, at 35.
21 Gregory Shaffer, An Alternative to Unilateral Immigration Controls: Toward
a Coordinated U.S.-Mexico Binational Approach, 41 STAN. L. REv. 187, 191 (1988).
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Responses to the crisis by the Mexican government reveal competing
impulses. In 1982, President Jose L6pez Portillo, for instance, na-
tionalized the banks, a move that foreign investors recall with distinct
unease. 22 A different course soon emerged, however. First under the
leadership of President Miguel de la Madrid and now under Harvard-
educated President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the government has
undertaken a massive restructuring of the national economy.
One part of the new orientation has been a greatly altered trade
regime. In 1985 President de la Madrid announced that Mexico would
apply for accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT),23 a process that required the country to dismantle many
elements of what had been a much more protectionist trading posture.
Commitments included tariff reductions, the gradual elimination of
import permit requirements, simplification of licensing procedures,
and the like. 24 Following Mexico's accession to the GATT in 1986,
trade liberalization between the U.S. and Mexico continued apace. 25
In addition to trade liberalization, the executive branch in Mexico
has also promoted a rapid restructuring of the country's domestic
economy. A series of regulations greatly liberalizing the rules for
22 See Baer, supra note 18 at 132.
23 GATT, a sort of entity/process hybrid devoted to the promotion and ration-
alization of international trade, was begun in the aftermath of World War II, and
now has over one hundred member states. It provides a mechanism aimed at increasing
free trade among member nations and throughout the world. A state applying for
accession to GATT must work out a detailed plan of satisfactory compliance with
various facets of the GATT rule structure. For general background information on
GATT, see TREATIES AND ALLIANCES OF THE WORLD 72 (Nicholas J. Rengger ed.,
5th. ed. 1990); JOHN JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969); FRED
L. BLOCK, THE ORGINS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DISORDER (1977). For recent
popular theorizing on trade policy and its relationship to economic development
strategies, see MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990);
ROBERT REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21sT CENTURY
CAPITALISM (1991).
2, See Liberalization Measures, supra note 13, at 2-1.
21 In 1987 the United States and Mexico agreed to a "Framework of Principles
and Procedures for Consultation Regarding Trade and Investment Relations" (Frame-
work Understanding), which set up a method for consultation and dispute resolution
on bilateral trade issues. A series of meetings have been held under the 1987
Framework Understanding. In 1989 Presidents Bush and Salinas agreed to the
"Understanding Between the Government of the United Mexican States and the
Government of the United States of America Regarding Trade and Investment
Facilitation Talks" (TIFTs), which looked beyond consultation and dispute resolution
toward actual negotiations for expanded trade and investment. Other agreements
followed, involving specific sectors of the economy and moves toward coordination
of standards. Id. at 2-3 to 2-8.
1992]
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
direct foreign investment have been promulgated by the executive
branch.26 A number of "pacts" involving business, labor, government
and others have implemented wage and price freezes, severe cuts in
social spending, and a tightening of credit. 27 A "Deregulation Pro-
gram" enacted by presidential decree in 1989 gave freer rein to
enterprises across a broad spectrum from banking and insurance to
trucking, oil, and commodities. 28 And "disincorporation," Mexico's
version of privatization, has resulted in a massive selling-off of gov-
ernment holdings in all kinds of industries and services, including
airlines, the telecommunications system, agricultural fertilizers and
steel, although observers differ in their assessments of these changes
and their impact on the Mexican people and economy. 29
For a celebratory and fairly detailed description of one set of these changes,
instituted in 1989, see Dionisio Kaye, Mexico: Liberalizing Foreign Investment, 4
TEMPLE INT'L & Comip. L.J. 79 (1990). See also Jorge Camil, Mexico's 1989 Foreign
Investment Regulations: The Cornerstone of a New Economic Model, 12 Hous. J.
INT'L LAW 1 (1989). The legal status of these regulations is arguably shaky, since
they appear to contravene the very statute on foreign investment that they purport
to interpret. The practical likelihood of a successful legal challenge, however, appears
slim, given the tremendous momentum of economic liberalization in Mexico today.
See Michael Barr et al., Labor and Environmental Rights in the Proposed Mexico-
United States Free Trade Agreement, 14 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 (1991). At any rate,
the queasiness of some foreign investors about the stability of such executive changes
is one of the sources of support for NAFTA in the international investing community.
See Baer, supra note 18 at, 132.
,7 See Liberalization Measures, supra note 13, at 1-3.
28 See id. at 3-1 to 3-7.
29 Id. at 3-7 to 3-13. Readers familiar with events elsewhere in the third world
will recognize the picture that emerges from the foregoing paragraph as a familiar
one. Through structural adjustment loans administered by the World Bank and
similar programs run by the International Monetary Fund, and with excruciating
leverage provided by the debt crisis, a long list of countries in. the South have
undertaken similar programs. See Private Sector Growth Now the 'First Premise',
I WORLD BANK WATCH, Apr. 15, 1991, at 4; Clive Crook, Sisters in the Wood,
THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1991, at 9 (U.K. Edition); Steven Mufson, Shock Therapy
for Sick Economies, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1992, at HI; Frances Williams, Adjusting
an Undeserved Reputation, FIN. TIMES, June 22, 1992, at 17; Walden Bello, Global
Economic Counterrevolution, CHRISTIANITY & CRISIS, Feb. 17, 1992, at 36; Agents
of Inequality: The IMF, the World Bank, and the Global Economy, DOLLARS &
SENSE, Nov. 1991, at 13 (interview with MIT economics professor Lance Taylor);
Alberto Gonzales Santos, Beyond Baker and Brady: Deeper Debt Reduction for
Latin American Sovereign Debtors, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 66 (1991); Richard Rothstein,
The Human Cost of Misguided Policy: IMF Conditions Have Hurt Third World,
U.S. Workers as Well, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1978, § II, p. 7. Compare Liberalization
Measures, supra note 13, at 1-1 ("cautiously optimistic") with Martin Feldstein and
Kathleen Feldstein, Mexico's Maestro, WORLD MONITOR, July 1992, at 43 ("Mexican
miracle") and Barkin, supra note 15, at 30 ("greater insecurity and poverty"). See
also remarks of Cuaut6moc Crdenas reprinted in pt. V, text accompanying note
64, infra.
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B. Maquiladoras
All these developments had an impact on U.S. investment in Mex-
ico, of course. One program in particular, the "maquiladora, ' '30 or
Border Industrialization Program, began to boom. Since it is the
subject of some commentary in the testimony that appears below, a
few words of explanation are probably in order here. Through a
series of dovetailed arrangements in each country, the maquiladora
program, initiated in 1965, 31 allows U.S. companies to import par-
tially-made goods into Mexico from the United States duty-free, finish
(or partially finish) them in Mexico with Mexican labor, and then
re-export them for finishing and sale in the U.S. market, paying
duties at re-entry only on the value added to the product during its
stay in Mexico. (Labor is in most cases the main value added and
is measured by the Mexican wage.) 2 In the beginning, the maquiladora
program was limited to facilities that operated within a certain distance
from the border, yet maquiladoras have with few exceptions been
exempted from Mexican ownership requirements that limited foreign
ownership of other firms. 33
30 "Maquila" is a Spanish word referring to the amount of corn held back by
a miller in return for grinding a farmer's corn. "Maquila" and "maquiladora" now
refer interchangeably to operations in Mexico that perform processing or secondary
assembly functions on goods brought in from another country and destined for re-
export. John E. Tarbox, Note, An Investors' Introduction to Mexico's Maquiladora
Program, 22 TEx. INT'L L.J. 109 (1986).
31 In that year, the United States had just terminated its earlier "bracero" program,
under which thousands of Mexican agricultural workers had found employment as
migrants for U.S. growers. With the ending of the program, Mexico was fearful of
massive unemployment among returning farmworkers, and the maquiladora program
was seen as a partial solution to this dislocation at the border. Gonzalo Gomez-
Mout, Mexico's Maquiladoras Outpace Oil and Tourism, FRONTIER Bus., Special
Year-End Report, 1986, at A-4.
32 Mexico is not the only country that has such an arrangement with the United
States. The U.S./Guatemala Labor Education Project reports that there are 300
maquila factories employing 60,000 workers in Guatemala, for instance. One com-
pany, Phillips Van Heusen, has become the target of a national campaign aimed at
pressuring it to recognize the union that is currently trying to organize at its facilities
in Guatemala City despite the long history of severe labor repression in that country.
See Phillips- Van Heusen Campaign: A Struggle for Justice and Basic Rights in the
Global Economy, (U.S./Guat. Lab. Ed. Proj., ACTWU-Chicago Joint Board, Chi-
cago, Dec. 1991); Phillips- Van Heusen Campaign Update #2, (U.S./Guat. Lab. Ed.
Proj., ACTWU-Chicago Joint Board, Chicago, March, 1992), both on file with
author.
11 See generally Tarbox, supra note 30, at 113-114; Al Watkins, Comment, The
Texas-Mexico Twin Plants System: Industry and Item 807,00 of the United States
Tariff Schedules, 16 TEx. TECH L. REv. 963 (1985); GARY HUFBAUER & JEFFREY
SCHOTT, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 91-93 (1992).
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These and other substantive and procedural restrictions and red
tape were progressively lessened over the years.34 When Mexican wages
took a nose dive in the eighties, at the same time that U.S. industries
were feeling heightened pressure from international competition, the
lure of massive savings in labor costs35 attracted an explosion of
maquiladora investments. 36 Border towns have found themselves in-
14 See, Tarbox, supra note 30, -at 114.
" Of course, decisions to redeploy capital are complex ones with multiple-deter-
minants. Nevertheless, the wage differential appears to be a highly significant factor.
As the managing partner of the Tijuana office of Baker MacKenzie, a lawyer active
in the maquiladora industry, put it:
By far the most profitable and alluring aspect of the maquiladora program
is the access to inexpensive Mexican labor. Labor rates in Mexico have
shown a consistent decline in dollar value compared to U.S. and foreign
markets. An American manufacturer may expect to pay, for example, less
than (U.S.) $1 per hour for maquiladora workers, including benefits ....
Gonzalo Gomez-Mont, Mexico's Maquiladoras Outpace Oil and Tourism, FRONTIER
Bus., Special Year-End Report, 1986, at A-4.
On a similar note, Amerimax Partners L.P. recently announced the formation
of the Amerimax Maquiladora Fund, explaining to prospective investors:
The Fund will seek to acquire companies where labor is a significant
component of company's cost of goods sold. It is anticipated that within
six to eighteen months after a company has been acquired by the Fund,
the designated portion of the company's manufacturing operations will be
relocated to Mexico to take advantage of reduced labor costs. We estimate
that manufacturing companies that experience fully loaded, gross labor costs
in the $U.S.7-$U.S.10 per hour range in the U.S. may be able to utilize
labor in a Mexico maquiladora at fully loaded, gross labor cost of $U.S. 1.15-
$U.S.1.50 per hour. Though each situation may vary, it is estimated that
this could translate into annual savings of $U.S.10,000-$U.S.17,000 per
employee involved in the relocated manufacturing process.
Amerimax Partners, L.P., Announcement (brochure for prospective investors, on
file with author).
36 Today precise figures on the number of factories and the number of employees
involved in the maquiladora industry are hard to obtain, given the extremely dynamic
nature of the industry. Whatever the exact statistics, the growth rate has been
phenomenal. One recent article reports 1700 factories and 400,000 employees in the
maquiladora sector at the border. Texas Governor's Environmental Advisor Calls
Border Plan "Disappointing, " 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 401 (Mar. 4, 1992). The
Institute for International Economics reports that 1,924 maquiladora plants employed
472,000 workers in 1990. Hufbauer & Schott, supra note 33, at 92.
It should also probably be noted that U.S. companies are not the only participants
in the Mexican maquiladora industry. For instance, in Tijuana, a Pacific Rim city,
Japanese investment has also been a presence. Compare William Branigin, The
Assembly Lines South of the Border: 'Maquiladoras' Thrive on Cheap Labor, WASH.
PosT, July 31, 1990, at CI ("of the five largest maquiladoras in Tijuana, three are
Japanese") with Stephen Baker & Karen Lowry Miller, Why Japan Inc. Is Steering
Clear of Mexico, Bus. WK., Dec. 2, 1991, at 50. See also, Anne Middleton, Locals
Hope for Investment Wave from Hong Kong, SAN DiEGo Bus. J., March 19, 1990,
at 1. Nevertheless, U.S. companies predominate in the maquiladoras, for obvious
reasons.
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undated with job seekers (and their families) from the interior and
are confronted with massive residential and industrial waste problems
that have far outpaced the ability of the local infrastructure to handle
them. Some of these problems, of course, spill over onto the U.S.
side of the border as well.37
The explosion has had a particular impact on women, in part
because women are always strongly affected as front-line care givers
in situations of social chaos and deprivation, and more particularly
because maquiladora employers have hired an overwhelmingly young
and female workforce. This gender pattern is observable in many of
the production-for-export facilities springing up in other third world
countries as well. 38
Disagreements over the maquiladora program have run deep. 39 Some
observers from both sides of the border see the program as a great
boon to Mexico and the United States alike, helping U.S. companies
to compete in the global marketplace, providing jobs for Mexican
workers, and providing a foundation for Mexico to overcome its
present crisis and move on to positive economic development.4 Others
say the program is a direct threat to the jobs, wage scales and living
standards of U.S. workers; while it does promote growth in Mexico,
the growth is exploitative of Mexican workers and does more to
distort and weaken the Mexican economy than to build a foundation
for equitable and sustainable development. 4' Many of the debates
37 See generally Sonia Nazario, Boom and Despair: Mexican Border Towns Are
a Magnet for Foreign Factories, Workers and Abysmal Living Conditions, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 22, 1989, at R26.
31 See WOMEN WORKERS AND GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING, (Kathryn Ward ed., 1990);
RACHEL KAMEL, THE GLOBAL FACTORY (1990); MARLA PATRICIA FERNANDEZ-KELLY,
FOR WE ARE SOLD, I AND MY PEOPLE: WOMEN AND INDUSTRY IN MEXICO'S FRONTIER
47 (1983).
39 For an outsider sociologist's description of the ways critics and proponents of
the maquiladoras organized and lobbied for their views, see Leslie Sklar, Trans-
nationals Across the Border: Mobilizing U.S. Support for the Mexican Maquila
Industry 24 J. AM. STUD. 167 (1990).
'0 For remarks representative of this view, see Alexander Good, Director General
for the U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service of the Department of Commerce,
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the House Com-
mittee on Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs (Nov. 25, 1986) (on file with author).
See also Bright Spot in Texas: El Paso Exploits Global Trends, BARoN'S, Jan. 29,
1990, at 72; Abelardo Valdez, Expanding the Concept of Coproduction Beyond the
Maquiladora: Toward a More Effective Partnership Between the United States,
Mexico and the Caribbean Basin Countries, 22 INT'L LAW. 393 (1988).
41 For remarks representative of this view, see William Bywater, President of the
International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Technical Salaried & Machine Workers,
1992]
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about the maquiladora program foreshadow the themes and concerns
that are emerging in the debate over NAFTA.
III. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
Despite the broadscale restructuring of the Mexican economy, the
lively pace of trade liberalization between the two countries, and the
breakneck industrial development taking place in the border region,
few observers were prepared for the rapidity with which President
Salinas proved ready to move on trade issues or the degree of change
his government was prepared to accept. 42 But in July 1990, George
Bush and Carlos Salinas issued a joint statement endorsing the idea
of a comprehensive free trade agreement between the two countries. 43
Over the next several months a series of meetings took place among
Mexican, Canadian, and U.S. representatives, and the negotiations
expanded to become trilateral in scope." The new aim was a North
AFL-CIO, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the
House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs (Nov. 25, 1986) (on file
with author); Steve Beckman, Economist for the United Auto Workers, Testimony
before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism of the House
Committee on Energy & Commerce (Dec. 10, 1986) (on file with author). See also,
Lou Dubose & Ellen Hosmer, Borderline Jobs, S. ExPosuRE, Fall 1990, at 30.
42 As recently as 1988 Robert Pastor, a knowledgeable commentator, remarked,
"a formal North America Free Trade Area is likely to be rejected by Mexico as
regularly as it is proposed by the United States." ROBERT PASTOR & JORGE CAS-
TANEDA, LIMITS TO FRIENDSHIP: THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO 4 (1988). Another
observer, while acknowledging that NAFTA grew out of "longstanding trends,"
described Salinas' decision to pursue this agreement as "a stunning political act."
Baer, supra note 18, at 132.
41 See Suzanne Sternthal & George Gedda, Bush, Salinas to Seek Free Trade
Pact, WASH. TIMES, June 11, 1990, at C5; Peter Truell & Michel McQueen, Bush
Acts to Aid Latin American Debt Ills, Trade, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1990, at A3.
As the latter article reveals, President Bush also took this occasion to announce his
new "Enterprise for the Americas" plan, which looked toward eventual hemispheric
free trade and proposed an aid fund "administered by the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank to promote privatization and market-oriented reforms." Truell &
McQueen, supra, at A3.
- A bilateral Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement is already in place, having gone
into effect on January 1, 1989. It was preceded by heated debate, especially in
Canada. See, Bruce Campbell, Beggar Thy Neighbor, in TRADING FREEDOM: How
FREE TRADE AFFECTS OUR LIVES, WORK & ENVIRONMENT 35, (John Cavanagh et.
al. eds., 1992); Robert McCormick, The U.S./Canada Free Trade Agreement in
Perspective, 1989 DETROIT COLL. OF L. REv. 785.
The Canadian debate continues as observers dispute the effects of the FTA on
the Canadian economy. Supporters of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement claim
that its benefits to Canada have been substantial and that it has helped to soften
the current recession there. For the comments of Canadian Trade Minister Michael
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American Free Trade Agreement involving all three countries.
On February 5, 1991, President Bush informed the chairs of the
Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committees that the
three governments intended to proceed with trilateral negotiations.
This notice to committee heads triggered a 60-day limitations period
during which either house of Congress could have disapproved the
application of "fast track" procedure to legislation implementing
NAFTA. 45 The fast track procedure prohibits Congressional amend-
ments to implementing bills or approval resolutions and strictly limits
the time allowed for debate.46 Supporters of fast track point out that
trade agreements are complex, interrelated, and hard to achieve. They
want maximum flexibility for the executive branch to achieve the
best agreement. 47 Detractors of fast track say Congressional partic-
ipation in international agreements is important for insuring popular
input and democratic control, especially when it is becoming increas-
ingly clear that some trade agreements will have profound domestic
consequences .0
A flurry of Congressional hearings followed the announcement for
the implementation of the fast track procedure. Substantial opposition
to application of fast track procedures eventually developed in the
Congress, but there was substantial support for it as well, and neither
Wilson along this line, see NAFTA Pact Can Be Reached by November, but Passage
Is Up to Congress, Hills Says, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 666 (Apr. 15, 1992).
Detractors claim that it has fueled the recession and had other adverse effects on
the Canadian industrial base and on the country's system of social security and
social services. See, e.g., Bruce Campbell, Canada Under Siege: Three Years into
the Free Trade Era (unpublished manuscript, available from the Canadian Centre
for Policy Alternatives in Ottawa, Canada); Hills, Wilson Praise U.S.-Canada FTA
Following Trade Commission Hearing, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1247 (Aug. 21,
1991). See also, Maude Barlowe, The FTA: A Corporate Bill of Rights, in TRDINO
FREEDOM: How FREE TRADE AFFECTS OuR LIvEs, WORK & ENVIRONMIENT 34 (John
Cavanagh et al. eds. 1992).
45 19 U.S.C. § 2903 (1992).
46 Trade Act of 1974, ch. 12, 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (1992).
41 See, e.g., views reported in USTR Hills Hopeful Congress Will Approve Unen-
cumbered Extension for Fast-Track, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 764 (May 22, 1991),
and Administration Witnesses Hail NAFTA as Vote on Fast-Track Requirement
Nears, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 697 (May 8, 1991).
42 See Jeff Faux & Richard Rothstein, Fast Track, Fast Shuffle, The Economic
Consequences of the Administration's Proposed Trade Agreement with Mexico
("Briefing Paper" prepared for the Economic Policy Institute, April, 1991) (on file
with author); Lori Wallach & Tom Hilliard, The Consumer and Environmental Case
Against Fast Track (prepared for Public Citizen's Congress Watch, May, 1991) (on
file with author).
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house mustered enough opponents to win a vote of disapproval before
the deadline on June 1, 1991. Consequently, fast track procedures
were extended and as things presently stand, will be in effect until
June 1, 1993. 49
A development that was key to the administration's ability to secure
Congressional acquiescence to fast track, and one mentioned fre-
quently in the testimony below, was the "memorandum of under-
standing" issued on May 1, 1991.50 Critics had proposed that labor
rights and environmental standards should be addressed in NAFTA
itself, to guard against the kind of "race to the bottom" predicted
by many critics. 5' In the May 1 memorandum, the President resisted
the inclusion of these issues as inappropriate for a trade agreement,
but attempted to assure Congress that the labor and environmental
- See generally 56 Fed. Reg. 32454, 32455 (1991). Since Congress declined to
withdraw fast track authority for NAFTA, there have been some indications that
the procedural questions may yet revive. Senator Riegle (D-Mich.) has introduced
a bill that would shorten the extension of fast track authority, lengthen the time
allowed for debate, and allow amendments to NAFTA in five areas: environment,
labor, rules of origin, dispute resolution, and adjustment assistance for displaced
U.S. workers. S. Res. 109, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
Meanwhile, on a more substantive note, Representatives Waxman and Gephardt
have introduced a sense of the Congress resolution which does not formally reverse
fast track authorization, but announces that Congress "will not approve legislation
to implement any trade agreement (including the Uruguay Round of the GATT and
the United States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement) if such agreement jeopardizes United
States health, safety, labor, or environmental laws (including the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Clean Air Act)." H.R. Con. Res. 246, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991). Further, on April 9, 1992 Representive Brown introduced the North
American Environmental, Labor, and Agriculture Standards Act, which calls for
"certain threshold protections regarding worker rights, agricultural standards, and
environmental quality." H.R. 4883, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1992).
5o See Peter Truell, Bush Tries to Ease Concerns in Congress on Effects of U.S.-
Mexico Trade Accord, WALL ST. J., May 2, 1991, at A4; Clyde Farnsworth, Bush
Trade Concessions Pick Up Some Support, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1991, at D2.
11 The proposals for inclusion of labor and environmental standards echoed in
some ways the Social Charter and Social Dimension much discussed in the context
of the European Economic Community. (There is also precedent for inclusion of
worker rights provisions in U.S. trade laws. See LANcE COmPA, TRADE'S HIDDEN
COSTS: WORKER RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY (1988)). For an exploration
of these proposals and a close look at the relevance of European Social Charter
ideas for NAFTA, see Michael Barr et al., Labor and Environmental Rights in the
Proposed Mexico-United States Free Trade Agreement,14 Hous. J. INT'L LAW 1
(1991). See also, Brian Langille, Canadian Labour Law Reform and Free Trade,
(Nov. 20, 1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). A recently introduced
bill in the House of Representatives would establish worker rights, agricultural
standards, and environmental quality as objectives in NAFTA negotiations. H.R.
4883, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1992).
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issues raised would be seriously dealt with in some "parallel" process .12
At any rate, with fast track procedures in place, negotiations began
in earnest. Supporters and detractors in all three countries have
mobilized to push forward, alter, or block the agreement.53 The issues
raised on both sides have been far-reaching.5 4 They include arguments
over the effects of NAFTA in both countries: on business and the
investment climate, on the environment, on the industrial base, on
wages, on working conditions and job security, on diversion of the
present flow of U.S. capital to Asia, and on agriculture and food
policy." Meanwhile, speculation continues as to whether President
52 May 1 memorandum to Congress (selected portions) are reprinted in 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 718 (May 8, 1991). See also Evelyn Iritani, Social Issues Pact
Doesn't Belong in Trade Agreement, Hills Argues, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Aug. 21, 1991, at B5.
11 See, e.g., KIm MOODY & MARY McGINN, UNIONS AND FREE TRADE: SOLIDARITY
VS. COMPETITION (1992); Governors Adopt Resolutions Supporting NAFTA, GA TT,
8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1237 (Aug. 21, 1991); Major Negative Impact on U.S.
Economy Seen from "Wrong" U.S.-Mexico Trade Pact, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1246 (Aug. 21, 1991) (study by Economic Strategy Institute); Free Trade with Mexico
Risks U.S. Jobs, New Study Warns, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1196 (Aug. 14, 1991)
(study by National Planning Association); William A. Orme, Jr., The Sunbelt Moves
South, in 24 N. Am. CONG. ON LATIN AM. REP. ON THE AMERICAS, May, 1991, at
10 (describing mixed reaction to NAFTA among Mexicans); Fidel Velazquez Sanchez,
Mexican Labor Leader's Call for Partnership, WALL ST. J., May 3, 1991, at All
(long-time chief of CTM, the dominant trade union confederation in Mexico, closely
allied with the ruling party, voices full support for Salinas' position on free trade);
Jill Abramson, U.S.-Mexico Trade Pact is Pitting Vast Armies of Capital Hill
Lobbyists Against Each Other, WALL ST. J., April 25, 1991, at A16; Canadian
Officials Warn Mexico Not to Sell, UPI, Mar. 13, 1991 available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library UPI File; U.S. Dept. of Commerce, North American Free Trade Agreement:
Generating Jobs for Americans (reprinted in Trade & Dev. Program, Washington,
D.C., March 1991) (on file with author); Stuart Auerbach, Factions Dig In Positions
Against Mexican Trade Pact, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1991, at F1; Bruce Campbell,
Ten Reasons Why Canada Should Not Enter into a Trilateral Free Trade Agreement
with the United States and Mexico, Dec. 1990 (brochure published by Canadian
Centre for Policy Alternatives) (on file with author).
14 Some of the debated issues transcend NAFTA and involve questions related
to GATT, to free trade generally, and to development policy. See Eric Christensen
& Samantha Giffin, GATT Sets Its Net on Environmental Regulation: The GATT
Panel Ruling on Yellowfin Tuna and the Need for Reform of the International
Trading System, 23 U. MIAM INTER-AmER. L. REV. 569 (1991-92); C. Foster Knight,
Effects of National Environmental Regulation on International Trade and Investment:
Selected Issues, 10 PAC. BASIN L. J. 213 (1991); Terry Collingsworth, American
Labor Policy and the International Economy, 31 B.C. L. REv. 31 (1989); Mark
Ritchie, Free Trade v. Sustainable Agriculture, in TRADING FREEDOM: How FREE
TRADE AFFECTS OUR LIVES, WORK & ENVIRONMENT 75 (John Cavanagh et al., eds.,
1992).
11 Most of these issues will be explored in the testimony below, infra part IV.
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Bush will bring a NAFTA before the Congress prior to the fall 1992
U.S. presidential elections, and what Congress will do with it if he
does.56 By the time these words are actually in print, we may know
much more than we do at present. Whatever NAFTA's status at that
time, I believe the views expressed below will be of interest to those
who care about the economic future of Canada, the United States
and Mexico.
For additional written sources on some of these issues not otherwise cited herein,
and taking a variety of positions regarding NAFTA, see James Russell, Free Trade
and Concentration of Capital in Mexico, MONTHLY REV., June 1992, at 23; Detroit
South: Mexico's Auto Boom: Who Wins, Who Loses, Bus. WK., Mar. 16, 1992,
at 98; Malissa Hathaway McKeith, The Environment and Free Trade: Meeting
Halfway at the Border, 10 PAC. BASIN L. J. 183 (1991); A Woman's Guide to Free
Trade, in EQUAL MEANS, Winter 1991, at 24; North American Free Trade Agreement:
Opportunity or Threat? ("Issue Brief" prepared by Trade and Development Program,
Washington, D.C., Fall 1991) (on file with author); Ann Reilly Dowd, Viva Free
Trade with Mexico!, FORTUNE, June 17, 1991, at 97; Richard Rothstein, Free Trade
Scam,_L.A. WEEKLY, May 17-23, 1991,; Jeff Faux & William Spriggs, U.S. Jobs
and the Mexico Trade Proposal ("Briefing Paper" prepared for Economic Policy
Institute, Washington, D.C., May 1991) (on file with author); Luis Rubio, Are We
Ready for a U.S. -Mexico Trade Revolution? Yes, If Mexico Prospers, So Will the
U.S., WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 1991, at 83; Michael Kinsley, Holy Guacamole!, NEW
REPUB., Apr. 1, 1991, at 6; Exploiting Both Sides: U.S.-Mexico 'Free Trade' (AFL-
CIO), Feb. 1991 (on file with author); $4 A Day? No Way!, 37 Am. LAB. 1 (American
Labor Education Center, Washington, D.C., 1991) (on file with author); Look
Before You Leap: What You Should Know About a North American Free Trade
Agreement (booklet prepared by the Development Group for Policy Alternatives,
Washington, D.C., 1991) (on file with author); William Hostein et al., Is Free Trade
with Mexico Good or Bad for the U.S.?, Bus. WK., Nov. 12, 1990, at 112; Adolfo
Aguilar Zinser, Free Trade: Prosperity for the Few or Development for the Majority?,
in TRADING FREEDOM: How FREE TRADE AFFECTS OUR LIVES, WORK AND ENvI-
RONMENT, 52 (John Cavanagh et al. eds., 1992).
56 See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, Bush Eases Cold-War Trade Curb: Sees a Mexico
Pact Before Fall Election, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1992, at Cl; NAFTA Pact Can
Be Reached by November, but Passage Is Up to Congress, Hills Says, 9 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 666 (April 15, 1992); USTR Hills Says NAFTA Negotiators Making
'Enormous' Progress in Talks, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 333 (March 25, 1992);
Trilateral Conference Call Called Off Due to Bush Campaign, Says Canadian Official,
9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 490 (Mar. 18, 1992); U.S., Mexican Officials Disagree
Over NAFTA Talks Progress in Agriculture, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 400 (Mar.
4, 1992); Baucus Rates Probability of Concluding NAFTA This Year as 'Not Terribly
High', 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 360 (Feb. 26, 1992); NAFTA Takes Shape Amid
Doubts Over U.S. Political Will for Early Deal, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1991, at 14;
Linda Diebel, U.S. Confirms Trade Deal Stall Paper Reports, TORONTO STAR, Nov.
10, 1991, at H5; NAFTA Deadline Seen Slipping, Congressional Action Not Likely
Until After 1992 Election, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1468 (Oct. 9, 1991). It is worth
noting that if a vote on NAFTA is delayed beyond March, 1993, a second extension
of fast track authority by Congress would be necessary. See discussion of fast track,
supra notes 45-48 and text.
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Before turning to the testimony, I should alert readers to some of
the choices that guided the selection offered here. The full hearings
were, of course, far too voluminous to reprint below. My effort has
been to present a sampling of voices that could show something of
the range of viewpoints expressed and the kinds of players who knew
and cared enough to appear. Many cuts were painful to make.
I favored testimony that addressed large questions (rather than,
say, a fine point on rules of origin) for reasons that I suppose are
obvious. Nevertheless, I included an occasional "micro-issue" as well,
to provide some sense of the extensive mosaic of interests and concerns
fairly touched by this agreement.
Due to space constraints I have not included colloquys between
speakers and the panels, though there were some, and many of them
interesting. For similar reasons I have often chosen written statements
for reprinting when they were available, rather than reproducing the
literal transcripts.17
In the spirit of providing readers with a relatively unfiltered sense
of the proceedings, the testimony will appear in the chronological
sequence in which it was offered, without any attempt to impose a
categorical ordering. For those who want a view of the overall se-
lection, however, the introductory table of contents may lend some
aid.
IV. SELECTED TESTIMONY FROM HEARINGS ON NORTH AMERICAN
FREE TRADE CONDUCTED BY THE TRADE STAFF POLICY COMMITTEE
AUGUST-SEPTEMBER, 1991
San Diego, California, August 21, 1991
David Weiss, Chairman, Trade Staff Policy Committee
Don Fisher, The Gap
San Diego, California, August 22, 1991
Jorge Escobar, Bank of America
Houston, Texas, August 26, 1991
Kathryn J. Whitmire, Mayor of the City of Houston
Michael A. Andrews, Congressman from Texas
Dr. Peter M. Emerson, Environmental Defense Fund
11 Many witnesses read their statements unaltered into the record anyway, since
time was limited; the written statements are, in any event, usually more concise. A
couple of witnesses reprinted here did not appear in person at all. They had submitted
written statements, but when the time came for the hearing were unable to appear.
19921
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Mary E. Kelly, Texas Center for Policy Studies
Maria Jimenez, Immigration Law Enforcement Monitoring Project,
American Friends Service Committee
James H. Branningan, American Petroleum Institute
Houston, Texas, August 27, 1991
Rev. Lydia Martinez, Rio Grande Conference of the United Methodist
Church
Cindy Arnold, Centro del Obrero Fronterizo
Jan Gilbreath Rich and Sidney Weintraub, Program for U.S.-Mexican
Policy Studies of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs,
University of Texas
Atlanta, Georgia, August 29, 1991
Bob Crawford, Florida Commissioner of Agriculture
Frank Bouis, Florida Fruit and Vegetable Agriculture Association
Shirley Reinhardt, Tennessee Industrial Renewal Network
Luvernel Clark, Tennessee Industrial Renewal Network
Diana Petty, Tennessee Industrial Renewal Network
Fran Ansley, Tennessee Industrial Renewal Network
Washington, D.C., September 3, 1991
Harry L. Freeman, MTN Coalition
John Cavanagh, Institute for Policy Studies
G. Mustafa Mohatarem, General Motors Corporation
Cipriano Munoz, Dallas Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, Greater
Dallas Chamber of Commerce
Michael Schaeffer, Pillsbury Company
Washington, D.C., September 4, 1991
Rodney E. Leonard, Citizen Trade Watch Campaign
Lori Wallach and John Audley, Public Citizen and Sierra Club
Steven M. Carbo, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational
Fund
Steve Beckman, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America (UAW)
Doreen L. Brown, Consumers for World Trade
Washington, D.C., September 5, 1991
Jack E. Pope, North American Committee on Agricultural Trade
Foster Furman, Furman Foods, Inc.
Sarah M. Vogel, North Dakota Commissioner of Agriculture
Doral S. Cooper, Retail Industry Trade Action Coalition
Cleveland, Ohio, September 9, 1991
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Marcy Kaptur, Congresswoman from Ohio
David Elliott, Procter & Gamble
Dan La Botz, Researcher and Writer
Boston, Massachusetts, September 11, 1991
William F. Weld, Governor of Massachusetts
Timothy Koechlin, Assistant Professor of Economics, Skidmore Col-
lege and Mehrene Larudee, Center for Popular Economics
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, AUGUST 21, 1991
David Weiss, Chairman, Trade Policy Staff Committee
I would like now to call these hearings of the Trade Policy Staff
Committee to order.
My name is David Weiss, and I am the Executive Director for
Policy Coordination at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
in Washington, D.C. I also serve as Chairman of the interagency
Trade Policy Staff Committee, or TPSC. This Committee is today
holding a series of public hearings in accordance with the provisions
of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act to seek public
views on the negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement,
or NAFTA ....
I would like to highlight very briefly just a few of the basic reasons
for the Administration's decision to pursue a NAFTA, some of the
primary issues for negotiation, and the importance of the recent fast
track debate in terms of lessons and commitments that emerged from
it. Finally, I would like to briefly outline how we see the negotiating
process unfolding, and how these public hearings fit into that process.
Canada is our single largest trading partner, and Mexico is our
third largest. Our combined three-way trade totalled $237 billion in
1990. Mexico has been our fastest growing export market, with our
exports there growing twice as fast as with the rest of the world.
Since 1986 U.S. exports to Mexico have more than doubled, and
with gains across the board in both agriculture and manufacturing.
As a result of this export growth, approximately 264,000 export-
related U.S. jobs have been created. The United States and Canada
are already linked through a free trade agreement. Indeed, we are
already linked to both Canada and Mexico in social, economic, and
many other ways. Yet many important barriers remain between the
United States and Mexico. The proposed NAFTA would link the
three economies in yet even more far-reaching ways, which the Ad-
ministration sincerely believes would be beneficial to all three coun-
tries. That, quite simply, is the rationale for the proposed North
American Free Trade Agreement.
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There are many important issues to be covered in the negotiations,
[including remaining Mexican tariffs, import licenses, local content
rules and limits on foreign investment]. . . . These are but represen-
tative examples of the issues to be negotiated in a NAFTA ....
At the conclusion of the negotiations, if the President enters into
a NAFTA, implementing legislation would be submitted by the Ad-
ministration to the Congress subject to the fast track procedures,
meaning in essence that the agreement can be voted up or down but
will not be subject to amendment. Fast track is necessary as a ne-
gotiating tool, for our trading partners would never negotiate their
bottom line only to have it amended or subject to renegotiation in
the congressional approval process. While the fast track procedures
were ultimately extended, the debate over the NAFTA-within the
Congress, in the private sector, among a variety of interest groups,
and in the public at large-has been extensive. If there is any one
single message that came through to the Administration from the
fast track debate, it is that we must, now and throughout the ne-
gotiating process, consult widely by continuing to seek and take into
account the full range of comments and concerns from all entities
with a stake in the NAFTA.
Obviously, the Administration believes that analysis and experience
indicate that a NAFTA will benefit us. Nevertheless, the Adminis-
tration also recognizes that some industries and workers likely will
face increased competitive pressures from a free trade agreement. On
May 1, in a letter to Congress responding to many of the concerns
and issues raised in the course of the debate, the President made a
series of commitments. One of those commitments was to make a
broad public outreach effort, and it is in that spirit that we are
holding these hearings today. At no time in the past has the executive
branch held such a broad set of hearings on a trade negotiation.
In his May I letter, the President also committed to work to ensure
that the NAFTA contains provisions to minimize any negative impact
on employment, and to assist dislocated workers by working with
the Congress to ensure an effective and adequately funded worker
adjustment program. For sensitive sectors, we will gradually phase
out duties and other barriers over time, and will consider transition
periods beyond the 10 year phase-out provided for in the U.S.-Canada
Free Trade Agreement. We will include an effective safeguard mech-
anism, and make strict rules of origin a priority to ensure that the
NAFTA benefits the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, and not free riders
in Asia or Europe.
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The President also committed to address environmental, labor stan-
dards, and worker rights issues. In that regard, his May 1 letter
commits us to develop and implement a comprehensive plan to deal
with pollution problems along the U.S.-Mexican border, to maintain
U.S. environmental and health and safety standards and their en-
forcement and to work with Mexico to improve theirs, to expand
the trade policy advisory process to include environmentalists, and
to expand cooperation on U.S.-Mexican labor issues. In short, the
successful negotiation of a NAFTA can set the stage for a new era
of progress and cooperation in North America not only in trade but
in the broader agenda between the U.S., Mexico, and Canada.
In terms of the negotiating process and timetable, the NAFTA
negotiations were formally initiated in a trilateral meeting held on
June 12 in Toronto, Canada between U.S. Trade Representative Carla
Hills and her Mexican and Canadian counterparts. The first phase
of the negotiations, of which these hearings are a part, is to con-
centrate on developing information, conducting domestic consulta-
tions and seeking advice from those concerned on the nature and
scope of the negotiations, and on identifying the key issues for
negotiation, In addition to these hearings, consultations have also
been conducted through our private sector advisory committee system,
and individually with scores of private companies, trade associations,
and other interest groups concerned with the impact of a NAFTA.
The latter phase, which is to begin in earnest toward the end of
September, will be for the negotiations themselves, which will be
conducted by breaking down the issues into 18 negotiating groups
falling under 6 broad categories: market access (including tariffs and
nontariff barriers, rules of origin and government procurement), trade
rules (such as standards and safeguards), services, investment, intel-
lectual property rights, and dispute settlement. This structure meets
the mandate from the U.S. and Mexican Presidents and the Canadian
Prime Minister for a broad, comprehensive negotiation.
Only with the beginning of the second phase will tariff offers,
nontariff measure request lists, and negotiating texts be exchanged
among any of the three governments. The timing of these hearings
has, therefore, been designed to enable you to present your views so
that your testimony and briefs may be fully considered and taken
into account prior to the beginning of the nitty-gritty of the nego-
tiations. At the trilateral meeting of ministers held just a few days
ago on August 18 to 20 in Seattle, Ambassador Hills and her coun-
terparts were to set out the plan for future work, and particularly
for the next phase.
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As for the timetable once real negotiations begin in late September,
the three governments have agreed not to set a deadline to conclude
an agreement. Rather, we have agreed to take all the time necessary
to conclude a good agreement. We seek an agreement that is on
balance beneficial to the United States, and that can earn the support
of the public and the Congress.
Today and throughout these hearings, we seek your input on the
full range of issues. We seek your comments in particular on the
economic costs and benefits to U.S. producers and consumers of
removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, on potential service
sectors to be included in an agreement and the economic costs and
benefits of removal of such service barriers, on the costs and benefits
of removing restrictions on direct investment, on the adequacy of
existing customs measures and on appropriate rules of origin, and
on possible environmental effects of a NAFTA. I should note, how-
ever, that the Environmental Protection Agency will be conducting
separate hearings on the proposed U.S.-Mexico Border Environment
Plan ....
With your help, we will develop a strategy for going about the
negotiations with a goal of concluding an agreement that is beneficial
to a broad spectrum of concerned parties in all three countries.
I would now like to call the first witness ....
Don Fisher, The Gap
Good morning. I am Don Fisher, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of The Gap, a nationwide retailer of apparel and accessories
which operates over 1,200 stores in 44 states, Canada and the United
Kingdom under the names Gap, GapKids, BabyGap and Banana
Republic. We have about 27,000 employees. Last year we had sales
of about $2 billion and we are, as you may be aware, one of the
fastest growing retailers in America today. This year we expect to
add about 150 new stores.
The key to our growth can be summed up in one word-value.
We offer clothing of excellent quality-well-made and durable-at
affordable prices. Our ability to offer value is the direct result of
our ability to source goods worldwide-both domestically and
throughout the world. Last year we imported from about 3 dozen
countries. Yet, we still buy most of our denim products from man-
ufacturers in the U.S.
While we were currently discussing with Mexican apparel makers
the possibility of placing orders, we have no ongoing business re-
lationship in Mexico. The prospect of a trade agreement which would
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eliminate tariffs and quotas would make Mexico a much more at-
tractive prospect. I doubt that Mexico would displace any of our
domestic sources, but it would offer an appealing alternative, because
of proximity, to other offshore sources ....
I believe everyone wins under NAFTA. The American consumer
gets the benefit of more affordable prices. The American worker gets
the benefit of more retail jobs, and American retailers get the op-
portunity for increased growth. Recent history shows that innovative
domestic apparel manufacturers can adapt to change and even Amer-
ican textile mills could have an opportunity to sell more of their
products to Mexican apparel makers ....
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, AUGUST 22, 1991
Jorge Escobar, Bank of America
Bank of America strongly supports U.S. participation in the current
negotiations for a trilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Canada
and Mexico. We are optimistic that such an agreement will be rea-
sonably complete and balanced in dealing with the trade and in-
vestment objectives of all three countries.
We have been encouraged by the tangible results that Mexico's
change in development strategy and consequent opening of its econ-
omy have yielded so far. The rationalization and privatization of
numerous state owned enterprises followed by the sale of banks back
to private investors have been key moves toward regaining the con-
fidence of Mexican and foreign investors. The inclusion of foreign
participation in the privatization of certain industries has helped
Mexico to attain substantial growth in investment in the past two
years.
In the financial sector, we believe that President Salinas' modern-
ization plan should go beyond the privatization of commercial banks.
Privatization is a very solid first step and should be followed by the
well managed introduction of foreign competition with its consequent
benefits in technology and product innovation, pricing, etc.
The current individual and aggregate limits on foreign investment
in the Mexican banking sector will preclude any major move by
outside financial institutions into the country, thus hindering critically
needed growth and stability of investment in general. By contrast,
the full opening of the Mexican banking sector to foreign investment
now would provide a substantial boost to the negotiations for the
FTA and renewed vigor to investment growth and permanence.
Bank of America Supports Full Opening of the Mexican
Financial Sector to Foreign Investment
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1. Foreign banks should be given the right to establish branches in
Mexico immediately, and once an FTA is signed, they should be
allowed full ownership of Mexican banks.
2. Foreign banks should be accorded full national treatment by the
Mexican government, thereby allowing them nationwide branching
with peso deposit gathering and lending powers, as well as other
consumer and corporate banking services, on an equal footing with
Mexican banks.
3. Mexico should permit participation of foreign banks in the de-
velopment of Mexican capital markets and be authorized to underwrite
and trade government and corporate securities.
4. Foreign banks should also be allowed to own leasing and finance
company subsidiaries or otherwise engage in these activities in order
to reasonably compete with the financial groups that have already
acquired Mexican banks or will likely control those banks not yet
sold.
5. Foreign banks should be allowed direct branching rights in Can-
ada and the authority for cross-border operations processing.
Rationale for Bank of America's Support
1. Mexico would gain substantially in investor confidence if the
financial sector is fully opened to foreign investment. Mexico needs
to continue taking solid measures that result in substantially more
capital repatriation and long term investment to finance the trade
deficits stemming from its market opening.
2. The Mexican financial system would benefit greatly from the
judicious introduction of foreign competition. Some of the salient
benefits would be:
Access to modern technology, which would result in increased ef-
ficiencies;
Innovative products;
Adjustment of overpriced banking services in Mexico toward inter-
national standards.
3. Several Mexican banks already operate in the U.S. through agen-
cies in the main financial centers and some through wholly owned
banking subsidiaries. In anticipation of an FTA, these institutions
are marketing their banking capabilities extensively in Mexico, the
U.S. and elsewhere among U.S. and foreign companies with a U.S.
presence. It is clear that a U.S. and Canadian bank may be at a
considerable disadvantage, even with its own customers, if the Mex-
ican government delays the opening of foreign competition.
[Vol. 22:329
NAFTA PUBLIC DEBATE
HOUSTON, TEXAS, AUGUST 26, 1991
Kathryn J. Whitmire, Mayor of City of Houston
Good morning. I'd like to first begin by extending a warm Houston
welcome to all the staff present from the United States Trade Re-
presentative's Office. We hope that your stay in Houston will be
both productive and fruitful. We in Houston are honored to have
an opportunity to host one of the six such hearings to be held
throughout the country on the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment. Over the course of the next two days, I am sure it will become
clear to those of you conducting these hearings that there is a great
deal of support in Houston, in Texas and in the entire region for
the establishment of a Free Trade Agreement between Canada, Mexico
and the United States. I believe that the support is there because of
the special relationship that already exists between Mexico and the
Border region both culturally as well as commercially. Trade between
the State of Texas and Mexico has been growing significantly since
some of the trade barriers were lifted. President Salinas has prudently
lowered tariffs on a number of goods which has resulted in a doubling
of the trade in the last three years .... I anticipate that once a free
trade agreement is negotiated, we will see a quantum leap in the
amount of trade between all three countries, as a result of open and
unrestricted markets.
I would like to make some observations about a recent trip I made
to the south Texas region. Last week I had an opportunity to visit
the McAllen/Reynosa area, and tour its free trade zone as well as
a couple of Maquiladora plants that have been conducting business
twin-plant style. What I encountered were two state-of-the-art
plants .... I came to find that all the maquilas in the area were
employing over 30,000 employees in Reynosa, which it is estimated
equals 15016 of the labor force in the area. Studies by a number of
firms on the impact of the maquilas on the McAllen economy were
consistently concluding that the maquila industries were creating many
thousands of jobs on this side of the border. It was almost one-to-
one the total number of jobs created in the McAllen area in the last
ten years. Purchases of goods by Mexican workers in McAllen retail
stores were also greatly enhancing revenues generated in sales taxes.
The impact on the free trade zone was an incredible one billion
dollars of business in the last year alone. I firmly believe that a free
trade agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the United States is
going to increase opportunities for development of businesses and
jobs throughout Texas and the United States. It can only help to do
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so. It is a win-win-win situation for everyone involved ....
Michael A. Andrews, Congressman from Texas
... For the city of Houston, the state of Texas, and indeed all
of the United States, free trade negotiations present great opportu-
nities. A North American Free Trade Agreement will not only benefit
Texas, but it is essential to positioning the United States economy
to compete in today's marketplace. We must cooperate regionally in
order to better compete globally. That lesson is becoming clearer as
the European Community comes closer to economic union in 1992,
and as the Asian economic powers of the Pacific Rim continue to
take advantage of economic cooperation.
In a speech earlier this year to the Texas Legislature, Mexico's
Present Salinas summed up what is at stake as our countries negotiate
a free trade agreement. He said: "We are at a stage in history when
we can take meaningful steps that ensure the competitiveness of our
countries and the welfare of our peoples for generations. Seldom do
these opportunities arise in the course of history. We cannot afford
to limit ourselves to short-term and local interests." This is especially
true for Texas, and the city of Houston ....
Environmental problems along our southern border must be ad-
dressed in the trade talks. There are nearly 2 million people in the
El Paso-Juarez area, making it the largest population and commercial
center on the U.S.-Mexico border. Over the last 10 years, the area
has experienced explosive growth; almost 2,000 trucks each day and
3.5 million people every month use the international bridges between
El Paso and Juarez ....
I recently had an opportunity to explore some of these issues with
local leaders in El Paso. Business, government, academic and health
care leaders spoke to me about an opportunity for positive change,
a chance to raise the standard of living in Mexico and to improve
the quality of life on both sides of the border. El Paso has an
impressive wealth of talent on border issues and decades of experience
in dealing with Mexico. It is important that the U.S. government
avail itself of this expertise. After all, El Pasoans deal every day
with the economic benefits of trade and struggle with the environ-
mental and health issues unique to the border. Local hospitals ex-
perience the fiscal strain of border health and the city must deal with
traffic congestion on its international bridges.
The environmental problems are significant and it will take a
cooperative effort at the international level to solve them. Without
a trade agreement, the money will not be there for enforcement of
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strong environmental standards, cleanup and pollution prevention.
An agreement that mutually strengthens the Mexican economy will
similarly assist that nation's ability to tackle its environmental prob-
lems.
Free trade opponents have raised the specter of American job losses.
But our exports to Mexico have more than doubled and 400,000 new
jobs for American workers have been created since 1986 when Mexico
began unilaterally reducing tariffs by 80 percent. A free trade agree-
ment will give us the opportunity to open the Mexican market to
high-value American exports, ensuring that more skilled American
jobs are created through increased bilateral trade and economic growth.
Experts estimate that for each additional $1 billion in real net exports,
about 25,000 jobs are created .... Seventy cents of every dollar in
Mexican imports is spent on goods from the United States-clearly,
more jobs in Mexico means increased consumption of products made
in the United States.
Cultural differences present a bilateral challenge. Mexican author
Carlos Fuentes once said, "What the United States does best is to
understand itself. What it does worst is to understand others." Tra-
ditionally, one of the greatest barriers to cooperation between the
United States and Mexico has been the U.S. misconception that
Mexico has little to contribute. Today, however, this mind-set is
changing as the forces bringing the United States and Mexico together
are stronger than they have been in generations. The time of crises
management of U.S./Mexico relations is over. Mexico is too im-
portant, and the consequences of a neglected relationship are too
severe ....
As President Salinas said when he addressed a joint session of
Congress last year, "We have a spirit of exchange, not only of
material, but also of ideas and cultures." Harnessing that spirit is
in the best interest of both countries.
Peter M. Emerson, Environmental Defense Fund
Mr. Chairman and members of the Trade Policy Committee, my
name is Peter M. Emerson. I am an economist, employed by the
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) in Austin, Texas. EDF seeks to
find innovative and viable solutions to today's environmental prob-
lems by linking science, economics, and law.
We appreciate the opportunity to share our views on the potential
environmental and public health impacts of the proposed North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). If negotiated properly, a free
trade agreement could foster cooperation in solving joint problems
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and promote sustainable development. However, achieving this goal
requires more than a statement of faith that trade liberalization will
lead to future economic growth which, in turn, will lead to better
environmental protection. Instead, the trade agreement will need to
incorporate the results of a comprehensive environmental review in
all three countries; it will need to include well-defined regulations,
incentives, and dispute resolution mechanisms; and it must address
the difficult task of funding environmental protection.
Past experience teaches us that international trade and trade agree-
ments themselves can have significant environmental effects. Several
controversial issues arising form the 1988 U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) demonstrate how dispute resolution forums and
"harmonization provisions" may potentially weaken environmental
standards. For example, when U.S. fishermen and others challenged
a Canadian regulation on salmon/herring catches, a dispute resolution
panel found that even though the fishing regulation had a legitimate
conservation purpose, it had to be revised. In short, the panel ruled
that Canada had to show there is no other way to achieve its con-
servation management objective without a trade-distorting effect.
In the area of pesticide regulation, the FTA requires Canada to
alter its pesticide "safety assessment" process in favor of the less
restrictive "risk/benefit" process used in the United States. On the
other hand, the Canadian government is currently challenging the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's regulations calling for the
phase-out of the production, importation, and use of asbestos as an
unfair barrier to trade. The EPA's regulations are designed to protect
people from asbestosis, a degenerative lung disease.
In Europe, a major issue delaying the entry of Switzerland and
Austria into the European Economic Community is the insistence
that these two nations allow 40-ton freight trucks to travel in their
respective countries. The increased emissions of carbon dioxide and
other pollutants, and the adverse effect on internal road infrastructure
would be severe.
In recent years, trade between Mexico and the United States has
expanded rapidly. Unfortunately, along with increases in industrial-
ization and trade have come huge environmental and public health
problems. On the border, "free trade" has caused the increase in
polluted industrial wastewater, hazardous chemicals, toxic fumes,
smog and untreated sewage to far outstrip the capacity of existing
treatment facilities and regulations. These effluents and emissions are
causing serious environmental and public health problems in Mexico,
and they continue to migrate into the United States.
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The U.S.-Mexico trade experience has also extended itself beyond
the border region. For example, the United States' prohibition on
imported tuna caught using methods that kill dolphins has caused
Mexican officials to charge that the law is designed to protect only
the economic interests of our domestic tuna industry. If the U.S.
loses this dispute, environmental legislation such as the Marine Mam-
mal Protection Act could be undermined.
These examples clearly demonstrate the inextricable link between
trade and the environment. To the extent that NAFTA results in
further economic integration, it will bring new strains and challenges
to the environment that must be understood and addressed at the
negotiating table.
Mexico's President Salinas has stated, "The greatest competition
of the coming decade will be the competition for capital." As a result
of reduced state intervention in the economy and anticipation of a
NAFTA, Mexico is already receiving a huge increase in foreign in-
vestment. According to Solomon Brothers, Inc., new foreign capital
investment was $8.4 billion in 1991 compared with just $700 million
in 1989.
As NAFTA triggers additional economic growth, the increased
consumption of fossil fuels will bring higher levels of air pollution.
As in Europe, increased transportation and trucking will bring sig-
nificantly higher emissions of carbon dioxide. In anticipation of a
global climate convention, many countries have made firm commit-
ments to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. The provisions of a NAFTA
will affect the ability of the U.S., Mexico, and Canada to meet their
international commitments. Presently, there are very limited resources
for testing and monitoring air quality. The El Paso-Ciudad Juarez
airshed is a major concern due to a combined population of slightly
over 1.3 million people and the particular geography and topography
of the area. In Mexico City, notoriously poor air quality and the
lack of basic incinerator standards for the disposal of industrial and
hospital wastes cannot be overlooked.
Expanded trade will cause a major increase in cross-border indus-
trial traffic. Seven new bridges are planned for the Texas-Mexico
border alone. Increased traffic will also necessitate improvements in
transportation infrastructure. Economists have estimated that at least
$20 billion will be needed to expand and modernize northern Mexico's
inadequate road and rail infrastructure.
Materials being shipped in international commerce are of critical
importance as well. One survey reports that over the past twenty
years, 950o of the industries along the border could not account for
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their hazardous waste as required by Mexican law. Clearly, these
materials are being dumped somewhere other than in approved fa-
cilities. Texas is facing a shortage of hazardous waste landfill sites,
and Mexico has only a handful of authorized sites for such wastes.
There is clear evidence of resulting environmental pollution. For
instance, groundwater has been shown to be contaminated on both
sides of the border at Nogales with high levels of cadmium, chromium,
and arsenic and other chemical pollutants.
Water resources that the U.S. and Mexico share are of critical
importance to the future development and sustainability of both
countries. At present, there are severe water shortages along the border
and in several Mexican cities. A major source of water for both
countries, the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo, is fully extended and shallow
groundwater that serves as a replacement source is of extremely poor
quality.
The World Bank is currently supporting a multi-year $90 million
logging and pulp manufacturing project in the Sierra Madre between
Chihuahua and Durango. At present, the World Bank has committed
a portion of its $45.6 million loan and is awaiting the completion
of environmental studies. This project will impact one-third of the
remaining coniferous forest in Mexico. The Sierra Madre project
area, which includes the Copper Canyon tourist region, is roughly
the size of Indiana and is very mountainous. It is anticipated that
deforestation will cause major soil erosion and heavy sediment loads
will wash into the Rio Conchos, the biggest tributary of the Rio
Grande. This river supplies twice as much water to the Rio Grande/
Rio Bravo watershed as any other source and is a vital resource for
the agricultural, urban, and park communities in both countries.
Despite numerous statements and pledges, the World Bank is currently
falling far short of its promised environmental considerations. The
potential sustainability of the proposed methods of logging and re-
generation have yet to be examined and the environmental baseline
study of the area has not been completed. The Inter-American De-
velopment Bank also has a similar forestry development project planned
for the Mexican States of Oaxaca and Guerrero.
As the above examples illustrate, challenges to the environment of
North America that will accompany a free trade agreement are very
significant. In order to deal with these challenges, the trade negotiators
must resolve the critical questions of: How the environment will be
protected and Who is going to pay for it?
A first step is to conduct a comprehensive environmental review
prior to undertaking the trade negotiations and to ensure that the
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results of the review are used in the negotiating process. The envi-
ronmental review requires an understanding of how the proposed free
trade agreement will affect the intensity and geographical distribution
of development in all three countries. Such development impacts are
the basis for anticipating potential environmental problems and pre-
scribing mitigation procedures. In addition, a review of the environ-
mental effects of the existing free trade agreement between the U.S.
and Canada, and of the maquiladora industry in Mexico will provide
important lessons for the trade negotiators.
We understand the Administration is currently developing an en-
vironmental review of the NAFTA, but we are concerned that it will
not cover the full range of environmental issues. At this stage, we
do not understand how the environmental review will be incorporated
into the negotiation process for the trade agreement. There should
be a public comment period after the review is completed and ac-
ceptance of revised and updated versions of the environmental review
as the negotiations progress. Meaningful environmental review will
help get trade decisions out from behind closed doors and help us
anticipate ahead of time the consequences of these decisions.
Secondly, just as the trade agreement will present detailed schedules
to phase out tariffs, quotas and subsidies over a period of time, it
should also set up a process to negotiate the ultimate harmonization
of environmental protection throughout all three countries. Undoubt-
edly, a phase-in period of several years will be required to achieve
this goal. But, the results of this process will guard against any
country gaining a trade advantage through environmental abuse and
will ensure that the free trade agreement promotes sustainable de-
velopment ....
Mary Kelly, Texas Center for Policy Studies
My name is Mary Kelly and I am the Executive Director of the
Texas Center for Policy Studies, a non-profit policy development and
technical assistance organization based in Austin, Texas. The Texas
Center for Policy Studies is active in researching and reporting on
a variety of environmental issues in the Texas/Mexico border area
and working with Texas and Mexican community organizations and
environmental groups throughout the region.
The notice of the Trade Policy Staff Committee hearings on the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) invites comments
on the "possible environmental effects of the NAFTA .... You
have heard and no doubt will continue to hear much about what
environmental issues should be addressed. These comments, however,
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address primarily the process by which such issues are or are not
currently being addressed.
On May 1, 1991, the Bush Administration released an "Environ-
mental Action Plan" ...
At this juncture, almost four months after the release of the Action
Plan, it is instructive to examine the Administration's progress in
meeting its commitments to address environmental issues in the con-
text of NAFTA. Such an examination reveals that while negotiation
of the trade agreement seems to be proceeding apace, the various
efforts to deal with environmental issues are either in disarray or
have yet to materialize.
The Administration promised to conduct a "review" of U.S.-
Mexico environmental issues .... Despite the fact that the chief
negotiators will have conducted two important meetings by late Au-
gust, not to mention the frequent meetings between lower level ne-
gotiators to discuss NAFTA issues, there is no "environmental review"
available to guide these discussions. Moreover, the proposed USTR
version of the "environmental review" left much to be desired, in
that it would not involve any public participation in determining the
appropriate scope of review and would not examine alternative ne-
gotiating positions for their environmental impacts.
It is readily apparent that negotiators do not view the "environ-
mental review" as a serious constraint or even an important factor
in developing the NAFTA. Specifically the U.S. Trade Representative,
Carla Hills and Mexico's Secretary of Commerce, Jaime Serra Puche,
apparently agreed in June to include oil and energy issues on the
NAFTA negotiating agenda, despite previous statements by the Mex-
ican government those issues were "off the table." Increased U.S.
investment in oil and gas exploration and production in Mexico under
NAFTA has many environmental implications since this is a very
pollution intensive activity ....
In essence, the Administration appears to be treating the "envi-
ronmental review" as nothing more than a paper exercise designed
to quell the call for a full environmental impact statement (EIS) on
NAFTA.
A central element of the May I Action Plan was the development
of an "Integrated Border Environment Plan" by the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) and its Mexican counterpart, the
Secretaria de Desarollo Urbano y Ecologia (SEDUE). As you may
have heard by now, EPA has finally made a draft of this Border
Plan available to interested parties and agreed to hold hearings in
the border region in September of this year. In fact, there seems to
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be some attempt on the part of the Administration to divert the
attention being given to U.S./Mexico environmental issues to the
Border Plan process.
Unfortunately, the Border Plan falls far short of expectations.
First, it does not even mention the potential effects of a NAFTA on
the border environment or on the abilities of responsible federal,
state and local agencies in both countries to regulate pollution and
conserve precious natural resources such as ground water and forests.
EPA has specifically denied the Border Plan is in any way "linked"
to NAFTA.
Second, the current version of the Border Plan lacks any discussion
of how the "wish list" of environmental improvements set out in
the Plan will be funded ....
The May 1 Action Plan also contained a very vague commitment
to "enter" discussions, in parallel to the NAFTA negotiations, to
address a wide range of U.S.-Mexico environmental issues-from
enforcement of environmental laws, to forests and marine conser-
vation to dispute resolution alternatives. As far as we can discern,
no formal parallel negotiations on environmental issues have begun
between the U.S. and Mexico nor are such negotiations contemplated
for the near future ....
In the May 1 Plan, the Administration, rejecting suggestions for
establishment of an environmental Working Group to help negotiate
the agreement, committed to appointing environmental representatives
to the following trade policy advisory committees: Advisory Com-
mittee on Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN) and the Advisory
Committees for the intergovernmental policy, services, investment,
industry and agriculture sectors. At this writing (early August), the
Administration has yet to announce any of the promised appointments
of environmental representatives to the various trade advisory com-
mittees.
Yet, at least some of these Advisory Committees have already been
meeting and, as discussed above, negotiations are proceeding rap-
idly ....
To date, the Administration has exhibited an unwillingness or
inability to deal with the environmental implications of a NAFTA
in an organized and effective manner. Its efforts are scattered between
an "environmental review"; a "Border Plan" and an as yet unknown
set of "parallel negotiations". None of these efforts has been carried
out in a way that provides a meaningful analysis of the potential
environmental impacts of a NAFTA-either in the U.S. or in Mexico.
None of these efforts appears to have the potential for developing
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sound policy solutions to deal with the serious environmental and
public health problems that arise if a trade agreement does not address
such issues as Mexico's limited environmental regulatory capacity and
necessary limits on resource development and exploitation in both
countries.
The Texas Center for Policy Studies urges the Administration to
regroup and correct its present course by:
1. Immediately appointing environmental representatives to the
Advisory Committees and establishing a Working Group on the en-
vironment for negotiation of NAFTA;
2. Putting all portions of the negotiations which involve issues with
environmental impacts on hold until the environmental review is
complete;
3. Recognizing the necessary and important links between the In-
tegrated Border Environment Plan and NAFTA and incorporating
those links into the development of the Border Plan and the nego-
tiation of the trade agreement; and
4. Immediately outlining and making public a schedule and agenda
for "parallel" negotiations on U.S./Mexico environmental issues that
proceed along the same timetable as NAFTA negotiations and com-
mitting to submit any environmental agreement to Congress for review
and approval, simultaneously with or before NAFTA submittal.
Thank you for the opportunity to offer these comments, and I
would be happy to answer any questions.
Maria Jimenez, Immigration Law Enforcement Monitoring Project
My name is Maria Jimenez. I am Director of the American Friend's
Service Committee's Immigration Law Enforcement Monitoring Pro-
ject. The AFSC is a Quaker organization that has provided human-
itarian Service to and supported the rights of immigrants and refugees
for nearly 75 years. The ILEMP has documented human rights viol-
ations of persons crossing the US-Mexico border for over four years
and has brought its findings before committees of both the US and
Mexican Congress respectively. While the AFSC-ILEMP work is sup-
ported by many Friends across the country and based on the Quaker
belief in the dignity of all people, the project does not speak for all
Friends.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has dramatic
implications for setting patterns of new relationships among peoples
of the three nations-the United States, Mexico, Canada .... So,
there is a mutual interest in bringing greater economic security for
the exchange of commodities, investment and access to markets through
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the permanence of legally binding international agreements. Although
the accord is framed in terms of deregulation, it could provide the
format for regulating-with social, labor and environmental guide-
lines-the inevitable process of economic integration that has already
occurred between the three countries even without a trade agreement.
Reducing the scope of issues to be negotiated to investment, com-
merce and production while removing topics of social concern will
shape a process for economic integration that will reflect the skewed
power relationships between countries and social classes: benefits will
accrue to only a few and the worst dislocation will be suffered by
the poor and working people in the three countries.
To illustrate only one area: NAFTA omits two sectors where the
US economy is most directly dependent on Mexico: labor and oil.
NAFTA will secure an operating environment of the production
of Mexican oil by facilitating US investment and additional services
provided by US companies. Without formal control of extraction and
production of oil, the United States will secure nonetheless a long-
term supply of oil from Mexico. The import of Mexican oil will have
the same effect that other imported oil has on the domestic extraction
and refining of oil, a decline on domestic activity in this area, with
particular negative impact on the labor force in the petrochemical
industry.
NAFTA will leave intact the most significant economic, social and
human exchange between the two countries, specifically, the migration
of Mexican labor across the international boundary. In the Uruguay
Round talks [of GATT] it was stated that: "The expansion of the
service exports of developing countries and their increased partici-
pating in the world trade services depends on the liberalization of
cross border movement of personnel covering unskilled, semiskilled
and skilled labor, and that effective access to markets for their service
exports can mainly be realized through this mode of delivery." The
result is that a free trade pact that does not expand to include a
flexible immigration framework- as the European Economic com-
munity has done-effectively freezes wages within national boundaries
and guarantees the continuing large wage differentials between Mexico
and the United States. Without dismantling of international legal
barriers to the movement of labor, Mexico is reduced to the status
of permanent supplier of low-cost labor to an otherwise dynamic
North American market. This situation will increase the rate and
intensity of economic exploitation of labor forces on both sides of
the border by maintaining the availability of an undocumented labor
force that is highly exploitable and insuring that the runaway shop
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across the Mexican border negatively impacts the labor forces in the
United States and Canada.
NAFTA should not preclude a trilateral or bilateral accord on
immigration or energy or ecological or labor protections. The General
System of Preferences already established a precedent for the inclusion
of labor concerns and guarantees in US trade policy. The 1988
Omnibus Trade Act declared it a principal negotiating objective of
the United States "to adopt as principal of GATT that the denials
of workers rights should not be means for a country or its industries
to gain competitive advantage in international trade."
Also there is a precedent for the inclusion of labor mobility in
trade talks; for instance, the temporary entry of providers of services
was expanded significantly in the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement.
Currently, it will have to be addressed as the Business Roundtable
has stated that a preliminary negotiating objective should be the
temporary entry for business persons and the California World Trade
Commission stated that "California growers seek the continued avail-
ability of farm labor from Mexico, whether through FTA negotiations
or other legislative vehicles." A year ago, the Mexican government
indicated that a labor component to trade talks be added to include
"the orderly flow of Mexican workers," dropping it only after the
refusal of the United States government to place it as an item of
trade negotiations.
The exclusion of labor mobility of Mexican workers from the table
of negotiations makes sense not as an economic consideration but
as a political calculation; it is a form of neutralizing sectors within
the United States that have traditionally worked for restrictive im-
migration policies. However, it ignores the economic conditions in
both the United States and Mexico that will continue to make Mexican
workers a permanent part of the labor force in the United States. It
also ignores the important role that Mexican labor has historically
played in the development of both the United States and Mexican
economies. Most importantly, it ignores the direction of restructuring
of the world economy that in the future will continue to need a
supply of low-wage workers that has traditionally been provided by
the international labor migrants.
The reality is that both declining and highly dynamic sectors of
the United States economy will continue to generate low-wage jobs.
Employment in the lower-paying service jobs has been rising rapidly
as a percentage of total US employment-28%0 in 1950, 32% in 1970,
39% in 1970, 430o in 1980, and 49% in 1986. In addition, today a
large array of economic activities are characterized by informalization,
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i.e., sweatshops and industrial homework, as is evident in the elec-
tronics, textile and garment industries in cities like New York and
Los Angeles. These general trends shaping the job supply have ac-
celerated over the last decade the influx of foreign labor to the United
States; international labor migrants emerge as an important source
of labor supply for US labor markets. In addition, the US labor
force is growing older; thus, there will be a need for immigrant labor
in the next twenty years if the United States wishes to maintain a
dynamic rhythm of economic growth.
Mexican labor has historically been an integral part of the United
States economic development. The pace of industrialization of the
US economy which gave impetus to the agriculture in the Southwest
and transportation systems, specifically the railroads, throughout the
country contributed to the initiation of streams of labor flows from
Mexico in the early period of the twentieth century. Current migration
streams between the US and Mexico date back to the period between
1900 and 1930 when at least one-tenth of Mexico's population moved
"north from Mexico" in response to an expanding US economy ....
According to the Census Bureau, the Mexican-ancestry population
quintupled between 1970 and 1988; nearly 450 of the increase resulted
from immigration and the remainder from natural growth. By 1990,
early census data indicate that the Mexican-origin population in the
United States is approximately 13.5 million.
The fundamental dynamic driving migratory flows from Mexico
to the United States is the tremendous difference in economic op-
portunity. In 1989, gross national product per capita was $2,165 as
compared with $21,082 for the United States; Mexico's unemployment
rate was 200%c as compared to 5.2% in the United States; Mexico's
hourly earnings in manufacturing is $1.99 ($.98 for maquiladora
workers) as compared to $13.85 for the US.
Mexico's population more than tripled between 1940 and 1980,
from 20 to 67 million people. An additional 21 million added during
the last decade to 88 million. Such growth in population produces
equally rapid growth in the labor force. One million persons now
enter Mexico's labor market each year, compared with two million
new jobseekers in the United States which has almost three times
Mexico's population. "We can speculate on how far free trade might
push Mexico's development to five years following its implementation.
Even in the most wildly optimistic scenario, the Mexican gross do-
mestic product would at best double and perhaps approximate 150c
of the United States. It is unlikely that even this improvement in
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Mexico's economy would have more than a slight reduction in the
flow of Mexican migrants to the US.
By itself the economic contrast does not explain the number of
Mexican immigrants in the United States. The long border between
Mexico and the US provides an opportunity for Mexico that does
not exist for other developing countries. Also, the existence of mi-
gratory flows for 100 years have created family and community
networks that connect Mexicans to relatives and friends in the United
States and provide communication channels to facilitate migration.
In addition, in the last twenty years, the migration of Mexican
labor has increased rapidly. Since 1976, the number of Mexican legal
immigrants has stabilized at a yearly average of about 66,000. At
the same time undocumented migration of the Mexican population
accelerated sharply in number and proportion. By 1980, approximately
55 per cent of the total of undocumented immigrants nationally-
estimated between 1.8 million and 4.7 million persons-were from
Mexico and they accounted for two-thirds of all Mexican immigration.
In 1990, apprehensions along the US-Mexico border increased from
854,000 in 1989 to 1.04 million in 1990: approximately 907o of those
arrested are Mexican nationals.
Paradoxically, the very measures commonly thought to deter im-
migration-foreign investment and promotion of export oriented
growth in developing countries-seem to have had precisely the op-
posite effect. The clearest proof of this is the fact that several of
the newly industrializing countries with the highest growth rates in
the world are becoming the most important suppliers of immigrants
to the United States.
This reduction was promised with the Border Industrialization Pro-
gram implemented in the mid-60's that was designed to strengthen
Mexico's economic development and provide jobs to braceros in
Mexico. Even with the growth in the maquiladora corridor there has
been no measurable decrease in undocumented migration attributable
to this economic program; the large majority of assembly jobs were
taken by a female workforce.
Thus, history and economics do not provide an optimism for
forecasting a decline in undocumented immigration to the United
States as a result of the free-trade agreement. To the contrary, the
restructuring of the United States economy points to a continuation
of high and ever-increasing level of international migratory flows.
Given its size, role in the economy and history, the Mexican origin
population in the United States can no longer be characterized as a
temporary worker staying here for a short period of time and leaving
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a family behind. Indeed studies of the newly legalized Mexican im-
migrants indicate that they had resided in the United States for 10
years or more and that four-fifths live with their spouses in the United
States. The US Census in 1980 indicated that two-thirds of Mexican
immigrants in the United States lived with immediate family members.
Yet despite the historical economic relationship of Mexican labor
in the United States and its current role in the process of regional
economic restructuring, the Mexican-origin population has long been
subjected to racism, prejudice and violence of the larger society;
viewed then, as a "foreign" labor force, it is a labor force that is
easily expendable in times of economic downturns. This is particularly
true of the undocumented Mexican immigrant; the anti-immigrant,
anti-Mexican social attitudes have triggered US enforcement crack-
downs when migratory flows have coincided with economic downturns
such as the repatriation of Mexican workers during the Depression
of 1930, Operation Wetback in 1950's and Operation Jobs in 1970's.
In addition, in times of economic dislocation, social and economic
problems are blamed on Mexican immigrants.
Mexican immigrants do not take jobs away from native-workers.
According to research by the RAND Corporation Program for Im-
migration Policy, "the general consensus [of many investigators] is
that immigrants in the United States (legal and undocumented) have
little effect on earnings and employment opportunities of native-born
peoples .... ." In addition, although some studies indicate that im-
migrants increase competitiveness with those of similar skills, others
indicate that the role of immigrants has been to fill jobs at the low
level of the labor market while permitting the legal US residents and
citizens to move up the employment ladder to higher paying jobs
and jobs at higher levels of the labor market. In general, most studies
indicate that the presence of the immigrant workforce is beneficial
to the economy and has a favorable net effect on the economic
development overall.
Mexican immigrants also contribute to the economic development
of Mexico. Mexican migrant remittances are a primary source of
foreign exchange in Mexico rivalling that of tourism. Remittances
have played an important macroeconomic role by revitalizing aggre-
gate demand, the establishment of and growth of small businesses,
and the expansion of social and economic infrastructure in numerous
communities in Mexico. Securing broader legal employment oppor-
tunities to Mexican citizens working in the United States would guar-
antee a stronger stream of remittances strengthening the overall
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purchasing power for consumers and improving the living standards
of otherwise poverty-stricken households.
The historical contributions of Mexican immigrants to the economic
and political well-being of the United States is buried in the politics
of racism and prejudice that even today is reflected in the charac-
terization of Mexican labor of all parties participating in the free
trade debate. Too recent in the public mind are the debates that have
led to ever more restrictive immigration policy toward Mexican work-
ers. The anti-immigrant and Mexican sentiment culminated in the
passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 that,
although it provided for the legalization of at least 2.3 Million Mexican
immigrants, has, through the employer sanctions provision, effectively
denied the undocumented Mexican workforce the essential human
right guaranteed by Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, approved by the United Nations in 1948, the right to work.
IRCA has crippled labor rights for those who did not obtain legal
status; the law has worked to lower living standards for all us working
people by driving down wages and working conditions for the most
vulnerable, in this case, two-thirds of the Mexican immigrants in
present in the United States. For the other third, the 1989 General
Accounting Office report on the effect of this provision on authorized
workers indicted high incidents of discrimination, particularly among
Hispanic and Asian workers. Thus, while not deterring undocumented
immigration, the employers sanctions provision of 1986 law has ef-
fectively increased the economic hardships of the Mexican-origin pop-
ulation in the United States by increasing discriminatory hiring practices
and unemployment, lowering wages and working conditions. This
discrimination and prejudice has, according to a study of the National
Council of La Raza, deprived the overall Hispanic community of at
least 11 billion dollars a year in earnings.
It is the politics of racism and prejudice that keeps the issue of
broadening the legal participation of the Mexican labor force and
access to US labor markets off the table of negotiations on a free
trade accord. In this context then, the Mexican labor force again
becomes an expendable component of political considerations, despite
being an important component of economic development. Thus, within
the framework of a developing legal agreement for economic inte-
gration on a continental basis, the exclusion of labor mobility from
these regulatory considerations points to the acceptance of the dif-
ferential treatment and regulation of the international Mexican mi-
grant, the inequitable incorporation of migratory labor flows on a
continental basis, and the persisting socio-economic subordination of
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the Mexican-origin population in the process of the proposed regional
economic integration. From the international human rights stand-
point, the inclusion of selected segments of international labor mi-
gration, i.e. for executives or Canadians as opposed to Mexican
workers, as topics of discussion and negations of NAFTA transgress
international norms that guarantee the exercise and protection of
human rights and fundamental liberties without distinction as to race,
sex, language, religion or national origin.
However, the United States bears a responsibility for the existence
of labor migration streams that shape its economic relationship to
Mexico and to the Mexican-origin population. Thus, we propose the
formation of one more negotiating group in the NAFTA negotiations
to focus on labor, including worker rights, labor standards, and labor
mobility. It is important that within this group the linkage between
labor rights and labor mobility as a trade privilege be a subject of
these negotiations. Amongst the first issues to be considered by this
group should be a strategy for dismantling legal barriers to the
mobility of labor tightly woven to a strategy to harmonize wage
differentials and provide for the promotion, protection and defense
of all human rights on an equitable basis. Specifically, the first non-
tariff trade barrier to be considered should be the repeal of the
employer sanctions provision of IRCA and respect for the right to
work of all workers regardless of their immigration status. More
importantly, a corresponding legal framework for expanded legalized
border migration is the only long-term check on exploitative wage
scales that negatively impact working people of all three countries.
In addition, a provision should be adopted that will create mechanisms
to monitor the implementation of the trade and related agreements
and provide a means for dispute resolution.
In conclusion, only the broadening of the scope of issues in trade
negotiations will insure that prosperity will not be restricted to few
but that a true framework of a real developmental alternative can
be erected. The crossing of borders in search of access to US labor
markets should be an essential part of the regional social-economic
integration. Closer economic integration should lead to close cross-
border political alliances parallelling new cooperation between the
United States, Mexico and Canada.
James H. Brannigan, American Petroleum Institute
My name is James H. Brannigan, and I am here to testify on
behalf of the American Petroleum Institute. API is a trade association
representing over 250 companies involved in all aspects of the oil
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and gas industry. We believe that the goal of a free trade area
encompassing the whole of North America is a desirable extension
of the bilateral arrangements already established between the United
States and Canada ....
Today Mexicans and Canadians may freely invest in nearly every
aspect of U.S. business. At the same time, U.S. citizens find almost
every aspect of Canadian industry open to them. We hope for the
same kind of reciprocity in a free trade agreement with Mexico. As
American capital flows into Mexico's industrial sector and American
markets open up to Mexican products, the benefits of a free trade
agreement will become immediately apparent in Mexico's improved
standard of living. Benefits to the U.S., in the form of jobs, economic
growth, and reduced dependence on Persian Gulf petroleum supply,
will come later. The magnitude and sustainability of these benefits
will hinge largely on the degree to which energy can be fully included
within the process of trade liberalization, since major new capital
investments in the Mexican energy sector will be required to sustain
Mexican economic growth ....
The U.S. petroleum industry has the technology and capital to
make major contributions to addressing the challenges faced by Mex-
ico in each of these areas ....
Despite the need for such investment, there is a troubling remnant
of Mexico's isolationist past which has survived recent liberalization
trends. That is, with the exception of petrochemicals, foreign capital
and technology in energy has largely continued to be excluded from
participation in recent liberalization.
In summary, American oil companies are willing and able to con-
tribute significantly to the major challenges currently faced by the
Mexican energy sector. We have met such challenges successfully
throughout the world for over a century and have operations with
state oil companies. Mexico holds promise to be a major North
American supplier of petroleum products as American capital, tech-
nology, and management experience become available to it. It is our
hope that the negotiators will be able to secure an agreement to
facilitate such contributions.
HOUSTON, TEXAS, AUGUST 27, 1991
Reverend Lydia Martinez, United Methodist Church
I am the Reverend Lydia Martinez, Conference Chairperson for
Church and Society, Rio Grande Conference of the United Methodist
Church. The Rio Grande Conference has 14,000 Hispanic members
in the states of Texas and New Mexico.
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From our perspective, the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Free Trade nego-
tiations present an important opportunity. We must choose whether
the growing integration between our countries will mean an oppor-
tunity that will begin to provide authentic cooperation to solve mutual
problems or the continuation of conditions which deny persons basic
human rights or destroy the environment in the name of economic
growth.
This is not a new concern for the religious community. John Wesley,
the founder of the Methodist movement, decried the economic ex-
ploitation of children and the environment in the early days of
England's industrial revolution. Unfortunately, 250 years later, social
concerns are not always integrated into economic development policy.
The three North American countries face three common problems
of development (1) an external debt burden that has forced cuts in
social programs, (2) heightened international economic competition
and the need to strengthen productivity as well as maintain and
improve the living standards for all, and (3) industrial pollution with
its dangerous effects on workers, communities and the environment.
We believe that tri-national cooperation can help to solve these
and other development problems. But these will never be addressed
if the agenda for discussion includes only trade and investment. Trade
and investment can be tools for development that includes economic
progress, social justice and a healthier environment, but only if
pursued in ways not detrimental to marginalized persons, particularly
women, children, indigenous populations, people of color and the
poor.
Representatives of workers, consumers, farmers, families, and the
poorest sectors of our societies, as well as those of industry and
governments, must have an opportunity to participate in the process
of defining and resolving development problems.
We believe that a fully participatory process is important to assure
the proper exercise of national sovereignty, and the participation of
the people of each country in the affirmation of their own social,
economic and environmental priorities. This vital balance between
national sovereignty and participation embraces the regional goal of
cooperation to improve conditions for all.
The agenda for U.S.-Mexico-Canada Free Trade negotiations must
include: human rights, debt, labor, environment, trade and invest-
ment, binding enforcement mechanisms and ways for citizens and
residents of each country to oversee the enforcement of the final
agreement. We view the following as some critical elements for a
common trade agreement.
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HuMAN RIGHTS - There must be a reaffirmation of commitment to
internationally recognized human rights and the acceptance of po-
litical and human rights monitoring and international dispute res-
olution mechanisms,
DEBT - Debt reduction plans must be made an integral part of a
tri-national initiative for meaningful and sustainable economic de-
velopment.
LABOR - Workers' living standards and working conditions in all
three countries must be improved by enforcing internationally-rec-
ognized rights of workers, enforcing appropriate labor, health and
safety standards and by providing workers needed opportunities for
education, training and re-training. The labor and human rights of
workers, both immigrants and refugees, moving between the three
countries must be recognized and protected.
ENVIRONMENT - Effective environmental regulation must include (1)
assessment of environmental risk and development of alternative
proposals, (2) creation of pollution prevention infrastructure, (3)
enforcement assistance for environmental standards and (4) revo-
cation of trade advantages for failure to comply with basic standards.
TRADE AND INVESTMENT - Foreign investment must not be allowed
to jeopardize the preservation and strengthening of domestic pro-
duction capacities, or the national control of vital natural resources.
Binding and enforceable standards must protect communities as well
as workers, communities and the environment in all three countries.
BINDING ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM - Fundamental labor and en-
vironmental rights and standards must be linked to access to eco-
nomic concessions by means of a formal and binding dispute
resolution mechanism. This process must include the power to with-
hold trade and other concessions for failures to observe environ-
mental and labor standards.
PARTICIPATION - In addition to having opportunities to comment on
the drafts of the agreement itself, citizens of all three countries must
have access to proceedings of the institutions established to enforce
the agreement. Proceedings which could have the effect of over-
turning hard fought legal rights in a country must be open to the
public, not decided in secret.
To reemphasize our original point: We believe that the U.S.-Mexico-
Canada Free trade negotiations represent an important opportunity
to work toward a plan of cooperation for mutually beneficial de-
velopment; an opportunity that is too important to the future of all
three countries to sacrifice for a quick up and down vote on a trade
agreement.
Cindy Arnold, Centro del Obrero Fronterizo:
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My name is Cindy Arnold, and I am the Development Specialist
with Centro del Obrero Fronterizo, Inc. The Centro is a non-profit
organization dedicated to improving the economic conditions of low
income Hispanics in El Paso County. The county's largest industrial
sector is the garment industry, which employs over 17,000 people.
85076 of these workers are Hispanic immigrant women.
I would like to share with you our serious concerns about the
impact the Free Trade Agreement will have on these and other
immigrant workers in the US. We base our analysis on women
workers' experience with the maquiladora program in El Paso.
During the past 20 years, El Paso's garment workers have not seen
the economic benefits and development promised by the maquiladora
program. Instead, many of the larger companies drastically reduced
their local production and/or closed their plants. Much of this pro-
duction went to other countries.
The city's immigrant women workers have been most seriously
affected; many lost their jobs as the industry reorganized. Yet there
were no effective local, state or federal plans to provide them with
economic assistance and/or retraining.
These women workers also have experienced a serious erosion of
their rights. Many of them had to take jobs in sweatshops in order
to support their families. They work from day to day without knowing
if they will be paid, or even if the company will continue to operate.
When they are paid, they receive minimum wage with no benefits or
protections. Unemployment and workers' compensation coverage are
often not provided.
This phenomenon is not confined to El Paso. The systematic de-
terioration of workers' rights and livelihoods is occurring nationwide.
Electronics, auto, and other manufacturers are dismantling their pro-
duction operations and moving them off-shore, or contracting them
to smaller companies. These smaller, almost underground, operations
pay far lower wages, offer few if any benefits or protections for
workers, and are practically invisible to enforcement agencies.
This kind of industrial reorganization and worker displacement has
serious impact on a community's economy. For every ten workers
who are displaced, nine others in associated employment also lose
jobs. Unemployment insurance rises for businesses; all levels of gov-
ernment lose income. Unemployment, crime rates, domestic violence,
suicide, drug abuse, and stress-related diseases all increase.
With the planning for the FTA, we hear the same economic prom-
ises, and see the same lack of serious plans for workers. Their
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concerns, especially those of immigrant women working along the
border, must be addressed. These concerns include:
The right to a life with dignity including the right to a job
The right to be treated as a human being on the job
The right to have one's legal rights upheld and protected
To do this requires:
1. A substantial and long-term investment in the renovation of the
garment and other labor-intensive industries.
Renovating an existing industry entails providing investment to
upgrade its management, finance, marketing, facilities and technol-
ogy. It is a strategy that utilizes the skills of an experienced workforce
and industry to create stable jobs. It avoids the serious costs of
permitting an industry to disappear and then trying to replace it.
To conduct an in-depth renovation of an industry requires a serious
investment by the federal government. State and local governments
cannot do it alone. This strategy is worthwhile because it is less
expensive, more productive and more achievable than recruiting mar-
ginal service jobs or totally retraining a large portion of the workforce
as a solution to the displacement created by the FTA.
2. It also requires serious and effective job training programs
and sufficient economic assistance for workers displaced by the FTA
to enable them to maintain their families while developing new mar-
ketable job skills.
The primary funding for retraining programs are JTPA funds and
TRA benefits. However neither of these is adequate for workers'
needs. Only TRA provides some income subsidy, and neither provides
service support. This assistance is especially insufficient for immigrant
workers who require language as well as new skills training, and who
are ineligible for other government services.
3. Increased enforcement and expansion of workers' legal rights.
The working conditions which I described earlier are an indictment
of government's efforts to protect workers' rights. Various state and
federal agencies have begun to enforce laws protecting workers, but
their efforts are insufficient to eliminate the widespread and flagrant
abuses. With the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement, the
government must make a serious commitment to enforcing the legal
rights of workers. As participants in the creation of the country's
wealth, they deserve full protection under the law.
Commitment to these strategies is absolutely necessary to ensure
that workers and communities do not have to choose between ex-
ploitation or unemployment as the Free Trade Agreement is imple-
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mented. These strategies ensure that immigrant women workers will
have a future in the United States.
Jan Gilbreath Rich, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs
I am Jan Gilbreath Rich. Sidney Weintraub and I form part of
the Program for U.S.-Mexican Policy Studies of the Lyndon B.
Johnson School of Public Affairs in the University of Texas at Austin.
We are testifying about two social issues that must be taken into
account in the negotiation of the proposed North American free-
trade agreement (NAFTA). These are labor standards and environ-
mental impacts.
The NAFTA is now under negotiation and we wish a favorable
outcome. Your purpose in conducting these hearings is to determine
the many impacts of free trade on our society in order to take
advantage of favorable features and avoid unfavorable outcomes or
repercussions. The social impacts of a NAFTA must be addressed
as thoroughly and as vigorously as the economic impact on our
nation. Failure to address social issues will greatly reduce the benefits
of liberalized trade for all three nations within the NAFTA. Failure
to address these issues would also convert many supporters into
opponents.
Many policy experts will testify about the social issues that must
be addressed in the trade negotiations or in parallel track discussions,
and others will address the process under which these issues should
be considered. We will outline some possible actions that the three
governments may take to ameliorate some of the adverse social im-
pacts of free trade. We will deal first with the environment.
Environmental Issues
The environmental impact of this trade agreement could be one
of its most costly side effects if trade negotiations fail to take into
account the degradation to natural resources that can occur with
continued industrial integration on both the southern and northern
borders of the United States. One of the most pressing needs is for
funding to improve the strained infrastructure of the U.S.-Mexican
border, where poverty levels and living conditions even on the U.S.
side of the border rival those of Third World nations. I would invite
those of you unfamiliar with the Texas border, which is the one we
know best, to visit the colonias (a Mexican neighborhood or residential
area, often referring informally to low-income areas and squatter
communities in South Texas as well as Mexico) there to understand
the depth of poverty. These conditions existed long before Mexico
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initiated the border maquiladora program in 1965 and certainly long
before border industrial integration received a boost from Mexico's
policy of promoting industrial competitiveness following the collapse
of the economy during the early 1980s. However, rapid and continuing
industrial integration will pose increasingly large roadblocks to border
economic development without a forceful and well-funded plan to
rebuild the border infrastructure in this region. If border pollution
becomes aggravated, the millions of Americans who live in border
states will pay a heavy price. The cost will be felt in the environmental
degradation and in the pressure for industry and other activities to
move elsewhere. Among them, the four border states have about one
quarter of the U.S. population and are growing. We are not a
negligible force in U.S. society.
To solve the border's numerous problems, substantial amounts of
funding will be needed over the next decade or more .... [Included
among] the most pressing and expensive of the border's infrastructure
needs [are] . . . sewage treatment . . . Water conservation planning,
coordination and related infrastructure construction. This will be
costly ... [control of] industrial hazardous and toxic waste pollution
... [help for] the poverty-stricken neighborhoods of both sides of
the border that lack access to potable water, sewage systems or
adequate medical care. . . [and reduction of] the air pollution prob-
lem ....
To resolve the infrastructure finance problems of the U.S.-Mexican
border, and to a lesser extent the infrastructure needs of the U.S.-
Canadian border, the following financing mechanisms should be con-
sidered. None has been fully developed. We are aware of the deep
misgiving about the T-word, but we should not enter into free trade
unless we can finance the necessary infrastructure to make it suc-
cessful, or take the required steps that will protect the environ-
ment ....
Border Environmental Policy Implementation
Currently, the United States and Mexico look to two binational
mechanisms for coordination and implementation of border environ-
mental projects: the working groups of SEDUE and the EPA and
the International Boundary and Water Commission. The SEDUE/
EPA relationship has been growing over the past decade, but it has
yet to establish the baseline environmental data needed for a border
management plan, much less the close coordination needed to im-
plement such plans. The SEDUE/EPA working relationship with the
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IBWC is not clearly established and is not adequately defined by any
formal accord ....
Several ideas should be explored for resolving the overlapping,
unclear responsibilities for the border region's pollution control ef-
forts: ...
Hazardous Waste Recommendations
The majority of the nearly 2,000 maquiladoras operating on the
U.S.-Mexico border region generate hazardous waste, and yet the
EPA acknowledges that only 91 of these companies have actually
returned their waste to the United States since 1987 in accordance
with the 1983 LaPaz agreement between the two countries. The
pressing question here is what happens to those wastes that don't
return? About 80 percent of the nearly 800 maquiladoras operating
on the Texas-Mexico border generate hazardous industrial wastes,58
so our state has a very specific interest in tracking them.
In addition to tracking these wastes, the United States and Mexico
face a lack of developed infrastructure for transporting or recycling
them, insufficient waste handling methods, contradictory government
policies governing them, and legal ambiguity in Mexico concerning
waste recycling procedures.
The following series of recommendations could be useful in solving
these problems. Some of these proposals could be initiated by the
state of Texas, but others must be implemented through the federal
government.
1. Make the tracking of wastes easier by creating a clearing-
house ....
2. Carry out an inventory on the types and volumes of haz-
ardous waste being generated by industry along the U.S.-
Mexican border ....
3. Border states should be encouraged to take an active role
in locating the parent companies of maquiladoras that want
to dispose of wastes within their boundaries. This infor-
mation would allow border states to deal more effectively
with questions of liability and costs relating to accidental
spills.
4. Work with Mexico to develop a mutually beneficial waste
recycling and treatment industry along the border. By deal-
58 This information comes from a database compiled by Market Strategies In-
ternational, Inc. of Austin, Texas.
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ing with wastes in the vicinity of its generators, the chances
of accidents during transport are greatly reduced.
5. Encourage and assist Mexico in dealing with the issue of
hazardous waste transportation ....
Research Opportunities and Coordination
U.S.-Mexico border economic integration has been going on for
decades, just as it has on the U.S.-Canadian border. But the Mexican
border poses special problems not evident on the Canadian border,
and for this reason its needs must be specifically addressed. Its
situation is unique because of the disparities in income between the
two countries that share this long border. It may also be the most
heavily utilized border in the world. There are approximately one
million legal crossings each day.
Before the border's problems can be addressed, the nature and
scope of those problems must be defined. This cannot be done without
baseline data on living conditions, population growth both in the
rural and urban areas, the state of border water and sewage systems,
level of air, surface and subterranean pollution, transportation in-
frastructure, capacity of local governments to solve problems, scope
of industry and the waste it generates, and the region's capacity for
waste recycling and disposal.
This data must first be gathered, analyzed and finally public policy
programs must be formed that take into account the status of the
border infrastructure. This represents a special challenge to the re-
search institutions of Mexico and the United States, and these in-
stitutions are beginning to aim a series of requests for financial
assistance to the federal government.
When the U.S. Congress allocates research funds for the U.S.-
Mexican border, its ability to receive beneficial results for its money
depends on the expertise of the research institution. A significant
problem exists in the way research funding decisions have been made
for the EPA through the Congressional budget appropriations process.
A case in point is the newly created Southwest Center for Environ-
mental Research and Policy, which proposes to coordinate the ma-
jority of border environmental research projects in the academic
community. Noticeably absent from this consortium were a number
of border universities with strong environmental programs. None of
the California universities were included and only one Texas university
was included.
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This consortium, which was authorized to receive $1.9 million in
fiscal 1991 and $2 million in 1992, never underwent any EPA scrutiny
to determine whether its services fell within the agency's own goals.
For fiscal 1993, the consortium is reportedly seeking $9 million in
federal funding, again outside the purview of the EPA.
Worker Standards
In his letter of May 1, 1991, President Bush said that the efforts
toward economic integration in North America would be comple-
mented by expanded programs of cooperation in labor and environ-
ment. We hope that Congress holds the feet of the administration
to the fire in both these areas.
The memorandum of understanding between the labor secretaries
of the United States and Mexico is a good first step. It at least
recognizes that the issue of conditions in the work place is a significant
aspect of trade and economic cooperation. However, by itself a
memorandum that promised cooperation "in principle," as this one
does is only as good as the follow-on actions that occur.
We have not come here to criticize Mexico. Given Mexico's status
as a developing country, the provision of health care under its Social
Security system is praiseworthy. But the reality is that we do not
know enough about Mexico's labor standards in practice to be able
to make any definitive statements. President Bush's discussion of
labor standards in Mexico in his presentation of May I was more a
recitation of Mexican law and aspirations stated in the Mexican
Constitution than it was of Mexican practice.
Therefore, as with the environment, a first necessary step is to
establish a baseline of the Mexican situation. We were told by op-
ponents of the free-trade agreement during the fast-track debate that
working conditions in Mexican maquiladoras were substandard, and
by the proponents that they were superior to Mexican factories gen-
erally. Which is the truth? We do not know. We were told by the
U.S. government that the average work week in Mexico is between
44 and 48 hours. Which is it? We know that there are laws on the
books in Mexico limiting child labor, yet there are persistent reports
of children under 14 dropping out of school to work in factories.
How frequent is this practice? It is not good enough to know what
the law says. We must know what reality is.
It is not only the United States that needs information about
Mexico, but also Mexico needs information about U.S. labor prac-
tices. How are Mexican migrant workers treated in the United States?
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Are Mexican children-or U.S. children of migrant workers - receiving
the required years of schooling? Compliance with minimum decent
levels of education needs to be verified in both countries.
Second, there must be some system under which each country can
verify the practices of the other, particularly when a complaint is
registered that violations are occurring. The memorandum of un-
derstanding is vague on this point.
Finally, while the memorandum spells out the areas of cooperation
in the labor area, there is no timetable attached to this. The free-
trade agreement itself will have a timetable. We urge that this be
done as well for upgrading labor standards in the two countries.
By far the greatest sensitivity in the United States toward entering
into free trade with Mexico relates to different labor conditions.
These refer to much lower Mexican wages and to less stringent labor
standards in Mexico for producing goods and services. Increasing
wages in Mexico can come about only as Mexican productivity in-
creases and all evidence indicates that free trade will contribute to
this. However, there is no need to wait until Mexican wages begin
to close the gap with U.S. wages before insisting on strict compliance
with labor standards that both countries have committed themselves
to apply.
Linking the Trade Agreement to its Social Implications
The danger of parallel track environmental negotiations is that they
will lag significantly behind trade negotiations or fail altogether if
not tied to the general trade agreement. General environmental prin-
ciples should be written into the U.S.-Mexican-Canadian free-trade
agreement. The same is true for labor standards.
Trade negotiations will not address all the natural resource problems
shared by the three participating countries. The U.S.-Canadian trade
agreement left many pesticide and other health and safety issues
unresolved. The United States and Mexico have many more dissimilar
standards, making dispute resolution more difficult and yet more
important. Congress should make it clear that either in trade ne-
gotiations or on a parallel track, the three countries need a workable
mechanism specifically tailored to resolution of environmental and
labor standard issues.
Conclusion
Our studies at the LBJ School of Public Affairs indicate that under
a free-trade agreement, Texas will capture a significant proportion
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of the projected gains in U.S. exports to Mexico. These benefits will
accrue only if the state is prepared for a higher level of economic
activity. At this time, the border region is in trouble and is unlikely
to take full advantage of the trade benefits. It has too few roads
and bridges leading into Mexico, a dwindling water supply and in-
creased pollution levels in the existing supply. At the same time,
population growth - particularly on the Mexican side - is straining
the inadequate infrastructure that now exists in the region. To resolve
these problems, we need a thoughtful agenda of natural resource
issues to negotiate with the Mexicans during trade talks, we need a
practical border management plan; and, we need carefully coordinated
research projects that will enhance, rather than detract from future
border development.
With respect to labor standards, we need a program to assure
ourselves that these will conform to what both countries say is their
goal. The first step is to know with some reasonable certainty what
labor practices now are, and then we require a mechanism and a
timetable certain to assure that whatever corrective measures are
needed will be taken.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA, AUGUST 29, 1992
Florida Department of Agriculture Commissioner Bob Crawford
Good afternoon. I appreciate the opportunity to speak today and
present the unified position of Florida agriculture on the North
American Free Trade Agreement.
Let me begin by saying that we've been troubled by the closed
nature of the negotiations to this point. Before the fast track vote,
we were assured that we would have the opportunity to observe the
entire negotiation process. Instead, we have found the process to be
tightly controlled and largely closed, making it difficult to observe,
let alone influence.
In Florida, we have a tradition of open government, which makes
the closed negotiation process all the more difficult to accept, es-
pecially when our $6.2 billion agriculture industry is on the line.
The unified position of Florida agriculture-a position which has
the support of Florida's Governor and Cabinet and our Congressional
delegation-is that import-sensitive, winter-produced fruits, vegeta-
bles, citrus and their products should be exempted from the North
American Free Trade Agreement.
That exemption should remain in effect at least until serious con-
cerns regarding food safety, sanitation, pesticide and environmental
19921
GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L.
regulations, animal and plant health, farmworker and labor issues
and food security are adequately addressed.
I noted that you recently formed two working groups with rep-
resentatives of the FDA, USDA and EPA to consider some of these
issues. I hope you will accept their recommendations and incorporate
them into these negotiations.
We recognize that our trade negotiators are striving to avoid ex-
emptions. However, I believe there are compelling reasons to maintain
existing tariffs on winter fruits and vegetables and citrus. And I
further believe that these products can be exempted without disrupting
the framework or disturbing the goals of a comprehensive free trade
agreement.
Clearly, Florida has reason for concern. Agriculture is a major
contributor to our economy-a $6.2 billion dollar business that vies
with tourism as Florida's number one industry.
Agriculture directly employs up to 500,000 Floridians, not including
all those who work in related jobs.
Florida is the only state in the nation with a growing season that
is virtually identical to Mexico's. That means, if import tariffs are
lifted, Florida would be in direct competition with Mexico.
Because Mexican growers enjoy significant economic advantages,
including greatly reduced land costs, government subsidies, and free-
dom from expensive labor, environmental and food safety require-
ments, Florida growers would be faced with an insurmountable
economic threat . . . a threat that we believe will put many Florida
growers out of business.
If Florida agriculture is put out of business, it will have a dev-
astating effect on Florida's economy. It will remove revenue that
cannot be easily replaced. Unlike states that share a border with
Mexico, Florida cannot shift easily into processing or another support
service.
Beyond the effect on Florida's economy, the devastation of Florida
agriculture will have a profound effect on the nation as a whole.
First, it will force America to rely on a foreign nation for a vital
part of its food supply. Right now, Florida produces more than half
of the nation's supply of fresh fruits and vegetables and nearly 100
percent of many crops in the winter months.
If Florida is driven out of the agriculture business, the U.S. will
be dependent on Mexico and other southern neighbors to supply our
winter fruits and vegetables. For the first time in America's history,
we will lack the ability to feed ourselves.
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I heard an interesting analysis recently that linked the fall of
communism in the Soviet Union to the Soviets' grain deal with the
United States. The analyst suggested that the grain deal demonstrated
to the Russian people that its government was not even capable of
feeding its citizens.
That is a major weakness of this agreement. It should be the goal
of every nation to provide the basic items it needs to survive, and
food tops the list.
Second, we believe the administration should be concerned about
the safety of food coming into this country from Mexico.
Mexican produce may be grown with pesticides that are illegal in
this country, and Mexico lacks an adequate regulatory program to
ensure that the food grown with those chemicals is safe to eat.
Poor sanitation in Mexico increases the chance that Mexican pro-
duce entering this country will be contaminated with microbes that
can cause serious illnesses. This year, melons believed to originate
from Mexico and the Rio Grande have caused hundreds of cases of
salmonella among Americans. Last year, imported melons produced
25,000 cases of salmonella and three deaths in the U.S. And the
persistent northward progression of cholera is a growing public health
threat.
The U.S. Embassy cautions Americans visiting Mexico to avoid
eating fresh fruits and vegetables for fear of foodborne illness. Yet,
if this trade agreement is adopted without exemptions, Americans
may have no choice but to eat Mexican fruits and vegetables right
here at home.
The FDA cannot possibly do enough testing at the border to ensure
the safety of food originating in Mexico. Mexico must develop an
equivalent regulatory program. Until a reliable program is in place,
fresh fruits and vegetables, citrus and their products should be ex-
empted from this agreement.
Third, if you drastically increase imports of Mexican produce into
this country, you will also drastically increase the import of agri-
cultural pests.
Last year, more than 9,400 pests and plant diseases were intercepted
as they entered this country from Mexico. That's an enormous threat
to American farms and gardens, and it's a threat that will grow as
Mexican imports grow.
Fighting that threat is an expensive proposition. Two years ago,
one medfly infestation in Florida lasted four months and cost $1.6
million to control. California recently waged a 14-month battle against
the medfly at a cost of $60 million.
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The Mexican fruit fly has the potential of being an even more
serious pest-one that we will very likely have to deal with if this
trade agreement ushers in vast amounts of Mexican produce.
Fourth, to this point I have not heard an adequate strategy to
prevent transshipments of agricultural products from other Latin
American countries through Mexico to the United States. Brazil and
Cuba both have large citrus holdings. What is to prevent their product
from displacing or combining with Mexican product and flooding
the U.S. market?
As you know, Florida has a large population of Cuban-Americans,
and we strongly oppose trade with a Castro-controlled Cuba. And
yet, this agreement almost guarantees the backdoor entry of Cuban
agricultural products into the U.S. We are very anxious to hear how
the trade negotiators propose to avoid this problem.
For all of these reasons, we believe winter-produced fruits, vege-
tables, citrus and their products should be exempted from this trade
agreement.
I have been asked whether a delayed implementation date for winter
produce would be an acceptable compromise. That's kind of like
finding out that your boss has given you two weeks to find a new
job. You're still out of work.
I believe the contributions of Florida's farmers are too important
to abandon. I can't believe it's the goal of the Bush Administration
to put thousands of Americans out of work or to trade away the
safety and security of our food supply. But that could be the legacy
of this agreement.
Thank you.
Frank Bouis, Florida Fruit & Vegetable Association
Mr. Chairman, I am Frank Bouis, a small citrus grower from Lake
County, Florida and President of the Florida Fruit and Vegetable
Association (FFVA) ....
When the Mexican Free Trade proposal was first advanced by the
Bush Administration they said it would be a good thing for American
agriculture because the agricultural trade of the two countries was
"complementary". Since then, there have been tens of thousands of
words, written and spoken, that have shown the supposed comple-
mentarily is an illusion of statistics ....
Fruit and vegetable agriculture is not well understood in government
circles. Maybe this is because it is market oriented instead of being
controlled by government programs. I thought, though, that the
dozens of presentations made over the last 15 months had brought
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light to the process. I know that is so in the Congress and the Trade
Representative's office.
But it may not be so in the U.S. Department of Commerce. Two
weeks ago, one of their senior officials, speaking to the National
Association of State Legislators, described the future under a NAFTA
in glowing terms of prosperity for all. Then, to add injury to insult,
he quoted the Economic Research Service of the USDA as support
for his contention that U.S. fruit and vegetable agriculture has suf-
ficient advantages vis-a-vis their Mexican counterparts to withstand
the additional threats.
Other government agencies understand this is not so ....
One of the Mexican diplomats charged with accomplishing this
Free Trade Agreement describes free trade as an ideal life where each
does the thing he is most efficient at. But the American fruit and
vegetable farmer is not free to farm efficiently. He farms as instructed
by his government. The Mexican fruit and vegetable farmer is free
to be efficient. The results are shown by the growing Mexican share
of the U.S. market ....
For many months and in many forums, we have submitted quite
a lot of data, which buttress our contentions that something new in
the way of trade negotiations is needed if U.S. fruit and vegetable
agriculture is to continue to survive in the way we know it and if
the American consumer is going to continue to get the kinds of fruits
and vegetables he and she has been accustomed to.
The challenge is to negotiate a new set of Mexican-U.S. relation-
ships, including a trade agreement, that does three essential things:
1. Assures the continued competitiveness of U.S. fruit and veg-
etable farmers vs. Mexican producers. Although U.S. farmers in many
ways are far more efficient than Mexican producers, they are burdened
with more costly labor, food safety, and environmental requirements.
If the prospective negotiations permit differential regulatory and labor
conditions to continue while reducing or eliminating tariffs, large
numbers of U.S. fruit and vegetable farmers will be forced out of
production and an important part of the rural American scene will
disappear.
2. Fosters harmonious marketing of fresh produce. Modern fruit
and vegetable marketing is a complex system of grades and sizes,
statistics and market reports, adherence to rules and prompt and
certain access to justice when deals "go sour".
3. Assures the safety of our food supply, as well as the public's
confidence in it. Surveys show that sampled Mexican food imports
are somewhat less safe than U.S. samples. But, sampling is incomplete
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and so is the testing of the samples. Not all foods are checked, nor
are all contaminants and chemicals checked for. Public confidence
in the safety of food is essential, as shown by the recent hysterias
over Alar on apples and arsenic on grapes.
This can be accomplished by making tariff reduction dependent
on meaningful progress in these fields . .. . Only in this way are the
real interests of the American consumer and the American producer
of fruits and vegetables going to be protected.
Shirley Reinhardt, Tennessee Industrial Renewal Network
My name is Shirley Reinhardt and I come from Morristown, Ten-
nessee. Three years ago I was just a regular factory worker who got
up in the morning and went to work and fed my family and cleaned
my house and went to church and didn't look too much beyond
what I had to do every day to keep things going.
In those days we were certainly not wealthy, but we were doing
all right. When I went to the grocery store and saw people in front
of me buying groceries with food stamps, I looked down on them.
Something about them seemed to make me feel superior. It seemed
to me that if they would just get up on their own two feet, they
could make something of themselves, and not be living off the rest
of us.
Well, I've changed a lot since those days. Maybe not down inside.
I mean I've always been somebody who cared and tried to do right.
But it seems like the world just looks different to me now. The
change in my attitude is because of things that happened to me,
things I have learned.
The place where I was working back then was a General Electric
factory in Morristown. I was on a computerized assembly line, making
electrical switch boxes. In 1986 or so we got the first sign that
something funny might be going on, but I didn't pay much attention
to it. The company told us that it would be shutting down the sub-
assembly part of our plant, and moving it to Mexico, to a place
called Nogales. None of us had ever heard of Nogales before.
About forty people from our Morristown plant were going to lose
their jobs. But after all, most of us were still working. We didn't
ask too many questions. One man I knew went down to Nogales to
train the people down there in how to do what we had been doing
in Tennessee. When he came back he was upset. "Shirley, he said,
"They're working children down there." He didn't like it. It made
him feel strange to be part of such a thing. "You can't believe how
they live down there, Shirley," he said. "And do you know what?
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The company gives them candy on Friday afternoons. Candy!"
I remember him talking about all that. And I kind of filed it away
in my mind. But I didn't really do anything about it. The folks who
lost their jobs just kind of faded away.
Not long after that, a union came to our plant and had an or-
ganizing drive. The campaign lasted a long time, and the company
pulled out all the stops. They told us that if we voted for the union,
they would close down the whole warehouse operation. (I know that
most people here in this room are probably not blue collar workers.
So maybe I need to explain this a little. But in America today, if
you are a factory worker, to be threatened with losing your job is
one of your worst nightmares. This threat puts fear in people's hearts.
Companies have discovered that it is a great way to beat a union.)
At the same time that the company was threatening us, they were
also sweet-talking us. I especially remember the video they made
which was shown to all the workers at the plant right before the
time for the union election. The video showed a lot of local spots
in Morristown. It was like they were trying to say how "at home"
the company was here in our little town, what a difference they made
to the whole community. (And of course they do make a difference.)
They had also gone around and taken photographs of every worker
at the plant. When they finally showed the video to us, there we
were up on the screen, each one a part of the picture. In fact, the
video said that we were all a part of the "GE Family."
Apparently most people were convinced-some by the fear and
others by the sweet-talk. In the election the union was defeated
overwhelmingly, two to one.
Two weeks later GE began lay-offs. They soon announced that
they were going to close down the warehouse after all, even though
we had voted against the union. The company's silent promise that
if we rejected the union they would keep the warehouse open was a
thing of the past. The "GE Family" was just empty words.
When they closed the warehouse another 150 jobs were gone. After
all the warehouse people exercised their seniority rights, some workers
from the production lines had to go for good, and I was one of
them. That was 1988. I had worked for GE for ten years. I have
not worked since.
When I got fired is when my education really began. Now I know
what it is like to be involuntarily unemployed. Now I know what it
is like to try to avoid talking to people you run into in the grocery
store. You can tell they are wondering why you don't have the
gumption to find a job.
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Those of us who were laid off from GE in 1988 were upset at
first, but mainly by the inconvenience. We thought that after some
looking we would soon find other jobs. Nothing could have been
further from the truth.
Most of us went first to the unemployment office. We wanted to
draw our benefits as long as we were out of work, and we wanted
that office to help steer us to our next job. We found to our surprise
that they had no jobs, at least not the kinds of jobs that we felt we
were qualified for and that paid the kinds of wages we knew we
were capable of earning. They suggested that we go to the temporary
agency.
The idea of going to a temporary agency was also a shock to us.
Most of us thought of temporary agencies as Kelly Girl kinds of
operations: places for young women who wanted to earn a little pin
money being receptionists or file clerks or typists, girls who needed
a little something to tide them over until school started. But we
learned that temporary agencies were changing. More and more em-
ployers didn't want the responsibility even of employing regular work-
ers. The more they could shift work to temporaries, the less
responsibility they would have.
Now you would think I would have been smarter than I was. I
had a sister who had been complaining to me for years about having
to work as a temporary. She would call me up and tell me about
what it was like: she had no'job security, no fringe benefits, no
retirement. She was treated always as a second-class citizen at work.
And at any moment she might be let go, and yet no one could say
she had really "lost" her job. After all, she was only temporary.
The more we laid-off workers looked into this, the madder we got.
When we went to the temporary agency, the jobs they had listed
paid terrible wages. They were sending us in to work side by side
with people who were making decent money and who had adequate
fringe benefits, but we were entitled to none of those things. We
began to hear more and more stories of this abuse.
And so eventually we formed an organization called Citizens Against
Temporary Services. And we have proposed legislation, we have
testified at hearings, we have generally raised sand in Morristown
and Hamblen County and all over Tennessee. But we have learned
that the problems are a lot bigger than we thought they were. The
problems are global.
And that's why I am here. It may sound like a long way from
the unemployment line in Hamblen County, Tennessee to the Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative. But really it's not. In fact I have
[Vol. 22:329
NAFTA PUBLIC DEBATE
come to believe that trade policy and unemployment are all tied up
together.
In July of this year, I went on a trip to Mexico that was sponsored
by the Tennessee Industrial Renewal Network. TIRN is a coalition
of labor, religious, and community organizations. It works to prevent
plant closing whenever possible, and when a closing is unavoidable,
TIRN works to lessen its impact on workers and community residents.
TIRN is convinced that the deindustrialization of America is related
to the fact that so many companies are moving their work to low-
wage countries in other parts of the world. Many of our members
work in factories or in industries that have shipped off many jobs
to Mexico. We decided that some of our members should go to
Mexico and see for themselves what was going on.
The things and people we saw on our trip we will never forget. I
guess I thought I had already learned just how hollow that talk about
"the GE Family" really was. I guess I thought I had already learned
that corporations seem to care first and foremost about their own
profits, and are willing to treat workers and communities as ex-
pendable as long as it is to their own advantage.
But nothing I had learned had gotten me ready to see the conditions
under which workers in Mexico are forced to live. Those colonias
to me are living proof that corporations have no bottom line of their
own, no minimum standard you can trust them to honor.
We saw conditions that are so bad I simply cannot describe them
to you. I can close my eyes and see them in my mind: one- room
houses overflowing with people, suffocating summer heat filling the
tiny boxes where mothers fanned their sweating babies, stagnant pools
of water with scum and garbage right next to where people were
living, drainpipes carrying toxic industrial waste into ditches that ran
through neighborhoods, bare feet, sick animals, horrible smells, open
sores.
And yet it is a strange thing. These pictures in my mind don't last
as long as other pictures: many of the people we met had a courage
and dignity I will never forget. Their eyes were shining. Against huge
odds they were fighting to build a life. They were beautiful people.
They were glad to welcome us, because they believed us when we
said we would try to come back to this country and tell the American
public the truth about life and work in the maquiladoras. They asked
us to bring back the word to you about what is happening to those
on the bottom in Mexico. Because what is happening ought to be a
crime. And it is hurting not only Mexicans, it is a direct threat to
the standard of living of American workers.
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The multi-national corporations bear much responsibility for what
is happening. But it is not just the corporations I blame. I blame
the government too. Our government should be insisting on corporate
accountability. Instead, it rewards irresponsibility. Our government
should set some ground rules so companies are not pressured to
compete with each other on the basis of how much they can gouge
their workers. Instead, it pushes a version of free trade that encourages
low-wage competition.
We must learn from the failures of the maquiladora program and
develop a free trade agreement with Mexico that will not repeat the
same patterns. We need decent jobs at decent wages for workers on
both sides of the border. We need roads and sewers and schools and
garbage disposal and health care and retirement plans and parks and
safe workplaces and playgrounds on both sides of the border.
Any trade deal we reach with Mexico should start with a com-
mitment to a healthy development pattern for both countries, not a
get-richer-quick scheme for the wealthy and powerful until they decide
they have used up some more land or some more people and it's
time to move on again. You can only keep using people up and
throwing them away for so long before your own wastefulness comes
back to haunt you.
Thank you.
Luvernel Clark, Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union
and Tennessee Industrial Renewal Network
My name is Luvernel Clark. I am here representing the Amalga-
mated Clothing and Textile Workers Union and the Tennessee In-
dustrial Renewal Network, or TIRN. Mark Pitt from my union, and
Dianna Petty from TIRN were unable to attend this hearing today,
so I will speak on their behalf. We have also submitted Dianna's
own testimony in writing. I am a worker at the Allied-Bendix Safety
Restraints Division in Knoxville, Tennessee, where we make com-
ponents for automotive seat belts and air bags. I am also a shop
steward for Local 1742 of ACTWU, my union.
A dozen years ago, our factory at Allied was a big, busy place.
There were over 3,000 workers employed there. We had contracts
with GM, Ford, and other big car manufacturers.
But in the early 80's, Allied started shutting down parts of our
operation and transferring them to a non-union facility south of here
in Alabama. The jobs did not stay in Alabama long. Soon we learned
that the work had been moved from there down to a place call Agua
Prieta, Mexico. That was the first that a lot of us had heard about
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all these factories moving to Mexico. We had no idea what really
was happening.
I am still working now, but I never feel secure. We are down now
to 300 employees. Even when the company announces it is adding
a new line, or hiring new employees, people keep the lid on their
feelings. No one wants to count on anything or get their hopes up.
We have seen too many industrial jobs at our factory (and at others)
go to other countries.
I now have twenty years of seniority at my plant. And yet I am
one of the youngest employees there. We just aren't hiring new people
these days. What does this mean?
I have one teenage daughter and one who is twenty, and I really
wonder what will happen to them. Will they be some of the lucky
few that "make it," or will they end up in some service job making
barely more than minimum wage? I don't think they will have a
factory job unless we see some big changes in how we are running
this country. It seems like no one will be left in the middle anymore.
We will have just the rich and the poor.
Over the past year I have begun working with the Tennessee
Industrial Renewal Network .... This spring we decided that some
of our members should go to Mexico and see for themselves what
was going on.
I applied to go on the trip. I was especially interested in learning
about health and safety conditions, because I am head of our local's
health and safety committee. I was accepted, and on July 9th we
left for Mexico.
We were not prepared for what we saw or heard. It was strange,
because I had looked at pictures that other people brought back.
And I had seen slides, and even some video. I had read articles about
all this. But those pictures could not begin to convey what it was
like.
What hit me the most was the way people had to live. We saw
people who had to step into foot-deep nasty water when they got
down off their front porches. We saw pigs eating grass right next
to chemical waste. We saw young mothers struggling to take care of
their children in the blistering heat, with no running water, no elec-
tricity, no garbage pick-up, and no refrigeration. And these were
neighborhoods where full-time workers lived. One tiny shack we saw
had five people working full-time in U.S.-owned maquiladora plants.
One person on our trip said that they should put up a sign by
those neighborhoods "American Made". All my life, as long as I
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live, I will never forget seeing the conditions that our own corporations
are willing for their Mexican workers to live under.
We are not against increased trade with Mexico. And we are
certainly not against Mexican workers having jobs. But we are against
blackmail. We are against any kind of system that pits workers against
each other on the basis of which one can be forced to take the lowest
wage. We are against any system that encourages corporations to go
"shopping" for the lowest wages or the most lax law enforcement
or the biggest tax break. But our government seems like it wants a
system like that. Its reaction to the global economy is that corporations
need more freedom! A visit to the maquiladoras will show you what
freedom without responsibility can mean.
Going to Mexico made me realize what a huge GAP there is-in
wages, and conditions and law enforcement. Our fight is not about
taking jobs from Mexican or U.S. workers. It is not about trying to
keep that gap. It is about unity and human dignity. Thank you.
Dianna Petty, International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried,
Machine & Furniture Workers and Tennessee Industrial Renewal
Network
My name is Dianna Petty. I work as a troubleshooter on a pro-
duction line at a North American Phillips plant in Jefferson City,
Tennessee. This plant opened in 1956 and was known at that time
as a "double plant." On one side of the building, television cabinets
were made, and on the other side was an electronics operation. The
whole facility covered 15 acres and employed 1580 people.
I went to work at Phillips in 1968 when work was very good. I
worked on the electronics side. We made stereos, T.V.'s, radios,
Odyssey pin-ball machines.
Then in 1981, management decided to shut down our electronics
division and move it elsewhere. Part of the work went to Greeneville,
Tennessee, where we have a "sister" plant, but most of it went to
Mexico. Six hundred people lost their jobs at the time. (Our company
now has six plants operating in Mexico, all in the city of Juarez.) I
was not laid off, but was assigned to work in the cabinet division.
I am still working now, but the future of our factory is uncertain.
Our manager has let us know quite clearly that our whole plant may
close before much longer.
Back before winter of this year I didn't know that much about
the maquiladoras. I knew that Mexican workers made less money
than we did, but I never gave it any further thought. Then in February
I had the opportunity to meet two women from the maquiladoras.
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They came to Knoxville as the guests of the Tennessee Industrial
Renewal Network, TIRN. They showed us slides of the conditions
faced by workers in northern Mexico. They told us about what it
was like to work in or live close to maquiladora plants. Suddenly
things began to look different to me.
This past spring, TIRN extended an invitation to workers whose
companies had operations in Mexico to go on a trip to the maqui-
ladoras. I thought it would be interesting to see where we had lost
so many jobs to, so I applied for the trip. I was accepted, and on
July 9th we left for Mexico.
We were not prepared for what we saw or heard. For one thing,
we were really hit by the size of the investments some companies are
making there. I saw one factory that was huge, and better equipped
than our own plant at Jefferson City ....
We were also amazed at how young the workers were at that
factory. We were later told by Mexican women that workers in the
maquiladoras usually work from age 15 to 24, and that it is not
unusual to find 13 to 14-year-old. (They lie about their age and no
one checks too closely.) In fact, some of the Mexican workers we
met were surprised that the women in our group were still working.
To them, we seemed too old to still be on the job!
Our American companies are telling us that in order to keep our
jobs we must compete with Mexico or the rest of our jobs will be
moved. If they really mean we are supposed to compete with Mexican
workers on the basis of wages, then they must be assuming it is
perfectly fine for U.S. workers to live below the subsistence level,
like so many Mexican workers do. Well, that is NOT just fine by
me. If I only made $27 for a 48-hour work week, I could not afford
electricity or indoor plumbing or a car. I could not afford to make
house payments.
Most people think if Mexican workers only make $27 a week, the
cost of living must be cheaper in Mexico. Unfortunately, this is not
true. When we were there we saw that our prices and theirs are not
that different.
In addition to visiting the factory and several industrial parks, we
also went to see people in the neighborhoods where they lived. We
were invited into some of the workers' homes. We saw one-room
shacks that as many as six to eight people lived in.
The people we met were very gracious. They were proud to have
us. But I did not feel pride, I felt shame: shame and guilt that
corporations from my country were causing these people to live in
such poverty for the sake of cheap labor, shame that in some of the
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neighborhoods we visited, you could not breathe because of your
eyes watering and coughing from open chemical ponds out back of
factories separated from a neighborhood by only a wooden fence,
shame that American companies would locate in some other country
in order to take advantage of desperate people.
I also want to talk for a few minutes about the beautiful children
I saw. Images of those children keep coming to my mind. The children
did not have toys to play with. They did not have the minimum
sanitation so important for young children to make it though the
early years of their lives. We saw a baby taking a bath in a five-
gallon bucket. We saw other children playing next to pools of filthy
water. I have a grandchild of my own, who eagerly asked "what did
you bring me" when I returned from the trip. It felt wrong and sad
that I was in a position to give him extras when we saw so many
children without even the bare necessities.
One person on our trip said the word that kept coming into her
mind when we saw what was happening to people in Mexico was
"violence." I told her the word that kept coming to my mind was
"'rape. 
"
People who defend the maquiladora program say that it is a success
because it is making money for businesses and providing jobs in a
country that has a serious unemployment problem. But can it be a
success when there is gross pollution and when the jobs are unsafe
and pay wages that are below subsistence level?
If we on the U.S. side keep losing our jobs and the companies
keep paying such low wages on the Mexico side, who do you think
is going to buy all these wonderful products that our American
companies are making in Mexico? One thing is for certain. It won't
be Mexican workers. They will still be struggling every day just to
keep beans on the table, just to keep something over their families'
heads. And if things keep on, it won't be American workers either,
because we will mostly be unemployed or flipping hamburgers or
emptying bed pans.
It's not just because of this trip to Mexico that I have strong views
on the subject of corporations taking responsibility for their actions.
I grew up in southwest Virginia, in the heart of the coalfields. My
father was a coal miner. But when I was just a child, many coal
companies decided to close down their mines and leave Virginia
behind. Whole communities were devastated.
Like many others, my father moved north looking for work. He
got a job in a steel mill in Chicago. After that, when boys we knew
back home would graduate from high school, many times they would
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come north and move in with us for a while until they could get
them a job and a place of their own to stay. And of course, they
would also be sending money back down home. I can remember
times we had eight or ten people staying in a three bedroom apartment
with one bath. I thought of those days when I saw people piled in
on each other in the colonias near the maquiladora factories, and
when I heard them talk about moving there from other parts of
Mexico, looking for work.
I wonder: in all these years have we learned anything? Look at
the coal counties in Virginia and you will see what happens when
outside corporate interests are allowed to take a region's resources
and work its people sometimes literally to death, and then move on
as it pleases them ....
If people have no say in the economy of their own home, if
government demands no accountability from major economic powers,
then the land and people will simply be abandoned when they are
of no further "use" to those who profited from them. Nowadays
many places besides Appalachia are finding out what it means to be
left behind. Those Chicago steel mills are closing down now, many
of them.
To me it looks like a sure thing that the U.S. and Mexico are
going to continue to grow closer together economically. We will share
more and more common ground, and the gap between our countries
will narrow. But what direction will this change take? Will it mean
that Mexico's standard of living rises or that ours falls? We in TIRN
believe that our government should do everything in its power to
assure that Mexican wages and working conditions move upward to
be more in line with ours.
As vice-president of our local, I am familiar with what negotiators
do and with what it takes for them to reach a successful outcome
in bargaining. Negotiators need to be in close touch with their base,
with the people they are supposed to be representing and bargaining
for. They also need to clarify their own goals and objectives and
stick by them.
So I urge you negotiators: first, remember who you represent. You
should be negotiating for all the American people, not just for the
powerful few. And second, your goal should be healthy, balanced
development for both countries, geared toward the welfare of the
majority. A trade strategy with a goal of maximizing short-term
profits for multinationals will be bad for the environment and bad
for the workers on both sides of the border.
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I left Mexico with a feeling of anger at our big American cor-
porations: anger that they could go into another country and take
such outrageous advantage of these people, anger at our government
for allowing this to happen, anger at Mexico's government for al-
lowing it to happen. This is not the road to peace and prosperity
for Mexico or for us.
There is another strong emotion I felt when I left this beautiful
Mexican country: fear. I have fear that the kind of North American
Free Trade Agreement favored by the present administration will turn
most of Mexico into one big maquiladora zone. I have fear that
joblessness will continue to increase in our own country, and that
the jobs that remain will lack the wages, the benefits, and the dignity
of industrial production. I have fear that if things are allowed to
continue as they are, what I have seen in Mexico may be my grand-
children's future right here in the United States. We call on you to
negotiate a free trade agreement with Mexico that turns these trends
around, that puts people first, not profits. Thank you.
Fran Ansley, Tennessee Industrial Renewal Network
My name is Fran Ansley. I teach law at the University of Tennessee
in Knoxville. Along with Shirley, Luvernel, Dianna and others, I paid
a visit to the U.S.-Mexico border in July of this year ....
The main purpose of the trip was to create an opportunity for
women factory workers from the United States to meet and speak
directly with women factory workers from Mexico. I accompanied
the trip in order to observe and document the experience, and because
I had helped to make the original contact between TIRN, on whose
board I serve, and the Comite Fronterizo de Obreras, the group of
Mexican women factory workers who hosted us while we were in
Mexico.
The members of our delegation were chosen to represent workers
who were being hurt by changes in the global economy generally,
and by the impact of the burgeoning maquiladora program in par-
ticular. Some were displaced workers. Some were still working, but
for employers or in industries that had already shifted much pro-
duction to Mexico. I can tell you, from long hours of talking with
this remarkable group of women, and from conversations with others
both before and after our trip, that American workers are deeply
frightened about this country's economic future.
The people who chose to go on this trip didn't want to ignore
their fears, nor did they want to be paralyzed by them. They wanted
to see for themselves where so many U.S. jobs were going, to see
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for themselves what it was that was drawing U.S. companies south
of the border in such large numbers and on so grand a scale.
Any woman who went on our trip will tell you that what we saw
in Mexico was a tremendous shock. We thought we had prepared
ourselves for what we would see by reading and looking at pictures
and talking to people familiar with the area. But nothing could have
prepared the group for what we actually encountered.
I believe I should explain that the workers who went on this trip
are not privileged people. They don't live in fancy houses. They don't
make high salaries. A number of women on the TIRN delegation
have spent portions of their own lives getting along without indoor
plumbing, have known very well what it means to live from one
paycheck to the next or to wish that someone in the family had any
paycheck at all. They are not, in other words, what you would call
naive or squeamish, not a bunch or delicate do-gooders.
But I am here to tell you that all of us were overcome by what
we saw. More than once we had to compose ourselves and try to
stop crying before we could go on.
We saw shiny new U.S.-owned factories with green grass growing
around them, beautifully manicured and watered. We got a tour of
one plant and viewed its well-groomed and air-conditioned work areas.
We saw how huge the industrial parks are. We realized with a little
chill the magnitude of the resources being taken from our country
and placed in Mexico.
And we also saw places where workers in maquiladora factories
are living. Entire houses that sheltered large extended families were
smaller than most of our bedrooms. In many areas there was a
complete lack of basic services like water, electricity and waste disposal
systems. We saw foul pools of water that had been standing around
people's homes since flooding that took place in May.
We saw places where chemical waste had been dumped immediately
adjacent to people's homes. We stood on a wall next to the hard-
packed yard of one woman's house, and saw and smelled open vats
of chemicals used by the next-door pesticide factory, chemicals whose
fumes made breathing a distasteful chore.
We saw children playing in filthy, toxic surroundings while their
mothers somehow managed to keep their tiny living quarters orderly
and neat as a pin. Perhaps most memorably of all, we saw astound-
ingly resilient people struggling to find dignity and beauty in places
where animals should not be allowed to live. They showed us their
flowers and their needlework as we stood helpless and stupefied in
yards and homes that looked like war zones.
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It is important to stress that the shocks we were enduring were
more than the shocks any "first worlder" is likely to experience in
certain parts of the third world. It was not pre-industrial poverty we
were seeing, not "underdevelopment." These squatter camps are home
to people who work forty, forty-eight, and fifty-two hours a week
with modern equipment in high-tech facilities for some of the world's
largest and wealthiest multinational corporations.
We all carry with us indelible images of these contradictions. One
such image is that of the men we saw threading their way home from
work along a muddy footpath in one of the worst neighborhoods
we visited, while emblazoned proudly on their shirts was the logo of
a major U.S. manufacturer.
Another unforgettable mental picture we will carry is that of the
maquila pay studs we saw. We heard one maquiladora worker explain
to us the starting salary of $27 for a 48-hour week at the automotive
parts factory in Reynosa where she works, and how an employee
might work her way up to $34 or $35 a week after several years
there. We also saw store and restaurant prices that were not so
different from our own. We were then better able to appreciate the
reason for the living conditions we had seen.
Another image we will not forget is the longing and anger we saw
in the eyes of maquiladora workers when we asked them how they
felt about their situation. Of course they explained that they want
jobs and a thriving economy; they are eager to work. And they were
quick to say they didn't want the border factories to leave. But they
are far from satisfied. They want a wage that will support a decent
life-just as U.S. workers do. They want a safe and healthy workplace
where hazards are avoided when possible and thoroughly explained
when avoidance is impossible-just as U.S. workers do. They want
to be treated with dignity and respect on the job-just as U.S. workers
do. And those we spoke with understand perfectly well that they are
not getting any of these things as matters now stand.
So, having had this very exciting and disturbing experience, our
delegation decided that we should send representatives to testify before
you today. We know that the free trade agreement you are working
toward will have a tremendous effect on us, on our children, and
on our new friends in Mexico. It could bring much good to both
sides of the border, or it could bring much evil.
We urge you to negotiate a free trade agreement committed to
lifting the living standards of people in both countries, rather than
depressing the living standards of U.S. workers to third world levels
and further damaging an already polarized and desperate Mexican
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economy. Your goal should be to harmonize labor and environmental
standards upward to the highest level rather than downward to the
lowest.
We urge you to negotiate a free trade agreement based on dem-
ocratic development policies that benefit and are shaped by the ma-
jority of people in both countries, not based on a short-sighted race
for quick profits for a transnational elite. U.S. workers and com-
munities have fought for generations to achieve some basic standards:
the eight-hour day, the minimum wage, the ban on child labor, the
right to a safe and healthy workplace, and more recently, legal
protection for the environment upon which we all depend. These
achievements are not now the out-moded luxuries of a former day.
They are an indispensable foundation for a humane and viable econ-
omy.
We can tell you from our visit to the maquiladoras that "free
trade" along the lines of that program would put all these past
achievements at risk. It would ask U.S. workers to compete with
their Mexican counterparts in a currency that required erosion of
those hard-won standards. What we saw of employer behavior at the
border also indicates that any notion of meaningful "self-regulation"
is a pipe-dream. It was like an unrestrained feeding frenzy. And no
amount of self-delusion by those responsible, no amount of deter-
mination to stay blind to or somehow disassociated from the massive
suffering involved, can really disguise that fact.
Redeployment of capital from the U.S. to Mexico is taking place
in an atmosphere where large business enterprises are increasingly
"free," while workers and communities are
increasingly stuck and powerless. Corporations display little or no
responsibility to the workers and communities they are leaving behind
or to the workers and communities they are so eager to use next.
Unless a free trade agreement strongly and directly takes account of
these problems, we will only see more of what we already have: U.S.
communities violently disrupted and abandoned by sudden withdra-
wals of capital, and Mexican communities violently disrupted and
exploited by sudden injections of capital, all accompanied by in-
creasing inequality and maldistributions of wealth.
I am a lawyer and a law teacher, and so I suppose before I close,
I should say something about the law. Certainly there are plenty of
legal questions involved. It required finely-tuned and dovetailed legal
arrangements between the U.S. and Mexico to put the maquiladora
program into effect in the first place. And as the U.S. and Mexico
continue their already heady pace of economic integration, further
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legal measures will no doubt be called for, with or without a free
trade agreement. (In fact, if the phrase "free trade" is meant to
suggest freedom from legal rules or from legal choices, then it is and
always has been a gigantic misnomer. U.S.-Mexican economic inte-
gration will be a highly regulated regime no matter what form it
takes. The question is what kinds of regulations we will choose and
to what end).
But legal questions are surely secondary to the larger questions of
social and political direction that are raised by the current NAFTA
negotiations. The paramount issue in my view is one of policy: will
the leadership of the nation pursue a trade strategy that highly values
stewardship of the environment and distributive justice among peoples
and nations? If this administration were to embrace such a strategy,
as of course I believe that it should, there are plenty of legal models
and analogies and ideas that could support and enable it.
The Social Charter currently being fleshed out and struggled over
in the European Economic Community provides one such model.
Labor standards already built into some existing U.S. trade laws are
another source of ideas and tools. .International human rights in-
struments provide yet another. In fact, some of our own domestic
laws that guarantee such basic protections as the minimum wage and
the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively, along with
their rich legislative histories, can provide much insight about the
conditions and the theories that led earlier elected officials to end
the virtually unrestrained exploitation that in those days styled itself
not as "free trade," but as "freedom of contract."
Our elected representatives in Congress decided long ago that bus-
inesses whose profit margin was based in part upon denying the basic
rights of their employees to freedom of association and expression
were not desirable players in the economy. They decided the same
as to companies whose wages were so low they could afford to be
unconcerned with productivity and could therefore make liberal use
of child labor and sweatshop methods. They decided similarly that
a national minimum wage was preferable to a regional or local one
because they were persuaded there should be a floor beneath which
states could not compete with each other for which one's workers
could be driven to work for the least money.
No more than in our own day were these decisions made dispas-
sionately or as a matter of "expertise." Nor were they unanimous.
They were forged in the heat of political struggle and represented
the impermanent outcome of social conflict and democratic debate.
But in my view they were wise decisions that represent both humane
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values and sound economic strategy. We should think long and hard
before allowing them to be abandoned and undone on the alters of
free trade.
Finding legal tools for creating and sustaining the type of trade
policy we are advocating is not a problem. Finding leadership that
will fight for that policy is the prior and tougher question. It will
take vision and political will and energy and a commitment to the
welfare of America's majority to steer a course in the emerging global
economy that will be fair and beneficial to all Americans and to our
southern neighbors. We challenge you and President Bush and his
other deputies to provide that leadership.
We urge you to negotiate a free trade agreement which recognizes
that there are inescapable connections between global trade on the
one hand and political democracy, workplace justice, environmental
protection and sustainable development on the other. Further, we
urge you to open the negotiation and policy development process to
the American public. Make it your business to find out how world
trade is affecting people on the lower end of the economic ladder,
both in this country and in Mexico. Get testimony and insight from
those who are themselves most strenuously bearing the marks of
global economic change. The stakes are very high indeed. Thank you.
WASHINGTON, D.C., SEPTEMBER 3, 1991
Harry L. Freeman, MTN Coalition
Mr. Harry L. Freeman, President of the Freeman Company, speak-
ing on behalf of the MTN Coalition ....
The MTN Coalition represents over 14,000 companies, and was
formed in December of 1989, for the express purpose of trying to
secure a broad and strong result in the Uruguay Round of the GATT.
NAFTA, of course, has come up since that time ....
Having done a lot of lobbying on NAFTA, GATT, Fast Track,
and having rather closely analyzed what Congressman and Senators
said as they cast their vote, I know that there is considerable concern
that the representations that the administration made on May 1-the
famous May 1, 1991 letter about environment, labor, and so forth-
may not be kept in the full spirit of the letter and the law ....
Submitting for Fast Track approval a NAFTA without a full re-
sponse to every point of the May 1 letter, would be a recipe for
disaster. The Congress really meant it when they accepted the re-
presentations of May 1, and they will be scrutinizing very, very
carefully what happens eventually.
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Obviously, NAFTA is very important. Our coalition endorses it.
We hope for a speedy, but not too fast-we want all the issues
covered-resolution of the issues. We think it will be difficult. We
think it's manageable. We think it's of terribly great importance. But
you'll hear that, and you'll hear that from 35 other people this
morning, and perhaps from hundreds of others.
Let me turn now to perhaps a more complex point, and I think
more important point, from my point of view. And that is, there is
really a very unhealthy trend, both in the United States and in the
world, particularly Europe, Japan, other key countries that are trading
partners, to think the United States is changing from supporting the
GATT Multilateral System, to a regional trading bloc approach. Some
say this because they think GATT is dead. That is, Lester Thurow
is frequently quoted, and he's a very smart fellow. Others think the
Uruguay Round will never finish, will die on the vine and in turn,
GATT will wither. Perhaps Professor Paul Krugman, another smart
fellow, is saying that. But increasingly, there is that feeling .... [A]
fax came over the weekend from a prominent, very prominent Eur-
opean, who said "why is the United States turning away from the
GATT system and concentrating on the western hemisphere, or a
NAFTA, which is a smaller approach?"
Others think that our response to the EC, with whom we're having
considerable difficulty on the trade issues, should be the NAFTA or
a NAFTA plus other countries, or perhaps a whole western hemisphere
trading bloc. No doubt you've heard of this. Therefore, one key
point is that regardless of the merits of the NAFTA, for the United
States' interest, the GATT Multilateral System, warts and all, is still
the biggest and best game in town. The administration and all of
your agencies, have to be very careful to send the right signals to
this effect, which is what I understand is the administration's trade
policy ....
I believe the Uruguay Round is perhaps misnamed in the word
"round" because this is not a traditional trade round. We are really
writing the comprehensive rules of trade for, perhaps, up to 150
countries if we count the 106 GATT member countries right now.
We've never had this kind of negotiation. I think it will be the last
of its kind because handling negotiations with 120 or 125 countries
is proving not to be the most efficient way. But that's another
issue ....
This is an incredible opportunity and we can't blow this oppor-
tunity ....
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John Cavanagh, Institute for Policy Studies
* , . I am an economist at the Institute for Policy Studies. I'm a
former staff economist with the United Nations .... I thought in
just five minutes, perhaps the most useful thing I could do is raise
five broad questions that I have about the agreement, and that I
think a lot of others have about the agreement, and I would like to
hear answers before I think I am willing to support any kind of
inter-governmental agreement. And I should say, these five questions
are just some of the dozens that are being raised by citizen's groups
in all three countries.
First question: how do we prevent free trade and investment from
sending labor, health, safety and environmental standards in all coun-
tries down to the lowest common denominator? You all know this
is a big concern.
In Seattle, a couple of weeks ago, Carla Hills was reported to have
told journalists that "wage rates in the three countries eventually
would equalize because Mexican wages would rise with increased
productivity" -now, this is wonderful if it's true. However, why
should we believe this when, in recent years, precisely the opposite
has been occurring?
The Economic Policy Institute has pointed out that between 1982
and 1988, Mexican wages fell about 50 percent in real terms. Over
the same time, or at the same time over this decade, Mexican man-
ufacturing productivity has risen as Ford and other companies have
relocated some of their highest technology plants to Mexico. I should
also point out that over this past decade, real U.S. manufacturing
wages have also fallen, and worker benefits have been eroded as
corporations have threatened workers with relocation to lower-wage
countries.
So yes, I think Carla Hill's equalization of wages is occurring, but
is occurring in a downward spiral. Now, I ask us to be very clear
about what's going on here. Corporations without binding and en-
forceable standards will punch labor and environmental conditions
down to the lowest common denominator. Their past actions show
that it is unlikely for them to act positively in this regard, without
the power of trade sanctions over them. Yet, why do you refuse to
put worker rights in this agreement, and set up a special negotiating
panel on it? Without them in effect, I think the people of the three
countries will conclude that largely what you're negotiating is a
Corporate Bill of Rights.
Second question: Will the agreement make North America more
competitive on global markets? Obviously, another major concern.
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The administrations of all three countries argue that the agreements
will make us more competitive, in particular with the nations of East
Asia. How, I would like to ask, however, is this possible?
In recent years, Taiwanese, Korean, and Japanese firms have been
rushing into Mexico, also into our own country, to make everything
from baseball caps, to toys, to furniture, to bicycles. Nissan is already
the largest car maker in Mexico, and around 100 plants from these
three East Asian countries are producing consumer electronics in the
Border region with the U.S. It is hard to compete, I would maintain,
with East Asian manufacturers when they are increasingly part of
you. I would like to hear your version, your sense of how this is
resolved.
Three: Why aren't you addressing the movement of people in this
agreement? In Europe, free trade and integration involves a freeing
of movement of goods, capital, and labor. The NAFTA negotiations
are only considering goods and capital, why?
Some might conclude that since Europeans are more-or-less of the
same color, whereas Mexicans are of a different color than most of
their neighbors to the North, that the motivation might be racial. Is
this so?
Others might argue that, "No, you must keep sweeping restrictions
on labor flows because the huge disparity in living standards would
lead to a flood of Mexican migrants." What is the answer here?
Why does it look, on the surface, like this agreement stands to benefit
goods and capital, and not people? Especially, as you refuse to take
on the constant violation of the rights of Mexicans already here in
the United States.
Fourth question: What really is the goal of this proposed agree-
ment? What is the "national interest," the term that the negotiators
like to throw around?
The Bush Administration tells the people of this country that an
agreement will lead to increased trade, and that this will create U.S.
jobs. They point out that U.S. exports to Mexico have more than
doubled from $12 billion to $28 billion since Mexico began to liberalize
trade in 1986.
What they don't tell you, and what I'd like to point out, is that
U.S. exports to Mexico stood way up at $18 billion way back in
1981, long before the Mexican trade liberalization. They then plum-
meted to $9 billion as Mexico staggered under the outbreak of the
debt crisis. These figures suggest that if the goal is to boost U.S.
exports, then major debt relief would be the most effective course.
Yet, why aren't you talking about debt relief in this agreement?
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In any case, I do not think that boosting U.S. exports should be
the goal of a tri-national agreement. Many people in all three countries
think that dignified jobs, a decent environment, and healthy com-
munities should be the goal. I maintain that this agreement really
ought to be about who will determine the economic future of our
communities and our nations. Will it be the representatives of a few
hundred, largely unaccountable corporations, many of whom are
addressing you today? Or will it be the broader public of these three
nations? And I would suggest that before you negotiate with foreign
governments, perhaps, really, you ought to negotiate with your own
public.
Final question: What's the big rush? Some suggest that the only
reason to rush an agreement is to boost our man to the South, Carlos
Salinas, a man who has resorted to massive electoral fraud twice, to
keep his party in power. Is this the reason? If not, what possibly is
the rush?
Let me remind you in closing that it has taken the European
community, really 30 years-but [in the recent] past, seven years.
And this is a set of nations with far fewer disparities than the nations
of North America. It's taken them seven long years of debate and
negotiation to hammer out what is referred to as Europe 1992. You
have been at this exactly 14 months, working on a North American
Free Trade Agreement. Would we not all do better to spend seven
years working through the implications of what we're doing before
rushing it?
I realize these are big questions. I don't expect you to have the
answers to most of them, if any of them. But I suggest that many
people in all three countries will want answers before their govern-
ments sign any agreement. Rather, I ask you to take the time to join
with others-and I think people would be happy to do so-in ex-
amining them. Let's reopen the agenda. Let's study the problems.
Let's open up the doors of the negotiations. Let's involve citizens at
every level. These issues are far too important for the short time
period you've accorded them ....
It's in the interest of all of us here that Mexican wages do rise,
both for the Mexican people and also in terms of creating a broader
market for goods of any kind. And I want to point out that there
simply is no connection in the era of big corporations between pro-
ductivity going up-which it is in Mexico-and wages going up. The
companies there have made it very clear that they are going to try
and keep those wages way down and continue to violate basic worker
rights.
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And so, I'm saying, if we want wages and working conditions to
rise, put this basic link in the agreement. We've already got it in a
number of pieces of U.S. trade legislation. It's in the GSP. It was
in the U.S. Trade Act of '88, that violation of worker rights was
an unfair trade practice. And I think it's important to look at this
carefully, and I really would encourage you to create a negotiating
group on labor rights ....
I am worried also because the next step is to a western hemispheric
free trade discussion. There are a lot of countries with even lower
wages and even worse working conditions than Mexico; thus, there
will be this constant competition to reduce wages and working con-
ditions.
I mean, basically, what happens is, Bolivia says, "Ah, we can out
do you, Mexico. We'll give even cheaper wages. We won't respect
worker rights. We'll allow you to not allow unions," and so on and
so forth. And you have that kind of downward spiral. And union
after union has pointed out in this country, that their own companies
have said to them, "Look, you take this ten percent cut in wages
and let's knock out health benefits or we're going to Mexico."
So, I guess the bottom line is this. We are for dignified jobs. When
we look at what exists in most of the maquiladora region of Mexico,
we don't see dignified jobs. We don't see work where people can
live and support a family and live in dignity. That's what we're for
and we think the only way to do that-and I think this is the wave
of the future for other agreements and the Europeans have certainly
picked up on this-is to include, in trade agreements, the basic
minimum standards on worker rights as well as health, safety, and
environment.
Mustafa Mohatarem, General Motors Corporation
Good morning. I am Mustafa Mohatarem, General Director of
Economic Analysis for General Motors Corporation. I am pleased
to be here today to discuss GM's views on the proposed North
American Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Mexico
and Canada. General Motors has much at stake in a NAFTA, because
we are the largest employer-as well as one of the largest exporters-
in all three countries.
General Motors Corporation was an early supporter of the ne-
gotiations towards a NAFTA. Our positive experience with free trade
in autos and auto parts between the U.S. and Canada convinced us
that a well-crafted NAFTA has the potential to provide new oppor-
tunities and benefits for all three countries. As a vehicle manufacturer,
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GM sees the NAFTA as providing U.S. and Canada-based producers
access to a Mexican market that has substantial potential for long-
term growth-particularly if Mexico's current program of economic
liberalization is successful. And, for Mexico's auto industry, it pro-
vides the opportunity to become an integral part of the vast North
American auto industry.
Despite Mexico's progress in opening its markets, substantial res-
trictions remain on the activities of the automotive and parts indus-
tries. We assume that these restrictions will be removed in a
NAFTA ....
From the auto industry's perspective, the agreement should be
constructed to further three primary objectives:
First, the agreement should improve access for U.S. and Canadian
automobile and truck exports, as well as parts, to the Mexican
market ....
Second, the agreement should include provisions to prevent Mexico
from becoming an export platform for third country vehicle manu-
facturers to produce cars and trucks for the U.S. and Canadian
markets ....
A third objective is to provide an orderly transition to an integrated
North American auto industry. In the U.S., many labor unions have
opposed the concept of a NAFTA because of fears that it would
cause dislocations for U.S. workers. We believe that labor's concerns
over the NAFTA should receive appropriate consideration, and that
mechanisms be developed to minimize-or avoid-such dislocations.
Parallel concerns in Mexico center on the issue of possible dislocations
of Mexican industry.
On the one hand, we wish to see many of Mexico's restrictive
policies go away to capitalize on the benefits of a more open trading
environment. However, as a major investor in Mexico, we recognize
that a free trade agreement will expose us to new risks. If barriers
are removed too quickly, there is a danger that firms who have made
substantial investments in Mexico will be penalized vis-a-vis new
entrants that have not been subject the same rigid investment rules
required of current investors in Mexico. To avoid such a result, we
believe the NAFTA must include transitional mechanisms to ensure
that firms currently subject to Mexico's Auto Decree be given the
opportunity to compete on an equal footing with new entrants to
the market ....
We hope that negotiators will continue to work closely with the
business community as the negotiations evolve. We are optimistic
that the final product of these efforts will be an agreement that will
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set the stage for a new era of North American cooperation and
competition. And, just as the U.S.-Canada AutoPact of 1965 led to
a twenty-fold increase in U.S.-Canadian automotive trade, we hope
that a NAFTA will provide similar impetus to three-way trade in
autos and autoparts, to the benefit of all three nations.
Cipriano Munoz, Dallas Hispanic Chamber of Commerce and Greater
Dallas Chamber of Commerce
Mr. Chairman, members of the panel, my name is Cipriano Munoz,
Chairman of the Dallas Hispanic Chamber of Commerce. I am here
this afternoon, speaking on behalf of the Dallas Hispanic Chamber
of Commerce and the Greater Dallas Chamber of Commerce, which
represent the voice of more than 8,000 businesses in the greater Dallas
community.
The Dallas Hispanic and Greater Dallas Chambers have long sup-
ported expanded free trade opportunities between our country and
other national economies. We, in the Dallas Hispanic Chamber of
Commerce strongly view the North American Free Trade Agreement
as a timely opportunity for America to leverage their Hispanic di-
versity into a global competitive advantage.
We view NAFTA as a policy initiative that will lead to positioning
North America as a dynamic competitive exporter, and enable diverse
American businesses to enjoy the benefits of an expanded economy.
As representatives of the business community, we see the benefits of
free trade, not only for the large, multinational corporations which
conduct business throughout the world, but for domestic enterprise
which will also benefit from expanding trade opportunities.
Free and fair trade acts as a stimulus to the general economy,
opening new markets which were previously restricted or closed, while
at the same time, encouraging even greater efficiencies at home to
create a healthy and competitive industrial base capable of meeting
global challenges. In this regard, both the Dallas Hispanic and the
Greater Dallas Chamber have worked hard to facilitate the passage
of critical legislation essential to the successful negotiation of a free
trade agreement.
We have also sought to facilitate the negotiating process by offering
the services of our city and both chambers to all national and foreign
concerns involved in these current discussions ....
Beginning in 1992, the United States will face increased competition
from a more unified European Economic Community. Whether we
meet this challenge will depend, in large part, on whether the North
American continent can come together in a positive and productive
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way. Removing trade barriers between Canada, the United States,
and Mexico would create the largest trading area in the world. With
a market comprising over 360 million people and $6 trillion in output,
the successful negotiation of a NAFTA accord will certainly, in the
words of President Bush, Prime Minister Mulroney, President Carlos
Salinas de Gortari, help all three countries meet the economic chal-
lenges they will face over the next decade. We have taken the first
step with Canada. Extending free trade to Mexico is the logical and
indispensable next step in this process.
Finally, we Hispanics understand the magnitude and implications
of NAFTA as it relates to business and bringing a better quality of
life to all Americans. Therefore, we urge your support for this
monumental trade agreement ....
Michael Schaeffer, Pillsbury Company
Good afternoon, my name is Michael Schaeffer and I am vice
president of operations at Green Giant, a division of Pillsbury Com-
pany ....
Pillsbury supports a NAFTA that will eliminate all tariff and
nontariff trade barriers to trade between the U.S. and Mexico. A
fully integrated North American market will enhance Green Giant's
and the Pillsbury Bakery Division's competitive position in Mexico,
lead to increased U.S. production, jobs and exports and will provide
a year-round production of quality, high value added food products
to U.S. consumers.
Let me briefly summarize our written statements filed with USTR
and with the ITC. Regarding U.S. imports, the Green Giant division
has the most interest in an agreement that immediately eliminates
U.S. duties on a number of fresh and, more importantly, frozen
vegetables such as broccoli and cauliflower imported on a seasonal
basis ....
The company has for several years established a global sourcing
strategy. This permits Green Giant to take advantage of growing
seasons throughout the world, thereby complementing its strong do-
mestic sourcing and processing operations ....
We have several recommendations to make regarding the treatment
of fresh and frozen vegetable imports from Mexico in the context
of the NAFTA negotiations. [these include keeping fresh produce on
the negotiating table, eliminating all trade restrictions, and imple-
mentation of "seasonality" in tariff structure.]
There appears to be a self-serving myth that the monolithic U.S.
vegetable industry is besieged with imports and uncaring about ex-
1992]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
ports. Yet, many cold weather vegetables such as corn, peas and
green beans exported by Green Giant are far more competitive than
in Mexico. This is important since it seems to use that if U.S.
negotiators decide that the tariffs on all vegetable imports from
Mexico should be phased-out at the final staging, then Mexico will
do the same.
In conclusion, trade liberalization will benefit not only Pillsbury
but U.S. jobs, exports and U.S. consumers who will pay less and
have greater product choice. But these gains can only be achieved if
the results of the negotiations themselves are based on credible sta-
tistical analysis on a product-by-product basis ....
WASHINGTON, D.C., SEPTEMBER 4, 1991
Rodney Leonard, Community Nutrition Institute
My name is Rodney Leonard. I am executive director of the Com-
munity Nutrition Institute, a consumer group, and formerly worked
in the Carter White House and the USDA on consumer issues. I am
testifying before you today on behalf of the Citizen Trade Watch
Campaign, the expanded and continuing coalitional effort of the
diverse citizens' groups-environmental, consumer, labor, agricul-
tural, religious, human rights and development-who joined together
in opposition to extension of the fast track procedure for Congres-
sional approval of trade agreements.
I am joined today by two of my coalition partners, Evelyn Dubrow,
Vice President and Legislative Director of the International Ladies
Garment Workers Union and John Audley, representing the Sierra
Club. ...
We will do our best to represent both the unrepresented sectors-
agricultural, religious and human rights and development groups-
and the many individual citizens' groups united in this effort.
Citizens' groups are unified in a serious concern about the Ad-
ministration's general vision of international trade policy, and as well
as the Administration's specific intentions concerning the upcoming
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
We hold in common a view of the general principles that ought
to underlie United States trade policy. Those general principles in-
clude:
1. Democratization of the Process
The process of developing trade policy must be democratized to
allow for citizen input into the setting of priorities in this important
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area. We believe that the fast track procedure for Congressional
approval of trade agreement implementing legislation is a major
barrier to the proper democratic functioning of trade policy-setting.
We call for citizen participation in the negotiation, implementation
and enforcement of trade agreements. We call for full debate before
any agreement is approved.
2. Equal Access to Information and Trade Officials for
Citizens' Groups
Even for Citizen Trade Watch member organizations that are rep-
resented on a trade advisory committee, participation in the current
advisory system is not effective or meaningful. We call for the re-
structuring of the trade advisory system to make representation of
environmental, consumer, labor and other citizen interests equal with
business representation.
3. Accountability of U.S. Negotiators to Ensure Responsiveness to
Citizen Concerns
We call for a formalized schedule for reporting back to Congress
throughout on-going trade negotiations as part of the USTR duty to
consult with Congress required under the fast track extension. We
also will work with Congress to develop a list of minimal substantive
requirements for an acceptable North American Trade Agreement
which will become the yardstick by which to measure USTR's re-
sponsiveness to Congressional directives.
4. Openness
We call for the minimalization of secrecy for documents concerning
the negotiation, implementation and enforcement of the agreement
as well as advisory group meetings and documents. We do not find
it acceptable that the USTR fails to comply with normal governmental
openness provisions such as the Freedom of Information Act and
the National Environmental Policy Act. We will take the appropriate
actions, including lawsuit to enforce USTR compliance with U.S.
law.
Although the above four principles would promote the formation
of trade policy that includes the concerns of the citizens of this
country, unfortunately, just the opposite principles have shaped U.S
trade policy.
For that reason we have continued and strengthened our joint
effort. Our goal is to promote a process guided by the above principles
and to ensure that U.S. citizens and their substantive agenda of:
19921
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
-safe food and products
-a clean environment
-sustainable development
-job security
-occupational health and safety
-human rights
-free association
-and fair trading arrangements with other nations will be promoted
in upcoming trade agreements ....
The loudest message we bring today on behalf of all of the groups
is that the negotiations of trade agreements, the contents of trade
agreements, the effects of trade agreements all have become part of
the common citizen agenda ....
We are aware of the massive detrimental impact this agreement
could have. We also know what would make for an agreement that
is good for the citizens in all of the countries involved.
We will fight to defeat any North American Free Trade Agreement
that excludes citizen concerns.
We hope that we may work with you to shape an agreement that
we will not have to fight.
Thank you.
Lori Wallach, Public Citizen, and John Audley, Sierra Club:
This testimony is presented by Lori Wallach of Public Citizen, a
consumer advocacy group founded in 1973 by Ralph Nader, and by
John Audley of the Sierra Club, founded in 1892 ....
The most important question facing the Administration regarding
trade is not whether unregulated industrialization negatively impacts
on the health and safety of U.S. citizens and their trading partners.
This fact had been accepted by organizations and administrative
agencies on both sides of this trade issue, as evidenced by the recent
EPA/SEDUE draft "Border Plan." The question now before us is
how to embark on a program of sustainable economic development
between neighboring countries.
This testimony has two purposes. First, we will discuss the recent
record of the Bush Administration on environmental issues related
to trade. Second, we will propose a series of concrete suggestions
that could begin the process of turning the trade negotiations away
from policy that strictly attends to the interests of the American
business community and towards policy that meets the needs of
ordinary Americans ....
We are compelled to offer this framework for trade negotiations
because the Administration has not lived up to its commitment to
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the environment regarding expanded trade. And if our attitude sounds
somewhat unkind during this testimony, it is because we are now
jaded from talking about the environment with the Administration.
From the beginning of negotiations to Fast Track, President Bush
promised environmental and NGO [non-governmental organization]
participation to insure environmental protection. These promises were
not kept. Without the intense interest expressed by Congressional
leaders regarding environmental and labor-related issues, we would
not have even the Administration's "May Day" plan as evidence of
your environmental program.
The concern for the environment and for labor issues expressed
prior to President Bush's May 1 Response to Congress has not been
translated into meaningful, implementable trade policy ....
The United States stands at a cross-roads. We can work toward
a trade agreement that is a model for future trade, based upon
responsible, sustainable development. Or we can continue in the trade
path we have worn so well over the years, one which ignores the
costs of expanded trade imposed upon citizens of the United States
and of our foreign trading partners. That the Administration's or-
ganizational skills are directed toward a repeat of old policy is alarming;
and we are forced by your unwillingness to work together to suggest
that no agreement is much better than a bad agreement. If the course
of present negotiations cannot be changed, we will devote all our
efforts at stopping this agreement in its tracks.
We have identified four broad promises made by the Bush Ad-
ministration regarding the environment and trade . ...
The May 1 Plan calls for a review of the environmental implications
of a North American Trade Agreement. The product of this review,
the Integrated Environmental Plan for the Mexico-U.S. Border Area,
is practically and legally inadequate ....
Throughout discussions with the Administration and its agencies,
the "comprehensive" Border Plan was regarded as the vehicle to
address the numerous environmental and safety issues facing our
border today ....
The plan that the EPA released on August 1 falls far short of
that. It is pathetically weak; We call it the "Where's the Beef, Where's
the Bun Plan" - no program and no money ....
President Bush's May 1 Response commits the Administration to
address environmental issues directly implicated by the agreement
within the terms of the Agreement. However, additional environ-
mental issues not specifically identified are to be discussed in parallel
discussions, not linked to the success of the proposed Treaty. We
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have never been in support of a parallel track; parallel means un-
related, and without linking these issues to the Trade Treaty itself,
there is no guarantee that these issues will be formally addressed.
It is clear to us that the lack of attention directed at environmental
concerns is part of the Administration's overall strategy to push
through a Trade Treaty before environmental concerns can be raised.
Although you do not blatantly prohibit environmental participation,
you have quietly begun to eliminate our concerns from the process.
Negotiations on environmental issues are simply not taking place ....
More recently, you've stopped responding to mail from groups
concerned about the environment. Numerous environmental and con-
sumer groups, including The Environmental Working Group of Cit-
izens Trade Watch Campaign, cannot get you to respond to letters
addressing their environmental concerns related to trade.
Finally, although you have finally named environmental advisors,
we are still waiting for these advisors to be invited to participate in
trade discussions. We are concerned that, at this rate, the agreement
will be completed and before Congress for consideration before en-
vironmentalists have had a chance to participate in any advisory
capacity.
Of equal importance is the lack of balance between advisors con-
cerned over the effects of trade with those directly benefitting from
trade. Environmentalists are sprinkled as minority members on several
existing advisory committees where their role will be as the dissenting
voice to what is an unbalanced, predetermined majority view. It is
difficult, if not impossible to constructively participate when faced
with a room of fellow advisors who all come from major industries
directly benefitting from trade.
In brief, we will address what the USTR could do to address the
real and demanding health, safety and environmental problems ....
Environmental concerns must be specifically named within the terms
of the Treaty as a legitimate defense to other provisions of the Treaty.
Such a safeguard must include global commons (extraterritorial) issues
and conservation of natural resources . ...
Enforcement of environmental standards will only occur by linking
compliance with environmental standards to the trade benefits offered
under the Agreement. Companies must not be allowed to avoid
environmental and safety regulations by locating in countries with
less effective enforcement mechanisms. Unequal standards or unequal
enforcement would encourage "environmental dumping" where com-
panies lower their production costs through noncompliance with en-
vironmental standards that are applicable to it and its competitors.
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There are several mechanisms that would remove the economic in-
centive to sneak such an environmental non-compliance subsidy-
like a duty equal to the amount the company saved by breaking the
environmental law.
Enforcement must not be on a voluntary basis, as suggested by
the current Border Plan ....
There are two different issues that arise under the topic of dispute
resolution. First, burden of proof - we consider it vital that the
burden of proof in trade disputes be on the challenging party. Thus,
if an environmental law was challenged as a barrier to trade, the
challenging party would bear the burden of proving that the law did
not fall under the environmental defense we discuss above ....
Second is the issues of standing. In order to ensure compliance
with the terms of the agreement, citizens in each country must have
standing to sue for compliance ....
The Agreement must be structured so that some of the economic
benefits expected from expanded trade be diverted to pay for the on-
going prevention or mitigation of the environmental, health and safety
harms also likely to be generated by the increased economic activ-
ity ....
Finally, the process of negotiating, implementing and enforcing the
agreement must be made more accessible to the citizens of the involved
countries. We applaud the Border Plan for calling for increased
information available to citizens of both countries, and for calling
for emergency mechanisms to deal with environmental disasters. More
of this must be encouraged. Public participation at each step of policy
formation and implementation must be institutionalized. Access to
information must be made available for citizens to make informed
choices about the policies which affect their lives so directly.
Steven Carbo, Mexican American Legal Defense & Educational Fund
I am Steven Carbo, Legislative Staff Attorney for the Mexican
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), a non-
profit organization which promotes and protects the civil rights of
Hispanics through litigation, education, advocacy, and leadership
development. We welcome this opportunity to express our concerns
about a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its
impact upon the Hispanic community.
MALDEF recognizes that lowering trade barriers between the United
States, Mexico and Canada may benefit the nation as a whole. In
May 1991, MALDEF offered qualified support for the extension of
Fast Track authority, based upon our realization of NAFTA's po-
tential.
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Nevertheless, MALDEF remains acutely aware of the pitfalls of
free trade, especially with regard to potential job losses. Our ultimate
position on a NAFTA will depend in large part upon how well the
Administration and the Congress address the worker displacement
and retraining issue. The Hispanic community must be assured that
Latinos, who already confront formidable hurdles to employment
and educational achievement, have an adequate opportunity to share
in the benefits of increased international trade.
More specifically, the Administration and the Congress must de-
velop new strategies and programs to address job losses among un-
skilled Hispanic workers. Worker displacement and retraining initiatives
must prove more effective than existing programs in reintegrating
Hispanic workers into the labor market with greater skills and at
higher wages levels. New and restructured worker dislocation and
trade adjustment assistance strategies must either be incorporated into
a NAFTA itself, or, as appropriate, be fully and strongly supported
by the Administration, and addressed by the Congress along with
the ultimate submission and consideration of a NAFTA.
A NAFTA should also be crafted to minimize painful dislocations.
Representatives of the United States should negotiate a gradual low-
ering of trade and non-trade barriers for industries and sectors of
the domestic economy most likely to be adversely affected by a free
trade agreement.
The demographic profile of Hispanics highlights the unique chal-
lenges which confront the Latino community and the nation as a
whole as we develop a 21st century economy. With labor shortages
projected for the future, the growing, youthful Latino community
presents itself as an invaluable human resource critical to the nation's
future prosperity.
According to the latest Census estimates, Hispanics now number
22.4 million and account for approximately 8.4% of the population.
By the year 2000, Hispanics are expected to comprise 9.4% of the
total population.
As a group, Hispanics are significantly younger than the non-
Hispanic population. About 30 percent of all Latinos are under 15
years of age, compared with 21 percent of non-Hispanics. The median
age of Hispanics (26 years) is about eight years lower than the median
age of non-Latino population (33.5 years).
Hispanics also constitute a rapidly growing proportion of the work
force. They currently occupy 7% of the labor market, or 8.6 million
workers. By 1995, Hispanics will account for 8-10% of all American
workers.
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Nevertheless, the positions which Hispanics occupy within the labor
force, and the educational achievement levels within the Hispanic
community suggest than many Latinos will have difficulties in ad-
justing to the demands of a technologically sophisticated economy.
For example, the largest share of
Hispanic men were employed as operators, fabricators or laborers
(30 percent) in March 1990. Non-Hispanic men were more likely to
occupy higher-skilled managerial or professional positions (27 per-
cent).
During the same period, only 51 percent of Hispanics had completed
four years of high school or more. Only nine percent had completed
four or more years of college. Twelve percent of all Hispanics had
less than five years of schooling.
These figures suggest that many Hispanics occupy the lower rungs
of the socio-economic ladder. With low skills and inadequate school-
ing, many Hispanics are particularly vulnerable to trade dislocations
which may accompany a NAFTA. In fact, Hispanics occupy many
of the unskilled positions which may be lost through increased com-
petition with low wage nations.
In February 1991, the International Trade Commission (ITC) re-
leased its study of the likely effects of a free trade agreement with
Mexico. The ITC reported that although the United States would
benefit overall from increased trade, with particular gains for skilled
workers and owners of capital, unskilled workers might suffer job
losses. Several domestic industries and their work forces were iden-
tified as particularly vulnerable to increased competition from low
cost Mexican competitors.
Prominent among those industries were horticulture (fruit and veg-
etables) and apparel. These two sectors employ many Hispanic work-
ers. The Department of Labor reported that 22.4 percent of the
655,000 domestic horticultural workers were of Hispanic origin in
1990. Almost 22.3 percent of the 1 million apparel workers were
Hispanic.
If the ITC's projections prove accurate, many Latinos will find
themselves thrown out of work with few occupational skills applicable
to the growth areas of the economy. Effective job displacement and
retraining programs must be readily available to meet the particular
needs of displaced Latino workers.
Two programs currently exist to assist displaced American workers.
Under the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program, workers
whose jobs are lost due to imports are eligible for income payments,
in the form of extended unemployment compensation (Trade Re-
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adjustment Allowances), and training and other assistance (occupa-
tional retraining, basic skills training, training-related allowances, and
job search and relocation allowances).
The Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act
(EDWAA) was enacted as Title III of the Job Training Partnership
Act (JTPA) in 1988. 80% of EDWAA funds are allocated to states
in the form of block grants to provide various services to dislocated
workers who are unlikely to return to their previous industries or
occupations. These services include a rapid response in the event of
a mass layoff or plant closing; job search assistance; occupational
retraining and basic skills training; and some needs-related payments.
Twenty percent of allocated funds are reserved to the Secretary of
Labor to award special grants to states and regions experiencing
major worker dislocations, or for especially hard hit workers or
industries ....
Hispanic workers dislocated by plant closings and relocations and
import surges present unique challenges for any worker dislocation
and retraining program. Comprehensive, program-wide studies on
Hispanic workers' experience under EDWAA and TAA are not yet
available. Nevertheless, the experience of 1100 Hispanic apparel work-
ers displaced by the closing of a Levi Strauss & Co. plant in San
Antonio highlights serious shortcomings with existing worker retrain-
ing and assistance strategies...
The worker dislocation and job training system in San Antonio
was totally overwhelmed by the Levi Strauss plan closing. Given the
resource limitations of these programs and the inferior delivery system
devised to assist dislocated workers, much of the Levi work force
received no more than an illusory promise of assistance ....
The benefits of increased international trade will be illusory if all
workers are not assured of an opportunity to share in them. With
these principles in mind, MALDEF proposes the following guidelines
and recommendations:
Worker dislocation and job retraining programs must be targeted
at low-skilled workers with low levels of educational attainment.
All services must be individually tailored to meet the particular needs
of the service population ....
Worker dislocation assistance and job training must be approached
as a critical investment in the human resources of the nation, and
maintained as an entitlement for workers displaced by trade dis-
location and plant closings and relocations ....
The NAFTA which is ultimately submitted to the Congress must
identify all domestic import-sensitive industries and provide for the
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gradual elimination of the trade and non-trade barriers affecting
them. The NAFTA proposal must present a credible strategy for
minimizing and ameliorating vulnerable U.S. industries.
Steve Beckman, United Auto Workers
The UAW is pleased to have the opportunity to present its views
to the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) concerning the nego-
tiations on a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). We
strongly endorse the administrative branch's efforts to solicit infor-
mation from interested groups and individuals across the country
through these hearings.
In the Federal Register notice announcing these hearings, the list
of topics of particular concern to the TPSC was spelled out in
considerable detail. In addition to the standard items of tariff and
non-tariff matters, views on the potential environmental effects of
the NAFTA were requested. The UAW has strongly supported the
inclusion of environmental issues within the negotiations rather than
conducting "parallel" talks. At the same time, we have made clear
that the impact of the negotiations on workers' incomes, working
conditions and living conditions must also be directly addressed.
Nowhere in the Federal Register notice did I see evidence of the
TPSC's interest in these issues. I believe this was a major oversight.
The focus of the balancing of costs and benefits of the U.S.-Mexico
agreement that the TPSC identified was the community of "producers
and consumers," with the interests of producers, presumably, rep-
resented by firms. I would like to remind you that the vast majority
of adult American producers and consumers are "workers". It is
their social role as workers to be producers and it is the income
generated in this activity that allows them and the members of their
families to be consumers.
It is the view of the UAW that insufficient attention has been
given to the impact of the NAFTA negotiations on workers, not only
in America, but also in Mexico and Canada. Discussions among the
three countries have the potential to frame a strategy for economic
and social development in all three countries that will enhance living
standards, promote equity, improve the environment and deepen
democratic activity. Unfortunately, we do not find these goals on
the agenda of the NAFTA talks the three governments have agreed
upon. Instead, we find the stale issues of "market opening", "de-
regulation" and "investment opportunities" that have accompanied
a steady decline in U.S. real wages, debt-inspired austerity for workers
in Mexico and restructuring in Canada that has undermined decades
of industrial growth and valued social policy.
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To those who characterized our opposition to these talks as a
negative response to closer relations with Mexico and Canada we say
that quite the contrary is true: we seek a much broader and deeper
understanding with the people of Mexico and Canada; we oppose
giving corporations the unfettered right to determine the destiny of
citizens of all three countries by restricting the rights of governments
to constrain them.
It has been stated by many that it is investment, not trade, that
is the most important issue on the negotiating agenda of the three
governments. Mexico is in need of investment from abroad to finance
economic development. Its efforts to attract investors from Japan
and Europe have not been as successful as planned; this left the
United States as its last, best hope. From Mexico's perspective, the
negotiations will be a success if billions of dollars of investment come
from U.S. and foreign firms that would, otherwise, have made those
investments in this country. Our own economy and the jobs of
American workers will suffer.
Although many U.S. firms have shifted production from the United
States to Mexico, there are many others that are concerned about
the treatment of foreign investors in Mexico. An agreement that puts
the force of the U.S. government behind the rights of U.S. companies
that invest in Mexico will result in an accelerated shift of production
from the U.S. market to Mexico. If this occurs, the U.S. economy
will not only lose the investment but also face increased imports.
The cost of such an agreement in displacement of U.S. workers has
been estimated at numbers ranging from a few hundred thousands
to nearly a million. We have made no specific estimate of our own,
but our own experience leads us to expect a very large adverse impact.
Rather than endorse this policy, which would doubly injure the U.S.
economy, as a way to make investment funds available in Mexico,
the UAW has supported debt relief for Mexico beyond that included
in the Brady Plan. The burden of Mexico's debt cannot continue to
be shifted from the banks to industrial workers while corporations
push for higher returns on their Mexican investments.
Because of the tremendous differential in wage and compensation
levels, working conditions and work-related standards between the
United States and Mexico, the first priority of the UAW in these
negotiations is to ensure that this gap is narrowed by improving these
areas in Mexico rather than reducing them in the United States. We
are not convinced by economic projections, Administration statements
or corporate propaganda that the "natural" result of a NAFTA will
be this type of relative improvement.
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We propose that the negotiations address the worker issues directly
and tie adequate performance to any negotiated trade benefits. The
UAW has had experience with the results of corporations creating
competition between U.S. and Mexican workers. The rapid expansion
of maquiladora plants in Mexico has shifted hundreds of thousands
of jobs from this country. The labor cost advantage of Mexican
production encourages companies to seek solutions to their compet-
itiveness problems that will undermine U.S. living standards over
time. Investments in training, education, new equipment and tech-
nologies require greater effort and expenditure; the well-being of the
nation and its workers cannot be achieved without them. The poverty
imposed on Mexican workers by debt crisis-inspired austerity measures
should not be perpetuated by the NAFTA. Only direct discussion of
ways to reduce the wage disparity and to hasten the implementation
of high-skill, high-wage development strategies can prevent this.
The worker related issues that must be addressed go beyond the
level of compensation and mechanisms for its improvement. Protec-
tions for worker rights and workplace health and safety standards
must also be included. Enforcement of these rights and standards
must be comparable so that differences between countries cannot be
the basis for pitting workers against each other. The highest standards
in any of the countries should set the minimum for standards in any
agreement.
The practices of maquiladora operators also provide the basis for
concerns about the environmental impact of a NAFTA. There is
extensive evidence of improper disposal of toxic waste despite the
rules that apply to disposal. We strongly believe that the only way
to adequately deal with existing environmental problems and to pre-
vent more problems from being created by further economic activity
is to include these issues within the negotiations themselves. A separate
understanding on the environment is not enough. Trade sanctions
under NAFTA are the appropriate tool to ensure that environmental
problems are corrected quickly. These problems confront people in
all three countries and are an important area of concern in each one.
The tariff and non-tariff barriers that are of greatest interest in
the UAW in the NAFTA negotiations are those affecting automotive
trade. The size of the automotive trade and the complexity of the
rules surrounding it make this an important issue for the U.S. ne-
gotiators as well as for us. Also, the issues that arise in the auto
sector cover many of the issues addressed in other negotiating groups.
Mexico has regulated its auto market through Auto Decrees for
nearly thirty years. The more recent of these decrees have required
19921
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
companies that sell vehicles in Mexico to run trade surpluses in their
Mexican operations. The UAW has tried to interest the Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative in opposing these measures as export
performance requirements since 1977, but without success. Recently,
we raised this matter in connection with negotiations on Mexico's
GATT accession and the U.S.-Mexico trade framework. We continue
to oppose these measures and urge the Administration to take up
this issue in the negotiations.
This experience, combined with the continuation of a variety of
auto-related non-tariff measures in Canada under the U.S.-Canada
FTA, gives us a different perspective on the meaning of "free trade"
negotiations and their results. Some experts have pointed to the
relative openness of the U.S. auto market and the closed Mexican
market in making claims about the potential for expanding U.S.
exports of vehicles and parts to Mexico and creating additional Amer-
ican jobs. While it is possible that U.S. automotive exports to Mexico
would expand if the existing barriers were lowered or eliminated, the
UAW insists that trade is a two-way street; it is just as important
to look at the import side of the trade. We are concerned that imports
will far outstrip any gain in exports. Since the U.S. auto market, at
its best, generates only a slow rate of growth, increased net imports
can contribute to even more worker dislocation than is already oc-
curring. If the increased imports from Mexico add to the already
excessive U.S. automotive trade deficit with Japan and other coun-
tries, the jobs of many thousands of UAW members will be lost.
The commitment made to an auto trade surplus in the past by the
Mexican government is unlikely to change in the NAFTA negotiations.
The levers at the disposal of the Mexican government to influence
corporate behavior will remain extensive ....
The auto-related issues touch on many of the areas of concern
identified in the Federal Register notice announcing these hearings.
There is one more. The questions that have arisen regarding enforce-
ment of the U.S.-Canada rule of origin in auto trade show how time
consuming and difficult such enforcement can be. It is reasonable
to assume that the cost related to U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade for the
U.S. Customs Service will increase and that the firms that benefit
from increased trade among the U.S., Mexico and Canada should
help pay for these services.
In this statement, we have raised extremely important issues for
the NAFTA negotiators to address. It is our expectation that intensive
consultations will continue through the period of negotiations on
these and other issues. The interests of our members and other
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American workers will continue to guide our approach to these ne-
gotiations and the advice that we provide.
Doreen Brown, Consumers for World Trade
My name is Doreen Brown, President of Consumers for World
Trade, a national, non-profit organization, established in 1978, and
concerned with the interest of consumers in international trade policy.
We believe consumers have a great deal to gain from trade expansion
and trade liberalization, in general, and that there are specific benefits
for them in the completion of a comprehensive North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Much research, both government-sponsored and by the private
sector, has been conducted and published regarding the economic,
industrial, labor, investment, environmental and other implications
of NAFTA. Yet very little information is available regarding the
impact of a free trade agreement (FTA) on American consumers.
Indeed, more has been written by economists, both here and in
Mexico, on the benefits to Mexican consumers. This is not surprising,
as the conventional wisdom has been that the overall trade impact
for the United States will be smaller than the impact on Mexico,
considering the discrepancy in the respective national economies of
the two countries and the fact that Mexico accounts for only six
percent of U.S. imports. Yet, the benefits of NAFTA to U.S. con-
sumers are real and deserve more attention.
It has been pointed out in many of the studies, including the one
done by the International Trade Commission at the request of USTR,
that average tariffs in the United States are 2.5 times lower than
those in Mexico and that 45 percent of Mexican imports come into
the United States duty free, under the General System of Preferences
or at reduced rates, under maquiladora production-sharing arrange-
ments. But what about the other 55 percent? A portion of these
enter the United States at the average trade-weighted rate of four
percent. A substantial number, however, are subjected to relatively
high duty rates and/or non-tariff barriers which directly affect con-
sumer choices and prices. Clearly, consumers would benefit from an
FTA which would eliminate these restriction.
For example, although 60 percent of agricultural imports from
Mexico enter the United States duty free, the rest come in at an
average rate of seven percent and some are subjected to non-tariff
barriers such as marketing orders and phytosanitary regulations which
artificially increase prices. Horticultural products, such as fresh and
processed fruits and vegetables, are also subjected to relatively high
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duties and quantitative limits [as are a number of other products]....
In all of the cases mentioned above, it is the low and fixed income
consumers who would benefit the most, as they spend a much longer
proportion of their income on such necessities of life as food, clothing,
housing and transportation. If by a very simplistic method, we con-
sidered only 55 percent of the total $30.8 billion worth of U.S.
imports from Mexico in 1990 or $16.9 billion, at a weighted average
duty of four percent, American consumers would stand to save close
to $689 million. This figure gains more significance when applied to
specific items such as clothing or canned tuna that have a particularly
high tariff, yet fall into the "most wanted" category for less affluent
U.S. consumers.
We must also keep in mind that, in addition to a wider selection
of goods in the market place and relatively lower prices for certain
Mexican products, U.S. consumers will benefit from increased price
and quality competition and from the boost to the national economy
resulting from an FTA. In fact, several studies note that the trade
expansion aspect of NAFTA is likely to increase the total real income
of consumers.
From the consumer point of view, therefore, NAFTA is as much
of a "win, win, win," situation as it is for the three countries involved:
the larger the market and the more effective the competition, the
better. CWT, of course, continues to prefer global trade negotiations
as the best way to liberalize trade worldwide. But we do not oppose
regional arrangements which seek to go further faster, as long as
such arrangements do not, in the process, increase restrictions on
imports or impede meaningful competition by producers, regardless
of nationality, in the world market place. Our conclusion, therefore,
is that NAFTA promises substantial enough benefits for U.S. and
other North American consumers to warrant our support and that
of other groups who favor a trade policy aimed at achieving an open
global trading system.
WASHINGTON, D.C., SEPTEMBER 5, 1991
Jack E. Pope, NA CAT
My name is Jack Pope. I am Executive Director of NACAT, a
national agricultural association that has been organized to work
toward an equitable free trade agreement for all parties involved.
Central Office: The produce industry needs a central office at the
U.S. Department of Agriculture where it can obtain information on
Mexico's trade barriers (such as licenses), phytosanitary barriers,
production figures, consumption information, etc. This will help in
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the produce industry's export efforts, which are crucial if the industry
is to offset the negative effect of increased Mexican imports.
Licensing Requirements: Mexico should immediately remove its
licensing requirements for all U.S. products. These licenses were
supposed to be discontinued as part of Mexico's GATT accession
agreement in 1986. The United States should not have to "pay twice"
to remove this GATT-illegal trade barrier.
Patented Plant Protection: Strong protection is needed for U.S.
developers of patented plant varieties. Mexico's reform of its internal
legislation must be enforced on the U.S. side by significant border
measures. Also, where patents have expired and there is proof that
the plants were stolen, border relief must be provided to the U.S.
patent holders.
Phytosanitary: The United States and Mexico need to move quickly
to resolve phytosanitary problems. NACAT is afraid that the Mexicans
will simply replace non-tariff trade barriers with phytosanitary bar-
riers. Already, the apple industry has faced such a problem. The
Mexican licensing requirements have been lifted for apples, but the
Mexicans have now imposed phytosanitary concerns that did not exist
in the past.
Transportation: Mexico must allow U.S. trucks to freely enter the
country. Currently, U.S. truckers are barred from entering Mexico,
but Mexican motor carriers can operate on the U.S. side of the border
for up to 25 miles. U.S. trucks should have the same access to Mexico
as that country has to the United States.
Tariff Phase-out: Fresh produce that is import sensitive should
have a tariff phase-out period of at least 20 years for any type of
tariff removal. This will allow the industry time to adjust to the
increased imports from Mexico.
Snapback: A snapback mechanism needs to be developed for per-
ishable crops. This safeguard should fall under the jurisdiction of
the USDA and should be able to be involved within four days. Mexico
must develop a system to track pricing information on a daily basis.
The USDA must have the resources available to track price and
volume fluctuations on a daily basis to ensure the effective functioning
of the snapback.
Labor Mobility: The free movement of labor should be addressed
in the negotiations. This will help offset the advantages the Mexicans
enjoy because of their lack of environmental and labor regulations.
Equal Investment Opportunities: Mexico does not provide an equal
investment opportunity for U.S. citizens. This is especially important
since the NAFTA will create incentives for U.S. agricultural producers
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to move south. U.S. growers should be able to freely buy land in
Mexico and export produce to the United States.
Marketing Orders: U.S. marketing order programs must be retained
in the NAFTA. Marketing order programs are indispensable for the
orderly marketing of produce in the United States. These programs
benefit consumers, domestic producers, and foreign exporters alike.
Canadian Labeling Laws: Almost simultaneously with the signing
of the U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement, Canada passed a series
of grade labeling regulations which discriminate against U.S. produce.
These discriminatory grade labeling laws must be reformed in the
context of the NAFTA.
Countervailing Duty Law: Even though duties are removed, U.S.
growers must have an independent right to file a countervailing duty
action if Mexico subsidizes and the U.S. grower can prove injury.
Foster Furman, Furman Foods, Inc.
We appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Trade Policy
Staff Committee. We are thankful we live in a country where we
-are free to express our opinion without fear of reprisal. May God
grant that it will always be so.
Furman Foods, Inc. is a small family-owned business which operates
a food processing plant in Central Pennsylvania. It was founded by
my father, J.W. Furman, in 1921, when Father and Mother canned
360 glass jars of tomatoes on a cook stove in the kitchen of our
home. Its present owners are three of the second generation, eight
of the third generation and two of the fourth generation.
During the months of June, July, August, September, and part of
October, Furman Foods cans peas, snap beans, peppers and tomatoes.
All of these are delivered to our processing plant by farmers in the
area. During the other eight months of the year, we utilize our plant
capacity in the canning of dried beans.
The principal business of Furman Foods, Inc. is canned tomatoes
and canned tomato products ....
All we ask is a level playing field. We hope time will help level
the playing field. To be fair with our workers, our farmers and
ourselves, we urge you to freeze tariffs at the present level for 5
years. After 5 years the MFN rates of processed tomato products
[should] be phased out at a rate no faster than one percentage point
a year ....
United States tariff rates on processed tomato products are already
the lowest in the world.
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Even with duties on, some tomato processing plants are moving
to Mexico. Removal of duties will no doubt result in many more
tomato processors locating in Mexico.
The net result is that even though we stay and continue to hire
workers and have farmers grow tomatoes for us, the companies that
move to Mexico will have prices so much better than ours, which
could force many small businesses to close. Tomato canneries that
close will not hire workers, will not need farmers to grow for them
and will not pay taxes ....
In all states except California, most of the farmers that depend
on tomatoes as a good cash crop are family sized farms.
We hope you recognize that tomato and tomato products are import
sensitive.
We are convinced that 10 years is too short a time in which to
phase out duties on import-sensitive products such as tomato products
from low-cost producing countries such as Mexico. We urge that
MFN rates of processed tomato products be phased out at a rate no
faster than one percentage point a year. The phase out should be
preceded by a standstill period of up to five years, such as in the
U.S.-Israel FTA.
Out of concern that our tomato products exported to Canada will
be replaced by tomato products from Mexico, we urge that Canada
be encouraged to adopt the same format and phase-in provisions as
are adopted by the United States.
Sarah Vogel, North Dakota Department of Agriculture
Good afternoon. My name is Sarah Vogel, and I am the elected
North Dakota Commissioner of Agriculture.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear at this hearing. My biggest
regret is that this agreement is of colossal importance to North Dakota
and witnesses are allowed only 5 minutes to express concerns. With
due respect, these hearings should have been held before the summer
of 1990, when negotiations started with Mexico, or before February
1991 when Canada decided to join in the negotiations. The chance
to influence the outcome is best at the beginning of the process.
Even at this late date, however, I believe these hearings will be helpful.
Over the past two years, I have received a blizzard of United States
franked mail with paper and studies from various United States
agencies which spell out the benefits of the agreement. I have received
very little franked mail that indicates caution or spells out the prob-
lems. It's ironic that study after study speaks of the benefits, but
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no one can get a copy of the premises from which the benefits will
flow. It is also ironic that the Canadian Wheat Board has had a
greater voice in these deliberations thus far than the North Dakota
Wheat Commission.
It is critical that we do not enter into an agreement that would
unfairly penalize our producers. We need a fair agreement. We need
a North American Fair Trade Agreement.
In this regard, policy makers and negotiators must not over gen-
eralize with rosy scenarios of overall benefits, while downplaying
effects on particular segments. For example, Secretary Madigan told
the House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture in April that
there would be "no losers" in the near term or long term if a North
American Free Trade Agreement were implemented.
Secretary Madigan. I don't think there are any losers in that time
frame (5 to 10 years), Mr. Hucaby, because whatever protection-
legal, artificial, or otherwise-that a particular commodity might
have now, that protection would be replaced by tariffication in the
event that there was a successful agreement, and in agriculture, that
we had gotten something in return that made it worthwhile for us
to give up the protection that now exists. Tariffication would be
incrementally phased out over a number of years with what is called
a "snap-back" provision to protect a producer of a commodity
from any surge in imports.
There would also be, in what we propose, countervailing duties
imposed on any subsidized imports.
So in the near term I don't think there are any losers.
In the long term, I think the entire agriculture sector has the potential
to be winners.
Ifi fact, there will be winners and losers. North Dakota will have
some of each. But why are Secretary Madigan and leading policy
makers glossing over the fact that there will be losers?
Secretary Madigan stated that protections presently in place will
be replaced by tariffs (which would be incrementally phased out),
that countervailing duties would be imposed on subsidized imports,
and that snap-back provisions would be applied to protect against a
surge of imports.
In light of the North Dakota experience with the Canadian Free
Trade Agreement, it is utterly naive to accept these assurances. Why?
Because we in North Dakota have already experienced the Canadian
Free Trade Agreement (CFTA). Because of similarities in land and
climate, North Dakota's major crops are also Canada's major crops.
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We produce hard red spring wheat, so do they. We produce durum
wheat for pasta, so do they.
North Dakota people were very concerned and vocal about the
negative ramifications of the CFTA. Before it was adopted, we were
promised that the President would seek an end to the $700 million
Canadian transportation subsidy to eastern U.S. ports of entry. In
addition, Chairman Rostenkowski was promised by Ambassador
Yuetter that if Canadian wheat imports rose and injured our growers
he would use available remedies to stem imports.
It is now September 1991, we have seen no progress on an end to
the transportation subsidy (worth 66 cents a bushel to our Canadian
neighbors) and no relief has been provided to us against the flood
of wheat imports to the U.S. market. We have also seen the USTR
twice propose accelerated tariff reduction on virtually all our products,
instead of honoring the 10 year commitment. We now import over
22 million bushels of wheat from Canada, up from 2 million in 1986-
87.
Our nationwide average wheat prices have fallen from $3.72 for
the 1987-88 and 1988-89 marketing years to a national average of
about $2.60-$3.00 this marketing year. In North Dakota, due to
transportation costs, our country elevator farm prices are much lower
than the national average, or about $2.20.
Durum wheat, which traditionally sells at a premium over other
wheats, has been especially hard hit. Although North Dakota wheat
producers and pasta producers have increased past consumption for
six straight years, the prices to durum wheat farmers have fallen
almost in half.
The U.S. consumes 76 million bushels of durum and we are im-
porting 11.5 million bushels from Canada, up from virtually none
before the CFTA. Our total durum exports are 55 million bushels;
yet our imports are 11.5 million bushels. In other words, one of five
of our hard fought export bushels is washed out by an import from
Canada.
Let's further explore this "fair trade". As calculated by the Pro-
ducer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) formula, Canada's wheat producers
in 1988-1990 received 31.18 percent PSE subsidy while ours was only
26.8 percent.
Until May of 1991, Canada's borders were barred to U.S. wheat
and wheat products because our PSE's were allegedly higher than
theirs. Now that theirs are higher than ours, our border doesn't close
to them. They can and do sell freely to us. Incidentally, now under
the "free trade" Canadian farmers can sell to our elevators, but our
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farmers can't sell to their elevators but only to "end users", e.g.
mills.
We have also found out that fine-print "details" such as PSE
formulas and calculations are very important. For example, the USTR/
USDA miscalculated state "subsidies" by illegally including farmer
checkoffs and counting programs for the general public, such as state
fairs, as subsidies. This "minor" error would have allowed us to sell
flour products to Canada in May of 1990, instead of May of 1991.
Our farmers also have to contend with swampbuster, sodbuster
and endangered species acts. Most important, our farmers contend
with acreage reduction programs. While we have reduced our wheat
acres by 20 percent over 10 years, Canada and the Common Market
have increased theirs. From 1980 to 1991 the EC has doubled its
durum production to 300 million bushels and Canada has increased
theirs from 80 to 110 million bushels to 150 million bushels today.
In these comments, I am not condemning Canadian farmers. Wheat
farmers north and south of the border are suffering. What is the
impact of this bankrupt "free trade" policy? According to North
Dakota State University economists, the market receipts for 1986-
1990 crops in constant 1982 dollars were $600 million a year less
than the period from 1976-1985. In a state of 630,000 people, that's
real money. We are not consoled by the fact that there has been a
net effect of less than ten hundredths of a percent to the overall
economy.
As a result of the "market oriented" Farm Bill and Canadian
imports, we expect to lose one of every seven of our cash grain
farmers this year! In my office, we conduct an agriculture credit
mediation service. About 1,000 requests for pre-foreclosure mediation
have come in each year for the past two years. We expect more and
more farmers to just give up.
Thanks to continuing pressure from the North Dakota Congres-
sional delegation, Secretary Madigan and Ambassador Hills are finally
"looking into" the durum and spring wheat situation with respect
to the CFTA. I wish them the best and hope relief will come. But
the sad fact remains, that relief, if it comes, will be too late for
many of our farmers.
This is the result of "free trade" and a "market oriented" farm
bill on wheat. Our farmers are the "friendly fire" victims of the
wheat wars.
I am sounding an alert to other states like the southern fruit and
vegetable states. I am telling them not to believe in the promise that
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problems will be addressed later. It is critical that we establish fair
trade policies from the inception ....
An issue of equal concern is wages. In North Dakota, our minimum
wage is applied to farmers and is $4.25 per hour. During a recent
debate on establishing a minimum wage, not one North Dakota farmer
objected to this rate-because they all pay more. The jobs in sugar
processing, potato processing and many other sectors of the North
Dakota economy are much higher paying than farm labor. We run
the risk of loss of many of these jobs to Mexico, if safeguards are
not in place. This problem did not surface in the Canadian Free
Trade Agreement, because Canadian wages and standard of living
generally meet or exceed ours. In contrast, Mexican wages are a
fraction of ours. Current wages range from $.60 to $1.00 per hour.
U.S. employers also pay expensive social security taxes and unem-
ployment compensation and must meet worker safety standards and
strict environmental standards. Farm employers and processing and
manufacturing employers in North Dakota pay property taxes and
income and sales taxes to support our schools, social services and
other indicia of a caring and compassionate society.
Maintaining a pure and wholesome food supply and ensuring con-
sumer confidence in that food supply is a primary objective of my
department, as well as other state departments of agriculture. Many
consumers have the perception pesticide residues and additives en-
danger our food. USDA and FDA are spending millions of dollars
on surveys and studies to prove our food is safe. This effort would
be jeopardized by lax standards in Mexico. Pesticides that are pro-
hibited in the U.S. are allowed in Mexico. Only a small fraction of
imports from Mexico are inspected at our borders. The U.S. FDA
doesn't have adequate staff at the borders.
In the April hearing before the House Ways and Means Committee,
it was apparent that while Mexico may have good laws, it is woefully
lacking in enforcement resources. According to the Christian Science
Monitor, Mexico's environmental enforcement budget was $3.15 mil-
lion. Although greater resources are now pledged to environmental
issues, even a hundred-fold increase would not be adequate.
It is my job to ensure that pesticides are safely used in North
Dakota. In our small state we dedicate $550,000 per biennium just
to pesticide law enforcement. In addition, we require training and
exams before a farmer may use a restricted-use pesticide. We spend
almost a million dollars per biennium to ensure our dairy farms are
clean, our milk is pure and our dairy plants are sanitary. And, we
have an EPA, FDA, or USDA inspection team visiting us virtually
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every month to audit us and inspect our inspections. The United
States does this to guarantee safe food for consumers.
Disparity in enforcement was not a serious problem with Canada,
but I am certain it will be regarding Mexico. Until there is assurance
that comparable standards are in place in Mexico, we run the risk
of loss of our consumers' confidence ....
In negotiating a North American Fair Trade Agreement, it is im-
portant to remember that the negotiating authority provided to the
U.S. Trade Representative by Congress specifically refers to the
"United States policy of agricultural stabilization in cyclical and
unpredictable markets".
We must not forget this policy in our zeal for free trade.
Doral S. Cooper, Retail Industry Trade Action Coalition
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Trade Policy Staff Committee,
my name is Doral Cooper and I am President of C&M International,
a trade and economic consulting firm in Washington, D.C. I am
testifying today on behalf of the Retail Industry Trade Action Co-
alition.
RITAC is a broad-based coalition of American apparel manufac-
turers, apparel retailers, retail trade associations, and other associ-
ations involved in international trade. Its members include the makers
and retailers of America's largest and most popular brands of ap-
parel-companies such as The Limited, The GAP, J.C. Penney, K-
Mart, Macy's, and Warnaco. The retail sector, which is one of
America's largest and most competitive industries, accounts for about
$1.7 trillion in annual sales and employs more than 19 million people
in 2 million retail establishments. RITAC represents the companies
that make sure American consumers are provided with a wide selection
of high quality products at very competitive prices.
RITAC strongly supported the decision of the United States, Mexico
and Canada to negotiate a North American Free Trade Agreement.
The NAFTA will lead to the establishment of a $6 trillion market
of 360 million consumers. By creating such a broad based market
with so many productive resources, the NAFTA also promises to
boost American living standards and improve U.S. global competi-
tiveness. Because of the obvious benefits of a free trade agreement,
RITAC and its members also worked closely with the Administration
and the Congress to win the extension of the fast-track approval
process that was critical to undertaking these negotiations. Now that
we are at the negotiating stage, RITAC continues to believe that the
right agreement will be in the best economic interests of all three
nations.
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RITAC has one basic request to make of trade negotiators: don't
forget textiles and apparel in the trade liberalization process. Inter-
national trade in textile and apparel today is heavily managed, and
in recent years the Administration and Congress have contended with
proposals to impose even new barriers on U.S. textile and apparel
trade. Most of those efforts have been held off, but, barriers have
also not been rolled back. The NAFTA talks now present an op-
portunity to move in the opposite direction by lifting the barriers
that inhibit textile and apparel trade across North America.
Free trade in this essential industry will provide immediate and
direct benefits to American consumers. In 1990, American consumers
paid nearly $60 million in tariffs on imports of textile and apparel
products from Mexico. The elimination of these tariffs could reduce
the effective duty rate on imports of textile and apparel products by
as much as eight percent, which is a very considerable amount in
the retail industry. The U.S. industries would also benefit by removing
barriers on U.S. exports to Mexico.
The elimination of formal trade barriers will also facilitate the
ongoing integration of the North American textile and apparel in-
dustries. In the process, it will help produce a more globally-com-
petitive industry that is at once able to provide consumers an array
of goods at competitive prices, and, equally important, able to com-
pete more effectively against manufacturers from other nations. Cur-
rently, many U.S. apparel products are exported to Mexico in semi-
finished form for final assembly and reexported to the Unites States.
Without the many obstacles to production-sharing that still exist, U.S.
manufacturers could draw on the differing competitive advantages
of Mexico and the United States, producing a more robust industry
able to take on competitors from Europe and the Pacific Rim.
Free trade will not mean the demise, or even the weakening, of
the U.S. textile and apparel industries, as some critics of the NAFTA
talks have argued. U.S.-Mexico textile and apparel trade is actually
currently quite modest. In 1990, the U.S. imported $678.4 million
worth of textile and apparel products from Mexico. That accounted
for 3.7 percent of total U.S. textile and apparel imports, and 0.4
percent of total U.S. consumption. The removal of trade barriers
will not open the U.S. to a flood of cheap imports from Mexico.
On the contrary, the U.S. should benefit by open textile and apparel
trade with Mexico. The U.S. textile and apparel industries do not
lack competitive vigor and are not at an obvious disadvantage with
Mexico. The U.S. surplus in textile and apparel trade with Mexico
testifies to the strengths of our own industries ....
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CLEVELAND, OHIO, SEPTEMBER 9, 1991
Marcy Kaptur, Congresswoman from Ohio
It is a pleasure to appear before you to testify on the proposed
U.S.-Mexico trade agreement. Might I say I wish the Bush Admin-
istration had sent some of its top-level appointees here to Cleveland,
Ohio to talk about unemployment in our Midwest and how the
government of the United States can be a partner, not just with
Mexico but with the central America I know best-Ohio, Indiana,
Michigan, Illinois, etc.... But we are here today to talk about the
other Central America and Mexico. For the record, just let me remind
you of the high unemployment figures in some of Ohio's cities.
Youngstown's unemployment is 8.5 percent and Toledo's unemploy-
ment is now 11.3 percent. Unemployment levels in Ohio translate
into 176,284 men and women out of work from both low-paying
and high-paying jobs.
What do we already know here in the Midwest about trade with
Mexico?
- We know that much of the trade is in the auto industry-39%
of the total maquiladora trade is in autoparts already.
- In Ohio alone, 100,000 jobs have been lost to Mexico.
- Workers in Mexico earn only .57 cents an hour. The national
minimum wage in 1989 stood at about $5.00 per day.
- A single working mother employed by a foreign owned plant in
Mexico must work 1/2 day for a gallon of milk; one day for a
pair of tennis shoes; 3 weeks to afford a toilet in her home.
- Approximately 11.5 percent of children ages 10-14 work in Mexico-
10 million from age 6-14 are self employed.
- Mexico's nearly 90 million people had an average GDP per head
of $1,820 in 1987, compared with $18,439 in the United States.
- Mexico is a one-party authoritarian state, one not only far from
democracy but one where extremely wealthy families exert enormous
influence on its statist economy.
- As Clyde Prestowitz stated "Mexico is still a system of men, not
laws".
- Unless this agreement is negotiated correctly, we know for a fact
Libbey Glass in my district and 1,300 workers will .be out on the
street. In addition, there will be serious ripple effects upon the
economic and social fabrics of the communities where glassware
plants now exist.
- Every single company in my district that has a Mexican affiliate
has either closed its doors completely or significantly downsized.
In my state of Ohio alone 100,000 jobs have already been lost to
Mexico. I submit for the record a report prepared by Dr. James
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Cypher of California State University at Fresno documenting the job
losses and the companies that have moved from Ohio and relocated
in lower-wage Mexico.
United States Trade Representative Carla Hills claims that there
will not be job losses as a result of a North American Free Trade
Agreement. I strongly challenge this claim and issue an invitation
today to Trade Ambassador Carla Hills to look for herself by joining
me and other Members of Congress on a tour of those very Ohio
and Midwest plants that have closed or downsized here in the U.S.
and the corresponding plants that have opened in Mexico. Let's take
a look together at what is happening to workers on both sides of
the border. Let's also tour the rural farm areas in both nations and
meet with the tomato and cucumber pickers and others. Let's see
how this agreement protects their rights.
Brief History of Congressional Action to Date
The vote in the House of Representatives last May on whether or
not to grant the President "fast-track" authority to negotiate a free
trade agreement with Mexico and the ongoing GATT negotiations
was a very close vote .... Now that trade negotiating authority has
been granted, over four dozen members of Congress concerned about
the agreement proceeding on a fast-track without real Congressional
oversight have organized a "Fair Trade Caucus" to closely observe
the negotiations to ensure that the Administration negotiates a "fair
deal" for all parties concerned.
Facts About a Free Trade Agreement
Let me point out that the Mexican Parliament has not been allowed
to debate nor even consider this proposed "free trade" agreement.
Ours is a free society, theirs is just beginning to open.
On May 1, the Bush Administration released its response to Con-
gressional concerns regarding the proposed U.S.-Mexico free trade
agreement going forward under fast track. The President's report
makes clear that key Congressional concerns will not be incorporated
into the body of the proposed agreement. Specifically, key Con-
gressional concerns on: worker rights and labor standards, the rights
of workers to freely organize, workplace health and safety standards,
environmental standards and protection, human rights, debt, invest-
ment and repatriation of capital, and enforcement and dispute res-
olution mechanisms. All that is being negotiated is the reduction of
tariff and non-tariff barriers. While the Administration's action plan
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acknowledges that with respect to labor rights, "there are a number
of labor areas where Mexico and the United States could benefit
from cooperation", it provides no means in the negotiations for these
matters to be linked to the reduction in trade barriers and enforcement
provisions of the FTA.
Though I support the concept of a new North American order,
ignoring these concerns is not the way to achieve it. Too much is at
stake.
Even though the proposed agreement is being called a trade agree-
ment, it is really much more. It really has to do with integrating
three societies that are highly different. One is a Third World de-
veloping nation and the other two are highly industrialized. The
concerns we have listed are even more important than the narrow
trade and tariff issues you are negotiating. This agreement goes far
beyond trade and it is the lack of inclusion of these matters in the
body of the agreement that is truly troubling ....
Let's set the record straight on the facts in this debate.
Jobs
-Proponents say such a agreement will create American jobs
through expanding exports.
FACT: Net job losses in the U.S. are estimated at 405,000-912,000
jobs by 1999 as a result of trade deficits the U.S. will mount with
Mexico. Of those, 500,000 U.S. manufacturing jobs will be lost to
Mexico....
FACT: U.S. exports to Mexico are not a real new export market
but are reshipments of goods back to the U.S. During the 1980's
U.S. exports to Mexico have increased from $15.1 billion to $24.96
billion; Mexican imports to the U.S. have increased from $12.8 billion
to $27.59 billion in the same period. However, 41.5%-and a growing
share-of Mexican exports to the U.S. are simply reshipments back
to the U.S. of U.S. components that have been assembled in Mexico
by low-wage workers and then transported back to the U.S. Under
traditional capitalism, this is not a real expansion of U.S. export
markets-since Mexicans are not buying U.S. goods. Rather, it is an
escape of U.S. jobs to a low wage economy where Mexican workers
cannot afford to buy the products they make. The target market is
the U.S. market where, theoretically, unemployed U.S. workers thrown
out of work by the loss of jobs to Mexico will be buying with their
unemployment checks lower-cost goods assembled by Mexican work-
ers.
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FACT: This trade agreement will not set the stage for the Mexican
market growing as a real U.S. export opportunity. Rather, Mexico
will become a cheap manufacturing platform for foreign companies
to back-door their goods into the U.S. market, as so many maqui-
ladora plants do now. This is why the average wage of the Mexican
worker during the 1980's has been cut in half at the same time as
the maquiladora plants have multiplied. Low wage Mexican labor is
being exploited by foreign firms in Mexico that take advantage of
export proximity of the U.S. market. Further, it is highly probable
that future inputs to Mexican production will not be sourced from
the U.S. but rather from the even lower wage economies of Central
and South America, and Asia. U.S. workers, 80 076 of whom have
seen their real wages fall in the last decade, will lose ground again
as trade deficits with Mexico grow.
FACT: A U.S.-Mexico agreement will not increase U.S. exports:
rather it will increase the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico as more
Mexican-based plants export more goods to the U.S., and U.S. jobs
are exported to Mexico.
During the last 10 years, the pace of U.S.-based multinational
corporations locating abroad has accelerated-output of these op-
erations has increased 50% in the 1980's and now amounts to $15
billion. A growing share of these manufacturing operations have been
located in developing economies. Offshore assembly operations have
grown from 4% of total U.S. imports in the early 1960's to almost
10% more recently. Offshore assembly for export to the U.S. employs
two million people, ten percent of total U.S. manufacturing em-
ployment.
Productivity
-Proponents argue that the U.S. will not lose jobs to Mexico
because Mexican productivity is lower and, therefore, less attractive
to investors.
FACT: In the foreign plants in Mexico, productivity is at world
standards because capital and technology are mobile and state-of-
the-art. It is these companies that take advantage of low wage labor
and world class technology.
Economic Studies
-Proponents' studies on the economic benefits of these agreement
are flawed.
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FACT: The three studies cited by the Administration-the Clopper
Almon study, the Peat-Marwick study (commissioned by the U.S.
Council of the Mexico-U.S. Business Committee) and the U.S. In-
ternational Trade Commission report-are based on unrealistic prem-
ises, such as the assumption that the U.S. enjoys full employment
and the assumption that there will be no shift of U.S. investment
and jobs to Mexico. For example, the Peat-Marwick study assumes
that Mexico will receive additional capital as a result of the FTA,
but not from U.S. investors.
Worker Adjustment
-The Administration argues that it can deal with the dislocations
to U.S. industries and workers that result from a U.S.-Mexico FTA
through a transition period, strict rules of origin and worker ad-
justment programs ....
FACT: The Administration's worker adjustment proposal does not
specify how U.S. job displacement will be adequately addressed.
Worker adjustment provisions are not funded up front nor are pro-
visions built directly into the FTA itself as they should be. Why
should a member of Congress "trust" the Administration to take
care of those that lose their jobs as a result of an agreement with
Mexico? This is the same Administration that has consistently zeroed
out the budget line item for Federal Trade Adjustment Assistance
which provides funds to help displaced workers and the same Ad-
ministration that is unwilling to extend unemployment benefits to
our long-term unemployed.
Further, how can this Administration commit future Administra-
tions or Congresses to fund worker adjustment programs, unless a
special fund is established up front to accommodate all U.S. workers
who will be affected, much as the European Common Market did
in its Reconstruction Fund.
Rule of Origin
- The Administration argues that a strict rule of origin will ensure
that the benefits of a NAFTA do not flow to mere pass through
operations exporting third-country products to the U.S. with only
minimal assembly in Mexico.
FACT: Rules of origin are not a strong deterrent to keeping out
third-country products from the United States if the tariffs on prod-
ucts that fail to meet the rule do not harshly penalize the offender.
In Mexico's case, most tariffs on exports are relatively low, such as
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the 2 1/2 percent tariff on automobiles. For example, Japan's auto
manufacturing companies are flush with capital to investment in
Mexico. There is nothing stopping them from opening plants in
Mexico, importing parts from Japan and shipping a finished vehicle
to the United States-they will certainly not be deterred by the 2 1/
2 percent tariff for not meeting the local content rule.
Labor Law
-The Administration claims that Mexico's labor law and practices
are stronger than generally known and that Mexico has a minimum
working age of 14. It proposes to deal with labor matters in a potential
FTA through "Memorandums of Understanding. "
FACT: it is well known that Mexico's labor laws are not enforced.
Women and children are the major workforce in the maquiladora
plants-many are 13 and 14 year old girls-and an FTA would open
up further avenues for abuse. Approximately 11.5076 of children 10-
14 work in Mexico-10 million from age 6-14 are self employed.
FACT: "Memorandums of Understanding" are what the United
States has had in the past in our trade negotiations with Japan. Yet,
America holds huge and constant bilateral trade deficits with Japan.
If the Administration were really serious about addressing this issue,
it would address it as part of the trade agreement. We should know
from past experience that "memorandums of understanding" and
"parallel" negotiations offer little hope for ensuring adherence be-
cause no enforcement mechanism exists. Instead, we should include
in the agreement itself North American worker standards as a means
for increasing employment opportunities and wage levels, eradicating
child labor, and ensuring that workers are not inhibited from ob-
taining effective and freely organized union representation, as already
exist in the U.S. and Canada.
Environment/Health & Saftey
-The Administration proposes to protect environment and health
and safety in an FTA by excluding any products that do not meet
our health and safety requirements and by initiating "parallel ne-
gotiations" with Mexico.
FACT: Relying on a parallel agreement gives us no guarantees that
America's high environmental and health and safety standards will
not be averted by companies moving to Mexico. Often the U.S.,
where standards are high, does not have adequate resources nor the
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enforcement ability to keep pesticides from showing up on our dinner
tables. Who will assure Mexican compliance?
FACT: Mexico passed an environmental law in 1988. The problem
is that it is not enforced. Fewer than 100 Mexican officials earning
only $150 a week are "responsible" for enforcing Mexico's environ-
mental agreements.
FACT: Mexico requires toxic materials to be exported by maqui-
ladora plants to the United States. But a 1986 survey of 772 ma-
quiladora plants found that only 20 had notified the EPA that they
were returning toxic waste to the U.S., as required by law. Of these
772 plants, 8607o used some sort of toxic chemicals. Mexico lacks
adequate tracking of hazardous waste origins and disposal, and as
a result hazardous waste is routinely dumped into sewer systems and
rivers. Without including environmental standards in the agreement
itself, Mexico's lax environmental regulation will continue unabated.
FACT: The Mexican government, with much publicity, recently
shut down its Mexico City PEMEX plant-a known polluter-as a
sign of good faith on the environment. Thousands of workers were
thrown out of work with no notice and no severance benefits. Workers
began to protest for fair treatment and the brother of the leading
critic was abducted by non-uniformed government officers. His where-
abouts are unknown.
Mexican Markets
-Proponents argue this agreement will make important contri-
butions toward lifting 50 million poor Mexicans out of poverty and
turn them into consumers.
FACT: Over 60 million U.S. citizens also live in poverty. During
the 1980's the standard of living dropped in the United States. Wages
in Mexico also dropped. Who speaks for our unemployed and low-
income citizens? Who speaks for Mexico's population of almost 90
million which nearly equals half that of the United States. Let's not
pit the poor of each nation against one another.
Mexican Standard of Living
-Proponents say investment in Mexico will raise the Mexican
standard of living.
FACT: In 1970, there were only 17 maquiladora plants in Mexico.
Today, 1,700 U.S. companies have located in Mexico and employ
500,000 workers. Yet Mexican wages have fallen during the past
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decade when the greatest increase in maquiladora plants occurred.
In the 1980's, Mexican wages as a percent of GNP fell from 37.6%0
to 15.8%. Unless Mexican workers earn a living wage and can afford
to buy what they make, U.S. export markets will not expand. What
can America sell to people who earn $27 per week take-home pay?
It is estimated today only 10 million people in Mexico have disposable
income to buy foreign goods. These wealthy citizens are already
exerting their buying power and thus are not a "new market".
-Proponents refuse to acknowledge achieving integration of the
U.S. and Mexican economies-so vastly dissimilar-will result in
severe dislocations in the U.S. and Mexico.
FACT: When Europe integrated Portugal and Spain into the Com-
mon Market-nations where the per capita income gap was 1/7 as
wide as the one between the U.S. and Mexico-the integration took
40 years to achieve. But that agreement contained a "Social Charter"
setting rights to social assistance, collective bargaining, vocational
training and health and safety protections as well as a $68 billion
Regional Development fund to narrow the gap between rich and poor
countries.
Mexican Oil
-President Carlos Salinas says he wants a free trade treaty with
the U.S.
FACT: In an April 15 Wall Street Journal article, President Salinas
flatly stated negotiations on U.S. investment in the Mexican oil
industry are absolutely "off the table". When asked if he would
include oil, a symbol of Mexican nationalism, in the free trade talks,
Mr. Salinas answered that Mexico would not bargain its oil. How
"free" will "free trade" be?
"We'll Move to Asia" Threat
It is argued, one of the main reasons to support a U.S.-Mexico
FTA is because if the United States doesn't, the jobs will move to
Singapore, or to Asia. Those that favor a free trade agreement with
Mexico argue that if we do not fully open the borders between the
two countries, companies will move to South Korea or Taiwan instead
of moving to Mexico. This is simply not accurate. Labor costs in
Mexico are far lower than they are in Asia. In 1988, the average
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hourly wage for manufacturing industries as quoted by the Wall
Street Journal was:
Mexico $ 0.88
Taiwan 2.71
Korea 2.46
Singapore 2.67
Honk Kong 2.43
Japan 13.14
United States 13.90
Since then, wage rates in South Korea and other NICs ["Newly
Industrialized Country"] have increased, while Mexican wages as a
whole have decreased. In addition, the proximity of Mexico to the
U.S. would keep transportation costs down for companies that want
to move to find cheap labor.
Mexican Market Potential
Those who favor a U.S.-Mexico FTA argue that the agreement
will create jobs in Mexico and enable Mexicans to purchase American
goods and ultimately create economic growth at home. But as Richard
Rothstein, a research associate of the Economic Policy Institute ac-
curately points out in a recent article in the Los Angeles Times, low-
wage markets are no bonanza. Mexican wages average less than $1
an hour and have been declining. "Consumers" earning pennies an
hour don't consume very much beyond the basic necessities. When
a $10-dollar-an-hour job in Detroit or Toledo is replaced by a 60-
cents-an-hour job in Tijuana, it is ludicrous to suggest that either
Mexican or U.S. workers will benefit. It is the companies pitting one
workforce against another that will largely benefit unless worker
protections are included and guaranteed beforehand in the agreement.
In fact, during the decade of the 1980's, Mexican consumers'
purchasing power was cut by over 25%. Poor economic performance
in the 1980's and an undervalued peso put disposable income per
head at about $1,200 in 1987. Low consumer purchasing power is a
gigantic barrier to those who claim an FTA will open markets to the
U.S. Some markets will expand. However, because Mexico suffers
from a highly stratified and uneven distribution of income, and a
level of development far below that of the United States, the size of
the market is really small. Some estimate that out of a population
of 82 million, somewhat over 10% or about 10 million people might
be able to purchase consumer products. This falls far short of the
economic boon some claim an FTA will produce. The hard facts
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indicate some U.S. industries and some Mexican consumers will ben-
efit. But that benefit is nowhere near the optimistic projections of
those who view this as a panacea for poverty, a unified American
market, and free trade.
Outsourcing of Low-Skilled U.S. Jobs
I find it intriguing to listen to some of the arguments that say
America must upgrade its workforce by pushing low-skilled jobs to
other places. My region of America is in deep recession. Millions of
American workers in Detroit, Cleveland, St. Louis, Chicago, are
locked into a hopelessness Washington power brokers cannot even
imagine. You can add to that list Miami, Los Angeles, New York,
Tulsa, Portland, etc. The U.S. has a tremendous need for millions
of new jobs for unskilled workers to gain workplace experience and
ultimately move up the opportunity ladder. By moving production
to Mexico, U.S. companies are displacing thousands of U.S. workers
and endangering America's industrial and agricultural base. Go to
any unemployment office. Toledo's unemployment is now over 11
percent and rising. It is safe to assume the immediate impact of a
FTA with Mexico will be felt in the U.S. by the additional elimination
of hundreds of thousands more jobs.
Labor intensive sectors of U.S. production are more likely to shift
immediately across the border to Mexico. For example, with such an
agreement, the United States risks high losses or even the total
elimination of manufacturing sectors in automobile and auto parts,
electronics, apparel, fresh vegetables and toys ....
We could sure use those jobs in Toledo. I have witnessed U.S.
companies threaten to move to Mexico if their employees do not
concede to $2-4 an hour pay cuts or health benefit cuts to compete
with the unregulated and "unbenefitted" Mexican production. Com-
panies often prefer a slow erosion in the workforce to a plant closing,
they quietly lay off workers permanently and relocate production.
The Right Deal
Conceptually, the idea of a free, North American, unified market
with Mexico-Canada and the United States in trade partnership makes
sense for the long haul. After all, Mexico is the United States' third
largest trading partner. But, I am less concerned with the ultimate
end of free trade than I am with the nearer-term means that must
be taken to achieve that end. I am suggesting gradual integration
with safeguards in order to achieve the "right deal" for a new North
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American Order. I submit for the record a summary of recommen-
dations to achieve this goal ....
For our nations to reap the mutual benefits of trade expansion,
despite our different national histories therefore, trade must be part
of a larger strategy for growth and change in Mexico, and for
adjustment here in the United States and Canada ....
In shaping this trade agreement with Mexico, the Canadian Free
Trade Agreement offers little that is instructive. The fact that our
three nations share the North American continent is our most common
experience; beyond that, our differences predominate ....
First, regarding income, Mexico's nearly 90 million people had an
average GDP per head of $1,820 in 1987, compared with $2,020 in
Brazil, $2,690 in South Korea, and $18,430 in the U.S. When actual
purchasing power is factored into the equation, the standard of living
of the average Mexican is well below a third that of a U.S. citizen.
This income gap widened during the decade of the 1980's. Further,
the gap between rich and poor in Mexico is among the worst in the
world, according to figures presented in The Economist (Feb. 11,
1989). "In the 1970's in Mexico, the poorest 20% got 3% of total
income, the richest 10% account for 23% of total income." Beyond
this, in Mexico unemployment hovers at 18%, with some economists
estimating underemployment at 40% ....
Thus, the policy question for the future will be how to negotiate
trade agreements which recognizes these economic realities while re-
specting the national interests of parties on both sides of the border.
The United States could suffer major losses from an FTA that
fails to take into account the structural impact on the U.S. economy
of export oriented foreign investment in Mexico. Another approach
to U.S.-Mexico economic relations-and to the NAFTA-is urgently
needed.
One promising model or framework is the Japan-Thailand economic
relationship. As in the case of the United States and Mexico, the
two countries are divided by large gaps in overall development levels
and incomes. But Japan has been able to use its sizable and growing
foreign investments to turn its low-wage neighbor into an export
platform to the rest of the world for Japanese companies' products,
thereby improving the competitiveness of both countries. Thus both
economies have enjoyed healthy economic growth rates and substan-
tial global trade surpluses, as well as large bilateral surpluses with
the United States. Japan, moreover, is running a large and growing
trade surplus with Thailand itself.
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If in its relations with Mexico, the United States could borrow
from Japan's example-and take advantage of Mexico's low-cost
labor to make the American industrial structure more competitive-
the results would be good for both North American countries.
The Condition of workers
No trade agreement with Mexico should be passed if it ignores the
serious conditions that exist in Mexico that can lead to exploitation
of labor. Nor should it be passed if it disenfranchises U.S. workers
of their rights to appeal unfair labor practices that arise as a result
of this "free trade agreement." Now how does one define exploitation
of labor: Pope Leo XIII defined it as "A small number of the very
rich able to lay upon the teeming masses a yoke little better than
that of slavery itself." And he continued: "Wages ought not to be
insufficient to support a frugal and well-behaved wage-earner". The
United States should not enter into an agreement where U.S. big
business wins and the average U.S. and Mexican working man and
woman loses ....
I consider it morally wrong that Mexican workers cannot afford
to purchase the products they produce in the transplants. For example,
I saw autos and auto parts being produced in Mexico but none of
the workers in the plant drove automobiles. In fact, there are no
parking lots at most U.S. owned Mexican factories. Mexican workers
are bused miles to the job by the company in the early morning and
then bused back at night to their humble, one-room dwellings in the
shanty-towns. It often costs the workers $5.30 a week for this trans-
portation out of a weekly wage of $25 ....
The production that occurs in Mexico is generally performed by
unskilled production workers, generally young, some in their teens,
mostly women below 21 years of age, some as young as 14 years.
Paying Mexican workers low wages with no benefits is an easy way,
in the short-term, for U.S. firms to bring down costs. I visited one
U.S. health products firm that lowered its labor costs from 15% to
2% of its operating cost by locating in Mexico. Of course, none of
the Mexican workers had health insurance that would permit them
to buy any of these appliances if they were sick and needed them.
In Mexico, with one million new workers being added to the workforce
annually, keeping people employed at any cost is preferable to masses
of unemployed. In my judgment, many U.S. firms caught in a
competitive battle internationally, are opting for cheap labor rather
than investing here at home in research and development, education
and training that could lead to long-term productivity and quality
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gains here in the United States. U.S. companies cannot ultimately
be globally pre-emininet by relying solely on short-term, low wage
rates to bring down U.S. costs structures. A U.S.-Mexico FTA should
not permit U.S. companies to turn their backs on the plight of
Mexican workers' well-being.
Last year, when I asked one U.S. auto parts plant manager in
Mexico whether the workers in his plant were covered by Social
Security, he told me he didn't know the answer because "all he
worried about was the bottom line". So much for social conscience.
In the same plant, I saw young women spraying glue on small rubber
rings and was told they weren't wearing masks because "they didn't
like them and the wall fan pulled out the fumes anyway, didn't it?"
In the same plant, mean assembly workers pulled down huge steam
presses to mold parts, but the machines had no hand guards or safety
braces to protect workers for burns, accidents or losing their arms.
Let me reiterate. Any trade agreement must rise-to the defense of
the Mexican worker as well as the U.S. worker. Each will be asked
to bear personally the cost of these market-opening measures as U.S.
production relocates labor intensive operations.
I also visited a giant Japanese-owned SONY plant near Tijuana
which employed approximately 1,530 people, and where thousands
of televisions were being produced, all for shipment out to the United
States of America-none of the workers could afford to buy them,
especially the 31 inch to 46 inch super screen SONY's that cost
$2,000-$3,000 in the United States. A Mexican worker in that plant
would have to work at least two years to afford to buy that T.V.
if all wages were saved for the T.V., an impossibility to say the least.
These T.V.'s are not even sold in Mexico because there is no market
for them. For the record, the origins of the imported components
used to assemble the T.V.'s are: 63% from Japan, 29% from United
States, 6% from Singapore, and only 2% from Mexico; 98% of the
parts are not even made in Mexico ....
Worker Representation and Rights
In Mexico, unions continue to be a stabilizing arm in the govern-
ment, not freely organized as here in the United States. Labor unions
give some benefits to their workers, many are known to be corrupt.
Membership in the PRI is a requirement to gaining union membership.
Independent and dissident unions are more active, but do not give
as many benefits to their members. They are more active in human
rights and working conditions. As an integral part of this agreement,
the U.S. Department of Labor, the AFL-CIO and international labor
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organizations should work to jointly embrace the process of en-
couraging free trade unionism in Mexico.
One of the key aims of any FTA is to attract foreign investment
capital. Yet, for many years Mexican capital has been fleeing that
nation at record rates. The fact that Mexican investors are placing
their funds outside of Mexico is most curious. Any FTA must be
conditional on the return of Mexican capital back home where it is
desperately needed. The United States cannot jump start an economy
when the battery has no fuel cells. Mexican industry and its financial
leaders must be encouraged to repatriate capital ....
Basic Political Freedoms
Though distant observers can only speculate about the election in
Mexico, enough questions have been raised about their legitimacy to
warrant serious concern on the part of all democracy-loving peoples.
The results of the recent August election are seriously called into
question by the controversy surrounding the election. While the PRI
won in a landslide victory, the election has been challenged by almost
every opposition party on the grounds the voters were all re-registered
before the election, and at least 3 million voters mysteriously did not
receive their new registration cards and therefore could not vote.
Additional accounts of fraud included thousands of people being
turned away from the polls because their names could not be found
on the registrar.
Bishop Mario de Gasperin, spokesman of the Mexican Bishops
Conference (CEM), stated that "The triumph of the PRI in the
elections was devastating and exaggerated, and this might have serious
consequences for the kind of government this country will have during
the next few months". He continued, "Some voters have been forced
or deceived to vote for the PRI, many others voted for the official
party for their personal interests".
Border Inspection
Beyond these basic issues of freedom, the role of Mexico as a drug
corridor cannot be ignored in any free trade negotiation. A U.S.
Customs Department report on July 26, 1989 states: Mexico continues
to be a major producer of both opium and marijuana, and the single
most active transit country for cocaine from South America ....
Any expanded trade between our nations will result in greater
requirements for border inspection. No free trade agreement should
be approved without these protections in place. The Customs' De-
partment continues, the "Salinas Administration has shown substan-
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tial changes in Mexico's approach to law enforcement at the federal
level." But this massive problem continues ....
Agriculture
A free trade agreement must require uniform application of pes-
ticide requirements to protect consumers. In addition, the agreement
must accommodate for the expected harmful impact a potential agree-
ment will have on small family farms in the United States .... [In
sum, what is needed is a] comprehensive development agreement
rather than a narrow trade agreement ....
David Elliot, Proctor & Gamble
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee.
My name is David Elliott; I am Associate Director, International
Trade for Procter & Gamble. As requested, I will summarize my
written statement, which I ask be include in the record.
Procter & Gamble is convinced that a comprehensive North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement is strongly in the overall economic interest
of U.S. consumers and industries.
Our conviction comes from basic economic logic, from the studies
made by the International Trade Commission and others, and from
our own assessment of U.S. and Mexican tariff rates relative to
differential labor costs.
Indeed, we expect the benefits to be greater than these studies
indicate, because they have been unable to quantify some matters we
expect will be addressed in an Agreement.
Our experiences in Mexico confirm these judgments. Our business
there, which supplies the Mexican market rather than exporting to
the United States, has grown very rapidly in recent years. This growth
has been accompanied by an equally rapid acceleration in our exports
to that country. We now have 3,700 employees in Mexico; these
exports support 1,500 jobs in the United States.
With a NAFTA, the number of U.S. jobs supported by our exports
to Mexico should grow to a net total of 3,500. They will be high-
skill, high-pay jobs.
To create these new jobs on the fastest possible timetable, we first
of all need to have 65 Mexican duties eliminated at the inception of
the Agreement.
Second, a broad range of nontariff barriers need to be removed.
Less well-recognized barriers that need to be addressed include
government-mandated price controls. These fundamental distortions
of the marketplace have been widely used throughout Latin America
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as a substitute for sound and effective economic policies. As result,
investment and technology transfer have been seriously discouraged,
unnecessary shortages of needed goods have been created and, ul-
timately, inflation exacerbated. The economic damage they have caused
in Latin America has reduced U.S. exports and employment.
We believe that it is most important a NAFTA include strong
disciplines over government-mandated price controls.
Similarly, the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement includes essen-
tially hortatory language on the trade barriers caused by different
technical standards and regulations. Experience has demonstrated that
a NAFTA should include definitive procedures for identifying and
removing barriers caused by these differences in technical standards.
So far as the environment is concerned, a NAFTA will provide
economic resources needed for Mexico to achieve its clear environ-
mental improvement goals. On the other hand, if a large part of its
population is forced to remain in a survival economy because NAFTA
is rejected, they will continue to be more concerned about food for
today than ecological disasters sometime in the future.
Thank you for this opportunity to present our views. I will be
very glad to try to answer any questions you may have.
Dan La Botz, Researcher and Writer
Good afternoon. My name is Dan La Botz and I am a researcher
and writer on U.S. and Mexican labor union, business, economics,
and politics. I work with the International Labor Rights Education
and Research Fund of Washington, D.C. The Fund's chair is former
Secretary of labor Ray Marshall and its board is made up of distin-
guished labor and civil rights leaders, as well as legislators in both
the Democratic and Republican Party.
On behalf of International Labor Rights I conducted an investi-
gation into workers rights in Mexico from December 1990 to February
1991. During the course of this investigation I conducted scores of
interviews in a number of cities including Mexico City, Cuautitlan,
Monterrey, Monclova, Chihuahua, Ciudad Juarez, and Tijuana. I
interviewed rank and file workers, labor union officials, labor at-
torneys, working women's organizations, employers, employer as-
sociations, human rights organizations, academics. In addition to the
interviews I conducted, of course I also used newspapers, magazines,
theses, dissertations and books dealing with Mexican labor and in-
dustry.
The findings of the investigation I carried out for the International
Labor Rights Education and Research Fund are absolutely crucial to
19921
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
understanding the impact of the Free Trade Agreement upon Mexican,
American and Canadian working people and their families. First I
would like to talk a moment about the general conclusions of the
study, and then in particular about the auto industry.
In brief, the conclusion of my investigation was that Mexican
workers are denied their fundamental labor union rights as specified
in the Mexican Constitution and in Convention 87 of the International
Labor Organization to which Mexico is signatory. Mexican workers
do not enjoy the right to join labor unions of their own choosing,
they do not have the right to strike, and they do not have the right
to bargain collectively.
In fact, the Mexican labor union movement (at least 90 percent
of it) is controlled by Mexico's one-party state. The Institutional
Revolutionary Party or PRI which, under various names, has ruled
Mexico for over 60 years, controls the Congress of Labor (CT) as
well as its affiliated labor federations such as the CTM, the CROM
and the CROC. The Mexican labor union system bears many simi-
larities to the state controlled unions which existed in the Soviet
Union or Eastern Europe until recently.
Those union which are not controlled by the Mexican one-party-
state, are company unions (sindicatos blancos) controlled by the
employers, such as the Monterrey industrial groups. There is a very
small independent labor union movement, made up of organizations
such as the Authentic Labor Front (Frente Autentico de Trabajo),
which fights heroically for labor union rights and worker's democracy
in Mexico.
In Mexico, workers who attempt to stand up and speak out for
their rights on the job or in the union may be expelled from the
union, fired, beaten, or even assassinated. In particular, labor or-
ganizers and activists among teachers and agricultural workers suf-
fered many assassinations in the 1980s and 90s. A number of industrial
union officials or activists have also been killed in the petroleum
industry, the transport industry, and in the automobile industry.
Journalists have also suffered a high number of assassinations.
The state and employers' control of the Mexican labor unions,
which has existed for decades, has meant that Mexican workers are
among the lowest paid industrial workers in the world. On an average,
Mexican workers make less than one-tenth the wages of American
workers performing the same work. In many cases they make even
less. Mexican workers also labor in some of the most unsafe and
unhealthy conditions. The Mexican Department of Labor and the
Mexican Institute of Social Security which are entrusted with the
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protection of workers' health and safety have incomplete resources,
have insufficient staff and inadequate equipment to do their job.
Moreover, they are not conscientious or diligent in protecting Mexican
workers' health, because the ruling party does not want it. SEDUE,
the Mexican agency responsible for environmental protection, does
not keep good records, does not have strong laws and penalties, and
in any case does not strongly enforce the laws and penalties which
exists.
Simply put: the Mexican government violates the workers rights,
keeps their wages at starvation levels, poisons their workplaces, pol-
lutes their communities, and lets gangsters shoot them if they demand
justice. This is, of course, completely in keeping with a one-party
state which does not respect civil and political rights, which murders
the members of political opposition parties, and which engages in
massive vote fraud.
To take the example of workers in the auto industry in Mexico,
which is dominated by foreign firms, principally American firms such
as Ford, Chrysler and General Motors, but also Volkswagen and
Nissan. How are Mexican auto workers treated? When workers at
the Ford plant in Cuautitlan, Mexico had, after years, succeeded in
winning modest improvements in their wages and conditions, Ford
closed the plant in 1987, laid off the entire workforce, and then
reopened under a new and poorer contract. When the Ford Cuautitlan
workers went on strike in 1990 to attempt to recoup their lost wages
and benefits, Ford allowed the PRI-controlled CTM labor union to
bring hundreds of gangsters in the Ford plant, and those thugs then
beat workers, shot them, and assassinated one named Cleto Nigno.
Eventually the workers' strike was defeated, the leaders of the
union and other activists were fired, and the workforce returned to
work at one tenth the wages of American workers. Throughout this
the Mexican government did nothing to protect workers' rights; quite
the contrary, it helped to violate those rights.
The suppression of workers' rights in Mexico makes it attractive
to U.S. investors. So, not surprisingly, Ford recently, spent $750
million to expand its Hermosillo plant which produces the Ford Escort
and Mercury Tracer, and Ford recently announced it would spend
$700 million to double the capacity of one of its Chihuahua engine
plants.
The proposed Free Trade Agreement has to be seen in the light
of Mexico's lack of workers' rights and resulting low wages and
unsafe and unhealthy workplaces and communities. The proposed
Free Trade Agreement between Mexico, the United States, and Can-
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ada, will have a devastating impact on workers in all three countries,
that is, unless the agreement contains conditions which protect work-
ers' rights, health and safety on the job, and the environment.
Why will the Free Trade Agreement be so bad for workers in all
three countries? First, workers in Canada, the United States and
Mexico will be thrown into competition to attract plants and jobs.
We have witnessed such competition in the United States for the last
decade, and we have seen that it has led to lower wages, a loss of
worker and union control on the shop floor, and a tremendous
deterioration of health and safety as witnessed by the epidemic of
repetitive motion trauma illnesses such as carpal tunnel syndrome.
This competition with Mexico will tend to lead to a lowering of
wages and a deterioration of conditions for Canadian and American
workers.
Second, Mexico's competition with the United States and Canada
is predicated upon the continuation of the suppression of Mexican
workers' rights and continuation of the starvation wages and dan-
gerous working and living conditions.
What will U.S. workers have to do to compete with Mexican
workers? Will U.S. workers have to reduce their wages to one-tenth
of what they are now? Will they have to give up regulatory agencies
such as OSHA and NIOSH and the EPA which at least in some
small degree protect their health and safety? In order to make the
United States competitive, are we prepared to see the unions nothing
more than police departments for the companies? Are we prepared
to see labor unions controlled by the government? Are we prepared
too to live under a one-party state which protects corporate profits
at the expense of human rights, because that will make us truly
competitive? That will be the tendency of the Free Trade Agreement.
There is an alternative to such a Free Trade Agreement. It is a
Free Trade and Human Rights Agreement which calls upon all parties
to protect workers rights to organize, strike and bargain, and to
healthy workplaces and communities. Such an agreement might not
only help to liberate Mexican workers from state controlled unions
and raise their standard of living, but it might also protect U.S.
workers who have faced gangsters in the Teamsters union or who
have had to work in the poultry plants of North Carolina which are
chained shut by their employers.
The Free Trade Agreement must contain protection for human
rights, for workers rights, for safety on the job and the health of
workers in their communities.
Thanks for this opportunity to testify.
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BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, SEPTEMBER 11, 1991
William F. Weld, Governor of Massachusetts
Good morning, Chairman Weiss. My name is William F. Weld and
I am the Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
I would like to take this opportunity to welcome you and your staff
to the State House here in Boston as you complete the USTR round
of hearings on the North American Free Trade Agreement.
Massachusetts is proud of its trading ties with Canada and Mexico,
and I am here to express my strong support of the North American
Free Trade Agreement.
One of the basic arguments for a Free Trade Agreement is that it
will benefit the U.S. economy. If you'll allow me to share some statistics
with you, I'd like to point out that here in Massachusetts we have
seen the results of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement increase our
exports to Canada by 51 percent in 1990 over 1989.
Canada is this Commonwealth's largest trading partner. The staged
and gradual reduction of tariffs over a 10-year period provided for
immediate tariff relief for our computer industry.
And each year, many other sectors benefit from annual tariff re-
ductions, as well as from accelerated reductions negotiated by both
countries.
Similarly, exports of Massachusetts products to Mexico have been
increasing consistently. From 1989 to 1990 our exports to Mexico rose
nearly 19 percent.
In April of this year I had the opportunity to meet privately with
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and his top economic aides. During
our meeting we discussed the dramatic implementation of economic
restructuring in Mexico which President Salinas has overseen.
We here in Massachusetts were impressed with the extensive priva-
tization of Mexican public entities, the manner in which they are
successfully dealing with inflation and external-debt issues, and some
of their other economic accomplishments.
President Salinas and I also discussed areas where our state and
Mexico might work together to provide solutions to some of the tough
problems he is grappling with in his nation, particularly in the area of
environmental pollution.
Accordingly, our environmental industry is working to bring Mexican
environmental specialists to Massachusetts to inform our companies of
the opportunities and challenges for that industry in Mexico. President
Salinas also told me of his goal to raise the level of efficiency in
Mexican industry to help his country's economy become more com-
petitive on a global basis. We here in Massachusetts are poised to assist
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this effort by providing Mexican industry with the tools and technology
to raise industrial productivity.
By working with Mexico to strengthen the Mexican economy, we
will in turn be a partner in President Salinas' goal to raise his people's
standard of living, and thereby to help keep skilled Mexican labor from
leaving his country. In December, my economic development staff will
lead a group of ten Massachusetts companies to Mexico to participate
in a trade event, meeting with potential trade partners to establish or
expand business in Mexico. The Massachusetts companies already doing
business in Mexico have impressed us with their reports of the op-
portunities they are encountering. We seek to enhance their efforts,
and the new efforts of many other Massachusetts firms, by supporting
an agreement that I believe will dramatically increase the excellent
business opportunities with our North American neighbors.
I support President Bush's commitment to careful consideration of
the potential impact the North American Free Trade Agreement may
have on U.S. and Mexican labor. And I also support the President's
pledge to provide for environmental safeguards within the Agreement,
enhanced by joint environmental initiatives, to ensure the protection
of the health, safety, and environment of Americans and Mexicans
alike.
In closing, I might add that I have just returned from a two-week
trade mission to the Far East. During that trip, I saw how technology
and expertise we have developed here in Massachusetts can benefit other
nations. And I want to make sure we have the opportunity to export
that expertise competitively with all our trading partners.
Again, I thank you for this opportunity to submit these views to
you today.
Timothy Koechlin, Skidmore College, &
Mehrene Larudee, Center for Popular Economics
[We are Timothy Koechlin, Assistant Professor of Economics at
Skidmore College, and Mehrene Larudee, staff economist at the Center
for Popular Economics. We offer this testimony today on behalf of
ourselves and of Samuel Bowles, Professor of Economics, and Gerald
Epstein, Associate Professor of Economics, both from the University
of Massachusetts in Amherst.]
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), should it
come to pass, will be an event almost without precedent in recent
history: a low wage country with a relatively small level of output,
Mexico, joining in a customs union with two countries whose wages
are about eight times as high, and whose combined level of output is
more than 30 times as large. It is not an easy task to estimate the
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investment flows and employment effects of such an event, precisely
because of the lack of historical precedents. Nonetheless, historical
analogies do exist, and we have used these to estimate the effects of
NAFTA on U.S. investment in Mexico. We believe that to do so is
preferable to the approach taken by several other studies, including the
International Trade Commission report and the Peat-Marwick study
done for the Mexico-U.S. Business Committee, which assume that
investment flows would be negligible and will therefore not be the
source of job displacement or income loss.
Our two estimates show that U.S. direct investment in Mexico is
likely to rise by between $3.5 and $5.9 billion in the first year of the
Free Trade Agreement. From 1992 through the year 2000, the cumulative
additional investment flow from the U.S. to Mexico, by our estimates,
would amount to between $31.2 billion and $52.7 billion. (All figures
are in 1990 dollars unless otherwise indicated.) As a result, we project,
between 29,000 and 49,000 jobs would be relocated from the U.S. to
Mexico in the year following the agreement, and over the period from
1992 through the year 2000, between 260,000 and 439,000 jobs would
be lost.
Our first estimate of this "common market effect" on investment
flows utilizes the fact that Spain and Ireland provide parallel cases.
When each joined the European Economic Community (EEC) each
had relatively low wages and levels of output tiny by comparison to
the European market. Both countries experienced sharp increases in
U.S. direct foreign investment (DFI) at the time they joined the EEC,
Ireland in 1974 and Spain in 1986. The average annual flow of U.S.
investment into Ireland from 1964 through 1973 was $109 million, while
from the date of entry into the EEC, 1974, through 1989 the average
flow was $716 million per year. For Spain, the average for 1964-1985
was $316 million per year, and from 1986, the date of entry into the
EEC, through 1989, it was $656 million per year.
We estimated econometrically the underlying trend rate of growth
or decline in the flow of U.S. investment to each country, so as to
isolate the effect of EEC membership per se on these investment flows
(see Appendix for details).5 9 Here we found a similar result: associated
with entry into the EEC, we found that the flow of U.S. investment
into Ireland multiplied by 3.8, that is, it was almost four times as large
as a result of joining the EEC as it would have been if Ireland had
19 On file with author.
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not joined the EEC. For Spain, U.S. investment flows multiplied by
6.2 in connection with its entry into the EEC. Figure 1, presenting
data for Ireland, illustrates our method of calculation. (Figure 1 shows
a 5-year moving average, smoothing out the year-to-year variations to
show the general trend more clearly; our calculations also used a 5-
year moving average.)
Figure 1
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Source: US Commerce Department. BEA
Note: The 'common market effect' for Ireland referred to
in the text is the ratio AC/BC = $400/$105 = 3.8.
The volatility of investment flows to Spain is greater than to Ireland,
and we therefore chose to use the smaller estimated "common market
effect" for Ireland to apply to the Mexico-U.S.-Canada case, although
this gives us a somewhat conservative estimate.
We then calculated the change in U.S. investment flows to Mexico
as follows: In 1990 U.S. DFI in Mexico was $2.1 billion. Applying the
"common market effect" seen in Ireland to this figure, we can say
that if NAFTA had been negotiated and taken effect in 1990, total
investment flow from the United States would have been $7.9 billion,
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or an increase of $5.9 billion over the 1990 actual level. Assuming
conservatively that the investment flow in 1992 and all subsequent years
would be equal to the 1990 investment flow in the absence of NAFTA,
our estimate is that from 1992 through the year 2000 the cumulative
increase in investment flow from the United States to Mexico will be
$52.7 billion.
Even without NAFTA, investment flows might well have increased
because the Salinas government has lifted many investment restrictions
and reduced tariffs; the increase we have estimated is in addition to
any increase that would have occurred without NAFTA.
Our second estimate of the "common market effect" on investment
flows is based on a multivariate statistical analysis of the location of
U.S. direct foreign investment. Our study employs U.S. Department
of Commerce data on U.S. direct investment flows to 23 countries
over the period 1974-1984, to determine the role played by labor cost,
market size, tax rates and other host country characteristics in attracting
U.S. direct foreign investment. The 23 countries included in the sample
account for over 90% of U.S. direct investment abroad.
Figure 2
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This study shows that the magnitude of direct investment flows
depends on three sets of host country characteristics: effective market
size; cost conditions (especially labor cost and tax rates); and political
risk. Figure 2 shows the relative importance of some of the main
determinants of investment location. NAFTA is likely to increase Mex-
ico's attractiveness to U.S. investors in two of these three ways:
(1)NAFTA will increase the effective size of the Mexican market,
allowing many U.S. firms to hire low-wage labor in Mexico without
sacrificing secure long-term access to the U.S. market; (2) NAFTA is
likely to make investment in Mexico less risky, by locking in for the
long term the policies of the Salinas government and making it difficult
for any future Mexican government to change these policies; this implies
an improvement in the business climate. Two relevant factors emerge
from this study.
First, like many other studies, our study shows that U.S. investment
is attracted both to large national markets, and to countries that
enjoy privileged access to large multicountry markets, such as the
EEC. According to our econometric estimates, EEC countries attract,
on average, 2.4 times as much direct investment as their "national"
characteristics would lead us to expect. We call this the "market
access affect."
We have estimated the effect of NAFTA on direct investment flows
to Mexico by applying our estimates of this "market access effect"
to the Mexico-U.S.-Canada case. The United States and Canada
together offer a market which is slightly larger than that of the EEC.
We have assumed, then, that by entering into a North American
Free Trade Agreement, Mexico will draw 2.4 times as much DFI
from the United States as it otherwise would have.
By this estimate the flow of U.S. direct investment to Mexico would
increase, due to the market access effect, by $3.0 billion in 1992,
and by a cumulative total of $26.7 billion between 1992 and 2000,
using 1990 investment flows as the base year.
We expect that direct investment flows to Mexico will increase for
a second reason as well: reduced political risk. The International
Trade Commission report on NAFTA argues correctly at p. vii that
"a U.S.-Mexico FTA would increase the confidence of investors in
Mexico's economy." We measure the business climate by an index
developed for its multinational corporate clients by a consulting firm
called BERI. Our econometric estimates of U.S. DFI location in 23
countries imply that a 10% improvement in the business climate will
increase U.S. direct investment flows to Mexico by $0.5 billion in
[Vol. 22:329
NAFTA PUBLIC DEBATE
1992, and by a cumulative total of $4.6 billion between 1992 and
the year 2000.
To give some idea of the meaning of a 10% improvement in the
business climate, the BERI index used in the study fell nearly 1876
in France between 1980 and 1982, when Mitterand was elected. In
Spain it fell by 16% between 1972 and 1977, following the death of
Franco. And in Chile, between 1973 and 1974, when the socialist
government of Salvador Allende was overthrown, it rose from six to
forty-six.
The combination of the market access effect with the reduction in
political risk, then, gives our second estimate of the total increase in
U.S. direct investment flow to Mexico of $3.5 billion in 1992, and
$31.2 billion from 1992 through the year 2000. Estimates of this type
are subject to considerable error. However, our conclusion that a
major shift in investment to Mexico will result from the Free Trade
Agreement seems unlikely to be affected by any reasonable modifi-
cation of the methods or data we used. The increase in U.S. DFI
in Mexico, then, by both our estimates, are likely to be considerable.
Does this mean an equivalent amount of reduced investment in the
United States?
On the one hand, it seems likely that other countries which have
recently engaged in DFI in the United States might respond as U.S.
investors will to the increased attractiveness of investment in Mexico,
and direct investment to Mexico which would otherwise have come
to the United States. To this extent the estimated U.S. DFI in Mexico
understates the decline in domestic investment in the United States.
On the other hand, some of the increased U.S. DFI in Mexico
will represent a shift of U.S. investment from other countries to
Mexico instead of decline in their investment in the United States.
To this extent the estimated U.S. DFI in Mexico overstates the decline
in domestic investment in the United States. We know of no way to
determine the relative strength of these two opposed effects.
In calculating the effects on U.S. DFI we have assumed that these
two effects are offsetting, that is, that the increase in U.S. DFI
represents a decline of the same magnitude in domestic U.S. invest-
ment from all sources.
How many jobs will be relocated from the United States to Mexico
as a result of increased flows of investment to Mexico? We estimate
that between 29,000 and 49,000 jobs will be relocated in the first
year of the FTA, and a total of between 260,000 and 439,000 jobs
through the year 2000. The range of the two estimates reflects the
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range from our low to our high estimate of increased investment
flow.
The estimate of job relocation per billion dollars of reduced in-
vestment was based on the gross value of capital assets per employee
in manufacturing in the United States. This capital/labor ratio was
$99,000 in 1990, and we projected its value through the year 2000,
based on its roughly 3% average annual growth rate from 1970
through 1989. The average value of this capital/labor ratio was about
$120,000 over the period 1992 to 2000. We divided the estimated
investment increase by this figure to obtain our estimate of jobs
relocated.
An alternative method we used to estimate the number of jobs
relocated to Mexico yielded almost identical results. The method was
developed by Glickman and Woodward and takes account of shifts
in exports and imports generated by foreign investment, and con-
sequent job loss in the United States. We obtained a ratio of plant
and equipment expenditures to jobs lost in the United States; again,
we forecasted the values of this variable through the year 2000, based
on the growth trend from 1977 through 1986, and then used the
average value of the variable from 1992 through 2000 in order to
project job relocation as a result of our estimate of the increased
investment flows to Mexico. This method of calculation also yields
an estimate of $120,000 per job. Details are given in the Appendix. 60
Conclusion
Policy discussions of the FTA have assumed little capital flow. If,
however, capital flows and relocation of employment are substantial,
as we have estimated, a different policy agenda must be addressed.
This policy agenda must be based on the fact that the attractiveness
of Mexico as an investment location consists primarily in its very
low wages and relatively lax environmental protection. These are not
efficiency-enhancing reasons for a reallocation of production from
the United States to Mexico. To the extent that investment and
production relocate under these incentives, the result is likely to be
a smaller, not larger, pie. There is thus great merit in policy initiatives
seeking to equalize environmental protections and provide conditions
for substantial increases in Mexican wages and productivity.
V. AFTERWORD
Since the hearings last August, activity around NAFTA has con-
tinued. At this writing, the future of the North American Free Trade
60 On file with author.
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Agreement is still uncertain, but it looks as though a text might in
fact be put before Congress prior to the November elections. However
the timing question is resolved, and whatever specific provisions
emerge from the present NAFTA negotiations, North American ec-
onomic integration is proceeding apace. Some might even say that
the NAFTA itself is of little importance, given the strong current of
change that is already flowing in international trade.
But I believe the executive negotiation and Congressional consid-
eration of the NAFTA affords an important moment for public
education, debate, and decision. The citizens of all three countries6'
deserve access to the information concerning changes that are oc-
curring in their countries. The citizens of all three countries-and
especially the poor and working people of those countries-deserve
a way to voice their concerns and share their visions, should have a
say in the important decisions that are being made, and an opportunity
for direct participation in the debate, especially since it may have a
significant impact on the glaring disparities in wealth, resources, well-
being, and power that presently characterize the global economy. It
is my hope that the hearings excerpted above have provided readers
some hint of what such a citizenly debate might be, at least in its
domestic U.S. manifestation.
It strikes me now as appropriate to close with some words from
the South. They are those of Cuauht6moc Cdrdenas, opposition
candidate for president of Mexico in 1988, widely believed to have
been deprived of victory in that election through fraud and intimi-
dation.62 Of course, this speech by Cdrdenas, in which he calls for
a "continental development and trade initiative, 61 3 is not the kind
6, Of course, the effects of a NAFTA will not be confined to citizens of its three
member states. Other affected persons and nations, especially in the Americas, have
a stake in this agreement and should be heard on the issues as well. See. e.g.,
Stephen Fidler, 'Little Benefit' in FTAs for Latin America, FIN. TIMs, Jan. 29,
1992, at 13. Unfortunately, the procedures and categories of international trade law
(not to mention international politics and international statecraft) are at present
hardly structured to accommodate this kind of participation.
62 Cirdenas ran as the candidate of the left-of-center Party of the Democratic
Revolution, PRD. See, David Brooks, Mexico's Future Hinges on Political and
Economic Reforms, in TRADING FREEDOM: How FREE TRADE AFFECTS OUR LIvms,
WORK AND ENVIRONMENT 50 (John Cavanagh et al. eds., 1992).
63 Cdrdenas is not the only one talking about an alternative NAFTA. The idea
of a development pact has also been explored by a coalition of U.S. groups, the
Mobilization for Development, Trade, Labor, and the Environment (MODTLE),
based in Washington, D.C. See Mobilization for Development, Trade, Labor, and
the Environment, Expand the Agenda in TRADING FREEDOM: How FREE TRADE
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of broad sampling represented by the hearings reprinted above. Nor
does Cdardenas speak for all Mexicans. But his words offer a per-
spective that I believe more U.S. citizens should hear, and raise issues
that I believe must be addressed. The issues Cdrdenas raises are
important not only for NAFTA, but in the larger context of resolving
contradictions between the North and the South as the international
community begins to further build and define a new world order.
Here is some of what Cdrdenas had to say:
We face a challenge no other generation of Americans, Mexicans
and Canadians have encountered: to prepare for the future by
creating a framework of genuine continental cooperation. If we
AFFECTS OUR LIVES, WORK AND ENVIRONMENT 50 (John Cavanagh et al. eds., 1992);
Alternative Development and Trade Strategies for North America (Mobilization for
Development, Trade, Labor, and the Environment, Washington, D.C., Nov. 1991)
(on file with author).
Another interesting development is the emergence of a trinational network of
opposition to the presently styled NAFTA. The network is still in its infancy, and
certainly cannot claim any formal representative status. Nevertheless, in attempting
to create channels of communication and cooperation between those usually treated
as the objects rather than the subjects of international trade policy, and to give
voice to their concerns, this loose affiliation is worth watching and listening to.
In October, 1991, during the third ministerial meeting of trade ministers to discuss
NAFTA (see supra note 7), this network held its own meeting in Zacatecas. Those
in attendance conducted an international forum on "Public Opinion and the Free
Trade Negotiations-Citizens' Alternatives." There was a participating coalition from
each of the nations involved: from Canada the Action Canada Network based in
Ottawa, from the United States the Mobilization on Development, Trade, Labor
and the Environment (MODTLE) based in Washington, and from Mexico the Mexican
Action Network on Free Trade (RMALC) based in Mexico City. This trinational
assemblage issued a Final Declaration, which was delivered to the ministerial meeting
before its conclusion. The declaration stated in part:
An agreement of the kind that the United States and Canada have already
signed is not acceptable because it has negative effects on so many levels
of society. We do not oppose trade as such; in fact, we are convinced of
the importance of its expansion. However, we reject a free trade agreement
that responds only to the needs of transnational capital and indiscriminate
investment.
International Forum: Public Opinion and the Free Trade Negotiations-Citizens'
Alternatives: Final Declaration, (October, 1991) (unpublished paper on file with
author). See Alva Senzek, Closed Doors Put Spotlight on Parallel Protest Meeting,
J. COMM., Oct. 29, 1991, at IA; Andrea Decernil, En la contrarreuni6n, se exige
proteccibn a los derechos laborales, LA JORNADA, Oct. 26, 1991, at 22. See also
Free Trade: Prosperity for the Few or Development for the Majority?, in TRADING
FREEDOM: How FREE TRADE AFFECTS OUR LIVES, WORK AND ENVIRONMENT 52 (John
Cavanagh et al. eds., 1992) (1991 testimony given by Adolfo Aguilar Zinser) to the
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade and the Subcommittee
on Western Hemispheric Affairs of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee.
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succeed and establish a mechanism for sharing with fairness our
respective talents and resources, our economies will be strengthened
and our people will live better, not at the expense of the wealth of
the neighbor, but thanks to each other's prosperity. However, we
must not be misguided by false illusions or self indulgence: such
compatible and equitable prosperity will not come automatically.
To have a new relationship, to do things the right way, Mexicans
and Americans in particular must acknowledge that the existing
premises of our economic integration are not necessarily adequate
to build a just and viable new relationship. The exploitation of
cheap labor, energy and raw materials, technological dependency
and lax environmental protection, should not be the premises upon
which Mexico establishes links with the U.S., Canada and the world
economy.
We cannot be satisfied with the kind of future that would emerge
from a simple economic liberalization. This would only extrapolate
present trends and exacerbate present vices. Instead we should act
with vision, to see and meet the future, not simply wait for it. Let
us be responsible and prudent: not any kind of trade is a mutually
advantageous exchange, not any type of investment is going to
transform our productive foundations and create the jobs and in-
comes we want for our people; not any kind of industry is going
to optimize the use of our resources and protect our habitat; not
any profitable business is a responsible enterprise. Economic lib-
eralization is not our objective, it is one of our tools. Development,
social justice and a clean environment are our objectives. ...
We know that there are those who consider that any agreement
is better than no agreement; that for Mexico any access to the U.S.
market is a sufficient basis for accepting indiscriminate American
demands, since that access is both a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for Mexican development. We reject that stance. Trade, we
insist, must be an instrument of development, not an end in itself.
The inertia of past and present trends, as well as the mistakes
made in the implementation of our development strategies-lack of
vision, the absence of any democratic accountability, corruption,
mismanagement and demagogy - have left Mexico with its secular
social problems largely unresolved. Mexico's state party rule and
imperfect development produced social lags and state atrophy, it
also created imperfect private enterprises and imperfect markets. So
far, the privatization and liberalization of the Mexican economy has
not brought self-sustained economic impetus, not improved Mexican
entrepreneurial initiative, national technological innovation, nor has
it allowed freer markets or more competition but rather a greater
concentration of wealth in a few hands and a deeper dependence
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on foreign capital and ingenuity. We want Mexican markets to
function, we are in favor of greater and fairer competition in Mexico
and between Mexico and the rest of the world, and we know this
cannot be achieved simply by shifting state monopolies to private
ones. It is necessary to nourish the growth of a progressive, modern,
bold and vigorous entrepreneurial class that Mexico never developed.
A large part of the Mexican private sector will have to learn to
stand on its own feet and profit from its initiative and competi-
tiveness, not from sharing corruption with the government .
It is absolutely inadmissible that an international division of labor
between the three countries assigns Mexico the role of a permanent
supplier of cheap labor. Raising Mexican wage levels and working
conditions in the general direction of American or Canadian stan-
dards, instead of systematically lowering our salaries and incomes
to attract reluctant investors, is a paramount reason for pursuing
new forms of economic integration. ...
Development is not just the business of developing countries. It
is now clear to everybody, but above all to Americans, that they
cannot isolate themselves from the poverty, deprivation, injustice
and environmental degradation of their neighbors. Without the north
re-adopting a humanistic ideal of development, international co-
operation will be hampered by pollution, urban decay, crime, drug
consumption and intolerance. The responsibility for solving these
linked problems is not only the market's. ...
... If Mexico, the United States and Canada are capable of
molding their respective development objectives in an unprecedented
understanding, this consensus should be the core of a new alternative
process of multilateral negotiations for hemispheric integration. The
Caribbean and Central America could join first, followed by the
Andean and southern cone nations of South America....
We propose an ambitious negotiation for a coherent, integrated,
global approach conducive to a broad, long-term continental free
trade and development pact. The proposed FTA currently on the
table, while nowhere near as broad-ranging as the one we propose,
is certainly not a strict trade deal. It includes the American trade-
linked agenda-investment, services, intellectual property, energy-
but nothing from the Mexican trade-linked agenda-compensatory
financing, labor mobility, environment, a social charter.
The alternative agreement we propose consists of five clearly
defined negotiating baskets: first, strictly trade related matters; sec-
ond, adoption and harmonization of norms in the following areas:
investment, anti-trust regulations, a social charter, the environment
and intellectual property; third, compensatory financing; fourth,
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dispute settlement mechanisms; and fifth, labor mobility....
As a general development strategy, Mexico's aim should be to
change the entire maquiladora scheme as a first and very important
step. Rules of origin should be designed with this purpose. After
more than twenty-five years of operation, the maquiladoras' back-
ward linkages remain virtually non-existent. The maquiladoras have
created nearly half a million jobs in twenty five years and generate
some support for the balance of payments. However, a large part
of them cause serious environmental damage and nowhere is the
gap between productivity growth and wages as dramatic, nor have
real wages remained so low for as long a period of time compared
to any other sector. This proves that under this type of arrangement,
neither Mexican wages nor living conditions can be expected to rise
significantly.
Subsistence agriculture, which produces most of Mexico's basic
grains, must be removed from the bargaining table. Millions of
peasants will be thrown off the land .... The modernization of
Mexican agriculture will not be achieved by following a path that
any successful industrial country would reject for themselves. ...
The existing disparities among the three economies imply that a
substantive, central objective of these negotiations should be the
gradual but decisive standardization of trade-related norms. First
and foremost among these must be a social charter, ensuring that
workers in the three countries enjoy the same real-not merely on
paper-work site conditions, collective bargaining rights, legal frame-
work, and occupational safety and health standards in order to
avoid the exploitation of Mexicans and prevent unfair competition
to their American and Canadian counterparts. Wages cannot be
decreed into uniformity, but the conditions under which they are
established, and the framework in which labor and management
relations take place, can be harmonized. ...
A genuine economic negotiation between Mexico and the United
States could not conceivably avoid the controversial issue of labor
mobility across the border. This is the most significant economic,
social and human exchange between our two countries and thus
sufficient reason to have migration at the top of our agenda ....
We understand the difficulties and recognize that there are deep
cultural sensitivities and even racial resistance towards Mexican and
Latin American immigration.
Ideally, Mexicans should not have to leave their country to find
jobs in the U.S. Creating economic opportunities for all is no doubt
our greatest aspiration. A free trade agreement is seen by many on
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both sides of the border as the bold economic move needed to stem
migration flows at their source by creating jobs for Mexicans in
Mexico. Furthermore, some believe that an FTA with no social
conditions attached to it will create the best of all possible worlds
for U.S. industry: direct access to a permanent pool of cheap labor
on the other side of the border. However, free trade alone might
very well give impetus to the migration process instead of killing
it.. .
It is understandable that many Americans do not want an open
border with Mexico. It is equally comprehensible that Mexicans wish
to do away with the humiliating and often repressive controls and
limitations on border crossings. The very reason for negotiating on
this issue is to find an intermediate, common ground between open
borders and illegal immigration beneficial for both parties. Legal
and broad access for Mexican labor to the U.S. job market that
protects the rights of Mexicans in the United States in realistic and
socially acceptable terms both from an American and from a Mexican
standpoint [is] surely possible....
A short-sighted, narrow trade agreement will only bring prosperity
for the few and a loss of hope for the many. A trade liberalization
conceived and conducted within the framework of a real development
alternative will mobilize the enthusiasm and commitment of nu-
merous social groups in Mexico who today see themselves excluded
from every benefit. We have the obligation to succeed with this
opportunity to bring true progress and fruitful cooperation between
our nations."
- Cuauht~moc Clrdenas, The Continental Development and Trade Initiative (text
of speech delivered in New York City, Feb. 8, 1991) (full text on file with author),
reprinted in part in TRADING FREEDOM: How FREE TRADE AFFECTS OUR LIVES,
WORK AND ENVIRONMENT 95, (John Cavanagh et al. eds., 1992).
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